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Abstract 
 
Following the Fall of France in 1940, the nation’s industry was fundamentally reorganised 
under the Vichy regime.  This thesis traces the history of the keystones of this New Industrial 
Order, the Organisation Committees, by focusing on the organisation of the French steel 
industry between the end of the Third Republic in 1940 and the establishment of the Fourth 
Republic in 1946.  It challenges traditional views by showing that the Committees were 
created largely to facilitate economic collaboration with Nazi Germany.  It also demonstrates 
that these institutions were run by a new group of technocratic managers from French 
industry and that they willingly oversaw production for the Third Reich insofar as it remained 
advantageous to French steel firms.  By extending the period of study beyond the end of the 
Vichy regime, this thesis casts light on why the leaders of the Resistance decided to maintain 
these problematic institutions and provides the first detailed account of how the bodies were 
reformed following the Liberation of France.  Finally, it reveals that although the 
Organisation Committees were formally abolished in 1946, Jean Monnet created parallel 
bodies, named Modernisation Commissions, which took over the functions and carried on the 
work of Vichy’s Committees under the auspices of the Monnet Plan.  By demonstrating the 
continuities of institutions and individuals in French industrial organisation from 1940 to 
1946, or l’entre-deux-républiques, this thesis contributes to the history of Vichy and post-war 
France and re-evaluates the origins of the Monnet Plan and of the European Coal and Steel 
Community, the forerunner to today’s European Union. 
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Introduction 
 
The Fall of France was a crucial turning point for the organisation of French industry.  
Amidst the military collapse and the decampment of the government from Paris to Bordeaux 
and ultimately to Vichy, the liberal economic order of the Third Republic crumbled.  Over 
the summer of 1940, the Ministry for Industrial Production put in place the institutions of a 
New Industrial Order,1  the keystones of which were the Organisation Committees, formally 
created by the law of 16 August 1940.  An Organisation Committee was created for each vital 
branch of industry and was given sweeping powers to coordinate production across the 
country.  The New Industrial Order was completed on 10 September 1940 with the creation 
of the Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products (OCRPI), which allocated 
raw materials to each industry, which were then sub-allocated by the Committees. These 
institutions remained in place after the Liberation of France in 1944 and were finally 
dissolved in 1946. 
This thesis studies the organisation of the French steel industry during this period and 
the timeframe of 1940-1946 is determined by the lifespan of the Organisation Committees.  
They were formally created with the law of 16 August 1940, although in practice these were 
preceded by Liaison Offices which were first created in July 1940.2  The Committees were 
ultimately dissolved with a legislative motion on 23 April 1946, albeit allowing for a 
transition period of six months, bringing the formal end date to 23 October 1946.  The 
existence of the Committees therefore corresponds almost exactly with the period between 
the end of the Third Republic on 10 July 1940 and the establishment of the Fourth Republic 
on 27 October 1946,3 or l’entre-deux-républiques.  Virtually all studies of the Organisation 
Committees focus on the Vichy period, ending their analysis in 1944.  In extending the scope 
of the study to cover the entire lifespan of the Committees, this thesis employs a new 
approach.  Given how the steel industry was organised during this period, this thesis focuses 
                                                          
1 The term “New Industrial Order” is derived from the similar phrases “nouvel ordre européen” and “nouvel 
ordre économique”; the French term would therefore be “nouvel ordre industriel”.  A similar phrase was used 
by Richard Vinen as a chapter title, “An industrial new order?”, in The Politics of French Business, 1936-1945 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 151-162. 
2 This is discussed in Chapter One. 
3 These are the generally accepted dates for the end of the Third Republic, with the vote of the National 
Assembly granting Pétain full powers, and the adoption of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, which came 
into force on 27 October 1946 after being supported in a referendum on 13 October. 
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on the history of the Organisation Committee for Steel (CORSID), looking at the institution, 
the individuals who ran it, and the broader context in which it operated. 
There are four chief reasons for concentrating on the organisation of the French steel 
industry.  First, the establishment of the New Industrial Order focused particularly on the 
organisation of the steel and coal industries, singling out these industries’ employers’ 
associations for dissolution.  Moreover, these two industries were among the first to have 
their Committees established, on 9 November 1940.  From the very beginning, steel was at 
the centre of Vichy’s reforms, and a study of CORSID can therefore further our 
understanding of Vichy’s broader policies.  Second, steel was identified by Jean Monnet in 
1946 as the central industry on which France’s post-war fortunes depended, describing the 
industry’s production programme as “unconditional, which will be executed regardless of the 
overall state of the economy.  It is ultimately steel that determines all other French production 
[and] it is therefore indispensable that the steel industry enjoy all the resources it needs with 
an absolute priority”.4   Not only was steel central to France’s economic recovery, but 
Monnet framed this recovery as the prerequisite for France to regain its rightful grandeur, 
lest it be “reduced to the rank of a second-rate power”.5  In this case, the organisation of this 
vital industry from 1940-1946 is crucial for our understanding of the maintenance of France 
as an important economic and political actor.6   
Thirdly, the importance of steel in the history of post-war Europe is most clearly 
exemplified by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the 
forerunner to the European Union.  Understanding how the industry was organised from 
1940-1946, how its leaders acted under Vichy and following the Liberation, and how Jean 
Monnet’s thoughts were informed by these bodies in the years preceding the Schuman 
Declaration, contribute to the study of the history of European integration.  Finally, following 
the imposition of the British blockade in 1940, it became apparent that the French steel 
industry was dependent on Germany, and the Ruhr in particular, for coal.  This dependence 
encouraged French heavy industry to collaborate with Germany during the war, as it was the 
only way to receive vital shipments of coking coal from the Ruhr.  After the Liberation, 
Monnet recognised that the success of the French economy and ultimately of France’s place 
                                                          
4 “Présentation des programmes de base”, note de Jean Monnet, 5 September 1946, AMF 5 9, FJME. 
5 “Memorandum sur le Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement”, 13 December 1945, 80AJ 1, AN. 
6 The importance of the Monnet Plan for France’s weight as an international actor is discussed by William 
Hitchcock in France Restored. Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel 
Hill: UNCP, 1998), 29-40. 
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in the world were dependent on receiving sufficient quantities of coal from the Ruhr.  This 
consideration guided French foreign policy, particularly with regard to the German question, 
in the early post-war period.  With the creation of the Bizone in 1947 and the Federal 
Republic of Germany in 1949 in the context of the Cold War in Europe, it became clear that 
Ruhr coal could only be attained for the French steel industry through Franco-German 
cooperation.  Central to the purposes of the 1950 Schuman Plan and the establishment of the 
ECSC was an effort to ensure both cross-Rhine cooperation and French access to the 
resources of the Ruhr.  By focusing on the French steel industry during l’entre-deux-
républiques, this thesis thus contributes to historiographies ranging from wartime 
collaboration to the history of European integration. 
One crucial observation that applies to these four reasons is the centrality of state 
policy in the French steel industry.  The creation of the Organisation Committees was 
decided by the government, the text of the law having been drafted by the Minister for 
Industrial Production and a small handful of associates.  Later, the fate of the Committees in 
post-war France was determined by the Gouvernement provisoire de la République française 
(GPRF) and their ultimate dissolution in 1946 was the result of a vote in the National 
Assembly.  The creation of the Monnet Plan, with all its implications for the French economy 
and the steel industry in particular, was realised by de Gaulle as President of the Republic in 
January 1946.  In none of these cases were industrialists consulted until after the ink on the 
legislation was already dry.  Given the importance of government policy in the organisation 
of the French steel industry, this thesis focuses on the role of the State in the industry, ranging 
from broad governmental policies to the projects of the Ministry for Industrial Production to 
the workings of the Organisation Committee for Steel.  While this approach does not extend 
to transnational networks of industrialists or supporters of economic planning, the role of 
individuals and the functioning of the relevant institutions at the national level, where the key 
decisions were made, are considered throughout. 
 
Historiography 
The Organisation Committees have rarely been the subject of thorough study.  For 
many years the key text on the Organisation Committees to which historians of Vichy 
referred was a 1976 Master’s thesis by Henry Rousso, “Les Comités d’organisation, aspects 
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structurels et économiques (1940-44)”.7  This was reworked into an article three years later, 
which remains one of the standard references in the literature on Vichy’s economy.8  
Rousso’s work is useful for its succinct overview of the institutions created by Vichy to 
organise the French economy, but his article and its conclusions are hindered by the uneven 
availability of archival documents then available. 
Thanks to extensive work on business history under Vichy over the past 25 years, 
there are many useful studies on economic collaboration9 and Aryanisation10 under Vichy, as 
well as studies of Nazi Germany’s policies in occupied Europe.11  In general, however, issues 
of industrial organisation and of Organisation Committees in particular are treated only in a 
peripheral way.  The only book-length study of the Organisation Committees since their 
dissolution is an edited volume by Hervé Joly.12  This varied collection includes a number of 
                                                          
7 Henry Rousso, “Les Comités d’organisation, aspects structurels et économiques (1940-44)”, Master’s thesis, 
Université de Paris I-Panthéon-Sorbonne, 1976. 
8Henry Rousso, “L’organisation industrielle de Vichy: perspectives de recherche”, RHDGM, October 1979.  The 
article was reprinted as “L’organisation industrielle de Vichy” in Vichy. L’événement, la mémoire, l’histoire 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1992), a collection of Rousso’s writings. 
9 The key works in this field include Richard Vinen, op.cit.; Alain Beltran, Robert Frank and Henry Rousso (eds.), 
La vie des entreprises sous l’Occupation (Paris: Belin, 1994); Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-Claude Hazera, 
Les patrons sous l’Occupation (Paris : Odile Jacob, 1995) ; Annie Lacroix-Riz, Industriels et banquiers sous 
l’Occupation. La collaboration économique avec le Reich et Vichy (Paris: Armand Colin, 1999); Olivier Dard, 
Jean-Claude Daumas and François Marcot, L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les entreprises (Paris: ADHE, 2000).  
One of the most important works on collaboration in general is Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande, 
1940-1944 (Paris: Seuil, 1995).  For a recent overview of the state of the literature on collaboration under 
Vichy, including economic collaboration, see Fabian Lemmes, “Collaboration in wartime France, 1940-1944” in 
European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire, 15:2, 2008, 157-177.  
10 Philippe Verheyde, Les mauvais comptes de Vichy. L’aryanisation des entreprises juives (Paris: Perrin, 1999); 
Claire Andrieu (ed.), La spoliation financière. Mission d’étude sur la spoliation des Juifs de France (Paris: 
Documentation française, 2000); Jean-Marc Dreyfus, Pillages sur ordonnances: aryanisation et restitution en 
banques en France, 1940-1953 (Paris: Fayard, 2003); Tal Bruttmann (ed.), Persécutions et spoliations des Juifs 
pendant la seconde guerre mondiale (Grenoble: Presses universitaires de Grenoble, 2004). 
11 For an overview of Nazi policies in Europe, see Yves Durand, Le nouvel ordre européen nazi, 1938-1945 
(Paris: Editions Complexe, 1990) and Mark Mazower, Hitler’s Empire. How the Nazis Ruled Europe (New York: 
Penguin, 2008); the classic French study on Nazi plans for a New Economic Order is Jean Freymond, Le IIIe 
Reich et la réorganisation économique de l’Europe, 1940-1942 (Geneva: Université de Genève, 1974); two 
recent economic histories of Europe during the war are Christophe Buchheim and Marcel Boldorf, Europäische 
Volkwirtschaften unter deutscher Hegemonie 1938-1945 (Munich: Oldenbourg Akademie Verlag, 2012) and 
Hein Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov, Occupied Economies. An Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 
1939-1945 (London: Berg, 2012); for Nazi Germany’s domestic economic policies, with some discussion of 
economic policies pursued by the Nazis in France, see Götz Aly, Hitlers Volksstaat: Raub, Rassenkrieg und 
nationaler Sozialismus (Frankfurt am Main: S. Fischer Verlage, 2005) and Adam Tooze, Wages of Destruction. 
The Making & Breaking of the Nazi Economy (London: Penguin, 2007). 
12 Hervé Joly (ed.), Les Comités d’organisation et l’économie dirigée du régime de Vichy (Caen: CRHQ, 2004). 
This was part of a CNRS-funded research project on “Les entreprises françaises sous l’occupation”, which ran 
from 2002 until 2009 and yielded a number of other collected volumes on various aspects of Vichy’s business 
history.  The only other book-length study of the Organisation Committees is a thesis in law published in 
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valuable chapters, ranging from studies of particular Organisation Committees13 to more 
general accounts of how the Committees were first created.14  The most pertinent for this 
thesis is Philippe Mioche’s piece on the Organisation Committee for Steel,15 which remains 
one of the very few publications to consider the body.  The quality of the contributions in the 
collection varies, however, and the distinct themes addressed in each made it difficult to 
arrive at meaningful conclusions about the Committees, aside from how disparate they could 
be.16   
Joly’s edited volume also displays one of the most widespread tendencies in studies of 
the Organisation Committees: it focuses exclusively on the Vichy period, despite the fact that 
the bodies continued to exist until 1946.  This shortcoming in the historiography was 
highlighted by Claire Andrieu in 1990,17 yet it persists in the literature and to date no 
monograph on the Committees from 1940 to 1946 has been published.  The most important 
work to look at some of these issues for the period 1940-1946 is Andrew Shennan’s excellent 
Rethinking France,18 which emphasises the importance of the theme of renewal throughout 
these six years.  Despite having chapters on “Dissolving Class Conflict” and “The New 
Economy”, however, Shennan’s work pays rather little attention to the Organisation 
Committees and even less to the steel industry.  Aside from Shennan’s monograph, the most 
notable study to consider this period is Richard Kuisel’s article on the origins of planisme in 
France, focusing on the abortive plans drawn up by the Délégation générale d’équipement 
national (DGEN) under Vichy.19  Although a fascinating and influential article, it addresses 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
occupied France in 1943.  See Jean-Guy Mérigot, Les comités d’organisation (Bordeaux: Université de 
Bordeaux, 1943).    
13 The studies range from Committees for key sectors such as construction and steel to less central industries 
such as hairdressing and entertainment. 
14 Annie Lacroix-Riz, “Les comités d’organisation et l’Allemagne: tentative d’évaluation” and Arne Radtke-
Delacor, “La position des comités d’organisation face aux autorités d’occupation: la pomme de discorde des 
commandes allemandes en 1940-1941” in ibid. 
15 Philippe Mioche, “Le comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie: un lieu d’affrontement entre modernisateurs de 
la sidérurgie et gardiens de la profession?” in Joly, op.cit. 
16 Hervé Joly, “Les comités d’organisation: un ensemble vaste et disparate” in ibid.  There are also a number of 
glaring factual errors in some of the contributions; in the Introduction, for instance, Dominique Barjot states 
that OCRPI (created in September 1940) was created before the Organisation Committees (created in August 
1940), which is incorrect and is contradicted by many of the other contributions.  See Dominique Barjot, 
“Introduction” in ibid., 8. 
17 Claire Andrieu, La Banque sous l’Occupation. Paradoxes de l’histoire d’une profession (Paris: FNSP, 1990), 
128. 
18 Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946 (Oxford: OUP, 1989). 
19 Richard Kuisel, “Vichy et les origines de la planification économique, 1940-1946” in Mouvement social, 98, 
January-March 1977, 77-101.  Kuisel’s approach is discussed further below in the discussion of the 
historiography on the Monnet Plan. 
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the Organisation Committees only in passing. The remaining important works on the period 
1940-1946 are memoirs, most notably Charles de Gaulle’s three-volume work, but also the 
memoirs of Louis Joxe, the Secretary General of the Comité français de Libération nationale 
(CFLN) and then the GPRF.20  Yet these autobiographical writings are defined by more 
personal start and end dates – the first 50 pages of de Gaulle’s memoirs are in fact about the 
interwar years and in both cases the narrative ends with de Gaulle’s resignation as President 
of the Republic in January 1946, rather than the establishment of the Fourth Republic in 
October that year.  Finally, a small number of unrelated works of French history have 
appeared in recent years taking 1940-1946 as their period of study, dealing with subjects 
ranging from Britain’s Special Operations Executive (SOE)21 to the black market22 and 
French policy in the Levant,23 but none addresses either the Organisation Committees or the 
French steel industry.   
Despite the limited number of studies of l’entre-deux-républiques, several important 
works have applied a longue or moyenne durée approach to the study of the French economy 
that includes these years.  Chief amongst these are Richard Kuisel’s Capitalism and the State 
in Modern France and Michel Margairaz’s monumental L’Etat, les finances et l’économie, 
both of which trace the origins of the political economy that had emerged by the early 1950s 
responsible for France’s Trente glorieuses.24  Kuisel’s study focuses largely on various 
proposals for economic planning developed from the start of the twentieth century, including 
schemes developed in the interwar period and during the Second World War, both under 
Vichy and within the Resistance, with the core of the study being the post-war years when the 
institutions for state planning were erected.  Margairaz meanwhile focuses on the 
“conversion” of France’s policy-makers from the liberal orthodoxy of the 1930s to the more 
dynamic, interventionist policies responsible for France’s post-war prosperity. Margairaz’s 
                                                          
20 Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre (3 vol.) (Paris: Plon, 1954) and Louis Joxe, Victoires sur la nuit (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1981).  De Gaulle’s collected speeches from these years are also collected as Discours et 
messages, 1940-1946 (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1946), although this was published in 1946. 
21 The classic study on the SOE is M.R.D. Foot, SOE. An outline history of the Special Operations Executive 1940-
46 (London: BBC, 1966), and a more recent volume has maintained these start and end dates.  See Neville 
Wylie (ed.), The Politics and Strategy of Clandestine War: SOE, 1940-1946 (London: Routledge 2007). 
22 Paul Sanders, Histoire du marché noir, 1940-1946 (Paris: Perrin, 2001); for an excellent recent study that 
extends the narrative until 1949, see Fabrice Grenard, La France du marché noir (1940-1949) (Paris: Payot & 
Rivages, 2008). 
23 Anne-Lucie Cahigne-Oudin, La France dans les jeux d’influences en Syrie at au Liban (Paris: Harmattan, 2009).  
The end date for this study is determined by the withdrawal of French troops from both countries in 1946.   
24 Michel Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion, 1932-1952 (Paris: CHEFF, 
1991); Richard Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France: Renovation and Economic Management in 
the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: CUP, 1981). 
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approach is considerably broader, with much of the emphasis on financial as well as 
economic policy, and the degree of detail provided for each section reveals an encyclopaedic 
knowledge of the French archives.  Both discuss the Organisation Committees in some detail, 
although given the impressive breadth of both studies, it is hardly surprising that the 
specificities of the steel industry are barely covered.   
A number of industry-specific studies have shed light on various aspects of the French 
economy under Vichy.25 The study of the French steel industry in the mid-twentieth century 
has been dominated by Philippe Mioche.  His Doctorat d’Etat is a wide-ranging account of 
the industry from the 1940s to the 1960s and he has published widely on various aspects of 
the industry, including some works of the steel industry under Vichy.26  He has argued that 
hardly any innovations in the organisation of the industry took place under Vichy, however, 
and his work tends to treat these years as a parenthesis.  In addition to Mioche’s work, 
Françoise Berger’s unpublished PhD thesis on the relations between French and German steel 
industrialists from 1932 until 1952 is a valuable addition to the field, although her focus is on 
cross-Rhine relations among industrialists.27  Publications on the steel industry under Vichy 
by scholars other than Mioche and Berger are surprisingly rare.   
The most notable recent work on the subject by a scholar other than Mioche and 
Berger is Christophe Capuano’s case study of Schneider’s factory in Creusot during the 
war.28  This paper fits into a larger debate within the history of economic collaboration under 
Vichy related to deliberate underproduction (freinage).  The nub of this argument is that 
                                                          
25 The automotive industry has been a particularly popular subject for such studies.  See, for example, François 
Marcot, “La direction de Peugeot sous l’Occupation: pétainisme, réticence, opposition et résistance”, 
Mouvement social, no. 189, 1999, 27-46; Jean-Louis Loubet, “Le travail dans quelques entreprises automobiles 
françaises sous l’Occupation” in Christian Chevandier and Jean-Claude Daumas (eds.), Travailler dans les 
entreprises sous l’Occupation (Besançon: Presses universiataires de Franche-Comté, 2007); Talbot Imlay and 
Martin Horn, The Politics of Industrial Collaboration during World War II: Ford France, Vichy and Nazi Germany 
(Cambridge: CUP, 2014). 
26 Philippe Mioche, La sidérurgie et l’Etat en France des années quarante aux années soixante, Doctorat d’Etat, 
Université de Paris IV, 1992.  Among his most important publications on the steel industry under Vichy are “Les 
entreprises sidérurgiques sous l’Occupation” in Histoire, économie et société, (11:3), 1992, 397-414; and “Le 
comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie: un lieu d’affrontement entre modernisateurs de la sidérurgie et 
gardiens de la profession?” in Joly, Les Comités d’organisation, op.cit. 
27 Françoise Berger, La France, l’Allemagne et l’acier (1932-1952): de la stratégie des cartels à l’élaboration de 
la CECA, Thèse de doctorat, Université de Paris I, 2000.  See also Berger, “Die Beziehung zwischen der 
französischen und der deutschen Eisen- und Stahlindustrie” in Zeitschrift für Unternehmensgeschichte, no.2, 
2005. 
28 Christophe Capuano, “Travailler chez Schneider sous l’Occupation. Le cas des usines du Creusot” in Christian 
Chevandier and Jean-Claude Daumas (eds.), Le travail dans les entreprises sous l’Occupation (Besançon: 
Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007), an edited volume which also contains a contribution from 
Berger. 
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some industrialists deliberately slowed production in order to hinder the German war 
economy for which French industry was producing.  First advanced by François Marcot with 
the case of Peugeot, it has more recently been applied to other industries as well, with 
Capuano arguing that Schneider deliberately underproduced as an act of resistance.29  A 
recent examination of this argument by Talbot Imlay has argued that underproduction did 
indeed occur, at least in the case of Ford France, but that this did not amount to resistance of 
any kind.30 Aside from Imlay’s work, no study on the question of underproduction has 
considered the role of the relevant Organisation Committee, and CORSID’s attitudes towards 
such strategies have never been studied. 
One of the key texts on French industry under Vichy that touches on the debate 
regarding economic collaboration is Richard Vinen’s The politics of French business, 1936-
1945.31  Adopting a broader time frame, Vinen challenges the notion that Vichy marked the 
revenge of the patronat on the Popular Front government by demonstrating that French 
industrialists enjoyed the support of the government by 1938 and that Vichy hardly served the 
interests of the much-derided “trusts”.  Vinen argues that while industrialists collaborated by 
producing for the German war economy, they were not enthusiastic supporters of the 
regime’s policy of collaboration.  This excellent study is based largely on French heavy 
industry, and while many of the conclusions are pertinent to the steel industry, its broader 
focus results in the steel industry being treated in less depth.  Also, while providing a 
thorough account of French industry from the election of the Popular Front to the Liberation, 
the debates within the Resistance concerning the fate of the Organisation Committees as well 
as the post-war reforms of the bodies are not dealt with.  Similarly, the best synthesis on 
Vichy, Julian Jackson’s exceptional France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944, does not deal with 
the post-war reforms of Vichy’s industrial order.32   
A number of other works have studied the continuities between the late Third 
Republic and Vichy, with a particular emphasis on intellectual history.  Gérard Noiriel’s Les 
origines républicaines de Vichy traces the origins of many of Vichy’s policies, including the 
                                                          
29 François Marcot, “La direction de Peugeot sous l’Occupation: pétainsime, réticence, opposition et 
résistance” in Mouvement social, no. 189, October-December 1999, 27-46.   
30 Talbot Imlay and Martin Horn, op.cit. 
31 Richard Vinen, op.cit. 
32 Julian Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 1940-1944 (Oxford: OUP, 1944).  Jackson does include a chapter on 
l’épuration, although given the scope of the study, the Organisation Committees are not discussed. 
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central tenets of the National Revolution, to the interwar period.33  More pertinent to the 
question of industrial organisation is Jackie Clarke’s France in the Age of Organization, 
which examines the scientific organisation movement of the interwar years to show the 
beginnings of planisme, technocracy, and the rationalisation of the factory and of the French 
household.34  Adopting a cultural historical approach, Clarke shows how organisation was 
seen by an array of intellectuals and technicians as a means to resolve the social problems 
confronting interwar France, and how a number of these individuals put these ideas into 
practice under Vichy, with Jean Bichelonne being a particularly useful example.  Another 
recent work that explores similar themes is Philip Nord’s France’s New Deal, which traces 
the intellectual origins of France’s post-war welfare state from the 1930s, particularly in 
terms of economic organisation, administration, and cultural policy.35  While all three works 
contribute to our understanding of the importance of the 1930s in terms of intellectual history 
and the influence of these ideas on both Vichy and post-war France, none deal with the 
Organisation Committees extensively, and Noiriel makes no mention of them whatsoever.  
Moreover, all three works focus on the history of ideas rather than institutional history.36 
Given that this thesis studies the organisation of the steel industry in the six years 
preceding the Monnet Plan, it is well worth considering the historiography on the origins of 
Jean Monnet’s initiative.  The key work on this topic remains Philippe Mioche’s first 
monograph, Le Plan Monnet, which considers the economic planning completed under 
Vichy.37  Mioche’s study, however, remains focused on the history of planisme rather than 
providing an institutional history of the antecedents of the General Commissariat for the Plan 
created by Monnet.  As such, his analysis of the Vichy period is limited to two abortive plans 
drawn up in 1942 and 1944, respectively, which leads him to conclude that no significant 
continuities from Vichy to the Monnet Plan exist.  Richard Kuisel, who first explored the 
                                                          
33 Gérard Noiriel, Les origines républicaines de Vichy (Paris: Fayard, 1999).  David Lees’ research builds on some 
of the themes discussed by Noiriel to argue that the National Revolution was a synthesis of republican and 
new, Vichy-era symbols.  See David Lees, “Vichy and the Republic: ideological compromise and symbolic 
adaptation in the France of the Occupation” (PhD thesis, University of Warwick, forthcoming).  
34 Jackie Clarke, France in the Age of Organization. Factory, Home and Nation from the 1920s to Vichy (Oxford: 
Berghahn, 2011). 
35 Philip Nord, France’s New Deal.  From the Thirties to the Postwar Era (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010). 
36 The study of the intellectual origins of Vichy generally focuses on the nonconformist movement in the 1930s 
and their journals, most notably Les Nouveaux Cahiers.  The classic work on this remains Jean-Louis Loubet del 
Bayle, Les non-conformistes des années 30. Une tentative de renouvellement de la pensée politique française 
(Paris: Seuil, 1969). 
37 Philippe Mioche, Le Plan Monnet. Genèse et élaboration, 1941-1947 (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 
1987).  Mioche’s consideration of the entire Vichy period, which remains focused on the DGEN’s abortive 
plans, is limited to fewer than twenty pages. 
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continuities between Vichy’s plans and Monnet’s, remains similarly focused on the DGEN’s 
wartime exercises in planisme.38  This focus has allowed some scholars to reject the idea of 
continuities in economic planning in France altogether, labelling the DGEN’s plans as “the 
exception that proves the rule”.39  The predominant view in the historiography today seems to 
be that the DGEN’s plans did not influence the Monnet Plan decisively, and the institutional 
antecedents of Monnet’s Modernisation Commissions have not been explored in any detail. 
The literature on the history of European integration, and especially the origins of the 
Schuman Plan, recognise the central role played by the Monnet Plan in bringing about the 
European Coal and Steel Community.40  In her excellent macroeconomic study of France in 
the 1940s and 1950s, Frances Lynch shows how the Monnet Plan established investment in 
the French steel industry as a national priority, and that “the Schuman Plan aimed to make the 
French steel industry compete in western Europe”.  The centrality of the development of the 
French steel industry in bringing about the Schuman Declaration in 1950 is similarly 
recognised in much of the literature on the history of European integration.41  While Lynch’s 
study of France’s post-war economy is thorough and insightful, her treatment of the Vichy 
period is comparatively brief, with barely ten pages devoted to the period 1940-1944, with 
much of this spent discussing the Resistance’s plans for the post-war era.  As a result, there is 
only one passing reference to the existence of the Organisation Committees.  Furthermore, 
Lynch’s macroeconomic approach does not focus on the institutional aspects of the Monnet 
Plan, and the Modernisation Commissions are consequently never mentioned.    
In light of this brief overview of the state of the historiography on the subject, a 
number of gaps become apparent.  First, the Organisation Committees remain understudied 
and have yet to be made the subject of a single historical monograph.  Second, existing 
                                                          
38 Richard Kuisel, “Vichy et les origines de la planification économique, 1940-1946”, op.cit.  The core of his 
argument is reiterated in his monograph, Capitalism and the State in Modern France, op.cit.   
39 Adrian Jones, “Illusions of sovereignty: business and the organization of Committees of Vichy France”, Social 
History, January 1986, 1-31. 
40 The best study on the creation and functioning of the ECSC is Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The 
History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 
1994).  For Franco-German relations in a longue durée perspective, see Raymond Poidevin and Jacques Bariéty, 
Les relations franco-allemandes, 1815-1975 (Paris: A. Colin, 1977).  
41 On the Monnet Plan’s role in bringing about the Schuman Plan and the ECSC, see Alan Milward, The 
Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945-51 (London: Routledge, 1984); Gérard Bossuat, L’Europe des Français, 
1943-1959. La IVe République aux sources de l’Europe communautaire (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 
1996); Matthias Kipping, Zwischen Kartellen und Konkurrenz. Der Schuman-Plan und die Ursprünge der 
europäischen Einigung 1944-1952 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996); and Michael Sutton, France and the 
Construction of Europe, 1944-2007. The Geopolitical Imperative (Oxford: Berghahn, 2007).   
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studies of the Committees almost always end their analyses in 1944 with the end of the Vichy 
regime, rather than following the narrative until the dissolution of the Committees in 1946.  
Third, studies of the origins of the Monnet Plan ignore the Organisation Committees, which 
were in many ways the antecedents of the Modernisation Commissions created by Monnet in 
1946.  This thesis fills all of these gaps, thereby contributing to the historiography on 
business history under Vichy, on early post-war France, and on the Monnet Plan. 
 
Methodology 
 In looking at the steel industry, it is essential to examine not only CORSID, but also 
the broader industrial organisation pursued at the State level.  Much of this thesis is therefore 
a study of the key governmental decisions related to industrial organisation, which 
determined the framework in which the steel industry would operate.  It therefore studies the 
creation of the Organisation Committees at the ministerial level, before looking at how 
CORSID in particular was assembled.  While this study draws on economic history, it does 
not provide a detailed analysis of steel production or other technical data; these issues are 
considered, but only in so far as they impact broader questions of industrial organisation.  
Although it engages with economic issues, this thesis remains more a work of political 
history than of economic history.   
 This thesis is largely an institutional history, following the creation, development, and 
abolition of the Organisation Committees, particularly CORSID.  Accordingly, it does not 
delve into the intellectual history of labour relations or economic planning.  While the 
intellectual background of those who established the Organisation Committees did influence 
the shape of the institutions, the focus of the study remains on the institutions themselves 
rather than the development of different conceptions of industrial organisation in the history 
of ideas.42  Similarly, while the creation of the Monnet Plan is discussed in the final chapter 
of my thesis, a detailed study of the exercises in economic planning completed by the DGEN 
under Vichy is not provided.43  Rather, the discussion of the Monnet Plan focuses on the 
                                                          
42 Several historians have argued for the importance of interwar discussions of industrial organisation, 
particularly the writings of the so-called nonconformists, and how these ideas marked a precedent for Vichy’s 
policies.  For two recent examples, see Philip Nord, France’s New Deal (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010) and 
Jackie Clark, France in the Age of Organization (Oxford: Berghahn, 2011).  The question of continuities from 
these ideas to the creation of the Organisation Committees is discussed in Chapter One.     
43 The key studies on this question are by Richard Kuisel and Philippe Mioche, as discussed above. 
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Modernisation Commissions, which Monnet described as the “keystones” of his Plan, 
precisely because of the institutional continuities between the Organisation Committees and 
the Modernisation Commissions.  In other words, the Monnet Plan was not taken as the 
starting point followed by a study of Vichy for its antecedents, as was the case with Kuisel 
and Mioche, but this thesis has rather examined the Organisation Committees during their six 
years of existence, which revealed some unexpected continuities with the Monnet Plan. 
 The question of collaboration has long fascinated historians, and the issues of 
economic and industrial collaboration have received particular interest since the 1990s, as 
discussed above.  This thesis is not primarily concerned with the nature of collaboration in 
the French steel industry, however.  There is a consensus in the historiography that the 
French steel industry produced massively for the Reich during the war; historians are left to 
debate the exact tonnage shipped across the Rhine and the motivations of the industrialists 
who carried out the orders.44  While these issues are dealt with in the thesis, the focus remains 
on the Organisation Committee for Steel itself, rather than the actions of particular 
industrialists or the relationships developed over the war between French industrialists and 
their German counterparts.  In concentrating on the institutional history of the Organisation 
Committees, my thesis thus contributes to the subfield of the history of economic 
collaboration by considering the role of Franco-German collaboration in the establishment of 
the Committees.  Similarly, while this work looks at the role of individuals, the emphasis 
remains on those who ran CORSID and the political leaders responsible for French industrial 
policy.  The actions of individual employers and workers from particular firms are therefore 
not the focus of this thesis.   
 Archival sources relating to the Organisation Committees have long been an issue for 
anyone studying French industry under Vichy.  For the most part, the archives of the 
Committees themselves seem to have been lost or destroyed by the late 1970s, before which 
they were not available for public consultation.45  In the case of the steel industry, the 
Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française (CSSF) did make some of its archives available 
in the late 1980s, although the papers of CORSID do not feature among the declassified 
                                                          
44 For a useful overview of the recent debates in the historiography, see Fabian Lemmes, “Collaboration in 
wartime France, 1940-1944” in European Review of History: Revue européenne d’histoire (15:2), 2008, 157-
177. 
45 See Henry Rousso, “L’organisation industrielle de Vichy” in Vichy. L’événement, la mémoire, l’histoire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992), 81. 
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documents.46  One of the most helpful series of documents discovered during the research for 
this project was a collection of circulars, decrees, and surveys issued by CORSID, as well as 
minutes from some meetings, which were gathered in the archives of Marine et Homécourt, 
one of France’s principal steel firms.  This collection allows the historian to follow the 
actions of CORSID fairly closely and to see precisely what was sent from the Organisation 
Committee to a typical steel firm.  The chief limitation of this series, however, is that the 
responses of Marine et Homécourt are not recorded; we can see the template of a census form 
sent to the firm by CORSID, for instance, but not the details filled in by the firm.  While this 
one-way dialogue has its limitations, the documents nevertheless give valuable insight into 
the activities of CORSID during the war.  Even more useful are the minutes from meetings of 
CORSID’s regional grouping for Centre-Ouest, roughly corresponding to the Occupied Zone 
of France.  These hitherto unexploited documents provide some of the most illuminating 
information on CORSID’s actions under Vichy. 
 Given the lack of formal archives of CORSID, and taking account of the broader 
context in which the organisation of the steel industry took place, a range of archival sources 
has been consulted.  Much of the research was completed at the Archives nationales in Paris, 
which moved to Pierrefitte-sur-Seine halfway through this project.  Among the most 
important series were the archives of the Ministry for Industrial Production (F 12), the 
General Commissariat for the Plan (80 AJ), the General Delegation for Franco-German 
Economic Relations (F 37), and the German Military Administration in France (AJ 40).  The 
Archives diplomatiques in La Courneuve also proved vital, particularly for the archives of the 
CFLN-GPRF.  The Archives nationales du monde du travail in Roubaix were especially 
useful for the archives of the CNPF and of individual steel firms, including some from 
Marine et Homécourt.47  The archives of René Belin, housed at the Institut d’Histoire Sociale 
in Nanterre, and of Jean Monnet, at the Fondation Jean Monnet pour l’Europe in Lausanne, 
proved invaluable.  The collections of the Centre des archives économiques et financières in 
Savigny-le-Temple and the Institut d’histoire du temps présent in Paris were also helpful.  
The archives of the German Military Administration in France, kept at the Bundesarchiv-
Militärarchiv in Freiburg im Breisgau were also valuable.  Finally, the National Archives in 
                                                          
46 The implications of these archives are discussed in Philippe Mioche, “Les « maîtres de forges » en quête de 
transparence. Archives de la sidérurgie et histoire économique” in Vingtième siècle. Revue d’histoire, no. 20, 
1988, 103-112.  
47 The archives of Marine et Homécourt, AQ 139, are split between the ANMT in Roubaix and the Archives 
nationales in Paris. 
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London yielded some useful documentation, particularly regarding the situation of French 
industry in 1940.  In addition to this multi-archival approach, the memoirs of many of the key 
figures discussed throughout the period, from René Belin and François Lehideux to Charles 
de Gaulle and Jean Monnet, have been consulted.  Given the highly subjective accounts 
offered in some of these memoirs, however, claims made in these publications are 
corroborated whenever possible with archival sources, and on a number of occasions 
narratives advanced in post-war memoirs are challenged in light of evidence from the 
archives.48   
 One question related to sources that confronts many historians working on Vichy is 
the weight to give to German archives.  Many of the classic works on Vichy from the late 
1960s and early 1970s relied heavily on the German archives, in large part because many of 
the key French archives from the Second World War were not yet open.49  As the French 
archives became accessible, a wave of historiography appeared, including many of the key 
works on the French economy under Vichy, based primarily or even exclusively on French 
sources.50  There seems to be a trend in the most recent literature on the French economy 
during the Second World War to bring the German authorities back into the narrative in 
reaction to what some have called an overly “Franco-French” frame of analysis.51  In this 
thesis, German archives, particularly those of the German Military Administration in France, 
have been used to supplement the French archives, which constitute the core of the source 
source.  The German archives have been particularly useful when discussing the 
establishment of the Organisation Committees, as there is some debate in the literature over 
the role of the German authorities in bringing about their creation.52  Given that this study 
focuses on the organisation of French industry by means of the Organisation Committees, 
                                                          
48 A full list of archival sources and memoirs used in this thesis is included in the Bibliography. 
49 Eberhard Jäckel, Frankreich in Hitlers Europa: die deutsche Frankreichpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Stuttgart: 
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Economic History of Nazi-Occupied Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Berg, 2012); Talbot Imlay and Martin Horn, 
The Politics of Industrial Collaboration during World War II (Cambridge: CUP, 2014). 
52 Arne Radtke-Delacor, “La position des comités d’organisation face aux autorités d’occupation”, op.cit. 
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however, it has been far more useful to consult the archives of different French actors, from 
the Head of State, to various ministries, to steel firms.      
More importantly, the narrative of this thesis, tracing the organisation of the French 
steel industry between the Third and Fourth Republics, is essentially a French one.  Because 
this study considers this period as a whole, rather than on the Vichy period exclusively, the 
German archives do not figure whatsoever in the second half of my thesis, since they would 
not be relevant to debates within the French Resistance in Algiers or to the policies carried 
out by the Provisional Government following the Liberation of France.  Given the timeframe 
studied in this project, it makes far more sense to maintain the focus on France throughout the 
period, supplementing this with German sources when relevant, than to emphasise the 
Franco-German dimension in the first half of the thesis and revert to a “Franco-French” 
narrative in the second.  German and indeed British archives have thus been used to 
supplement the French archives.      
 
Outline 
 This thesis is organised chronologically, from the creation to the dissolution of the 
Organisation Committees.  This approach has the advantage of focusing on the evolution of 
the Committees and highlighting continuities throughout the period.  This organisation 
nevertheless allows for a thematic organisation of the chapters, in that contemporaneous 
developments in Vichy and within the Resistance are treated in separate chapters.  Given that 
this study focuses on institutional change within the organisation of the French steel industry, 
periods of significant change are accorded more weight.  Consequently, the timeframe 
considered in each chapter varies, ranging from a few months, as in Chapter One, to several 
years, as in Chapter Three, in order to provide as comprehensive a study as possible of the 
organisation of the French steel industry throughout l’entre-deux-républiques.   
The first chapter considers the context of French industry immediately following the 
Fall of France and initial attempts to deal with a range of pressing issues in the summer of 
1940.  It reveals that, despite the pride of place given to the law of 16 August 1940 in the 
literature on the topic, virtually all of the elements of the law had in fact been agreed upon 
with the German authorities in the month preceding the law.  By demonstrating German 
support for these measures, the chapter calls into question the standard narrative that the 
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creation of the Organisation Committees surprised and angered the German authorities.53  
The context in which these measures were taken, particularly the backdrop of German 
Minister for the Economy’s much-publicised plans to create a “new European economic 
order”, is also discussed. 
 The second chapter looks at the implementation of the law of 16 August 1940, 
particularly the creation of the Organisation Committee for Steel on 9 November 1940 and 
the issue of choosing the members of the Committee.  The chapter show why, despite the law 
foreseeing the representation of workers as well as employers and the state within the 
Committees, this tripartism was never put into practice.  The dominance of employers in the 
Committee for Steel has led some historians to argue that CORSID was simply a continuation 
of the interwar Comité des forges by another name, a conclusion that is challenged in this 
chapter.54 
Having analysed how CORSID was created over the summer and autumn of 1940, the 
third chapter deals with how the Committee responded to the industrial policies of the Vichy 
regime.  The first section of the chapter focuses on the National Revolution and the Labour 
Charter, before moving on to the far more contentious issue of forced labour deportations to 
Germany.  The issue of economic collaboration is discussed, particularly the question of 
whether CORSID engaged in deliberate underproduction as a form of resistance.  The chapter 
concludes that CORSID consistently acted in accordance with its overriding objective of 
keeping its factories running.  
 With Chapter Four, the narrative moves to the Comité français de Libération 
nationale (CFLN) based in Algiers.  With the outcome of the war becoming clearer, the 
Resistance was forced to consider the question of whether to maintain the Committees 
created by Vichy for their pragmatic value or to dissolve them due to their association with 
the regime.  This debate, which began in earnest in 1943, was decisively settled by de Gaulle 
in March 1944, just in time to secure the support of the Communists for the CNR Programme 
for post-war France.  The uneasy consensus within the Gouvernement provisoire de la 
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République française (GPRF) by D-Day was that the Organisation Committees should be 
maintained, but subjected to purges and reforms.       
Having seen how the GPRF opted to preserve Vichy’s Committees, Chapter Five 
concentrates on how the bodies were actually reformed from August 1944 until 1945.  
Although the leadership of CORSID was removed, its members were moved into equally 
influential positions within the steel industry and none were subjected to l’épuration.  The 
most significant reforms were those which increased labour representation within the 
Committees, thereby realising the promise of the law of 16 August 1940 to include workers.  
In this sense, the GPRF was more successful at implementing the clauses of the Vichy law 
than the Vichy government had been.   
 The final chapter is devoted to the dissolution of the Organisation Committees, which 
was decided upon in the National Assembly on 23 April 1946.  In order to understand how 
this decision received unanimous support in the Assembly, the chapter examines the 
contemporaneous development of the Monnet Plan and considers continuities from the 
Organisation Committees to the Modernisation Commissions, as well as the roles played by 
the Vichy-era members of CORSID.  It concludes that the organisation of the French steel 
industry from 1940 until 1946 had lasting effects on the Monnet Plan. 
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Chapter One:  
France’s New Industrial Order: Reorganising Industrial Production after France’s 
Capitulation, Summer 1940 
 
The Armistice signed by France and Germany on 22 June 1940 initiated a ceasefire 
between the two countries and established the context in which cross-Rhine relations would 
unfold until the liberation of France four years later.  While the crucial matter of French 
industrial production was not directly addressed in the document, by the end of the summer 
the French Government had fundamentally reorganised the nation’s industry.  The keystone 
of this New Industrial Order was the law of 16 August 1940, put forward by Minister for 
Industrial Production René Belin.   The existing literature on French industry in 1940 
naturally focuses on this law, but in so doing fails to adequately explain why the New 
Industrial Order took the shape it did.  In order to answer this question, it is necessary to 
study the actions of the French authorities in Paris over the month of July, rather than the law 
written in Vichy in August.  Such an analysis reveals not only that the reorganisation of 
French industry occurred weeks earlier than it is generally held, but more importantly that the 
entire undertaking occurred under German auspices and in the context of broader Franco-
German collaboration.  Far from being an assertion of French sovereignty in the face of 
German exigency, the New Industrial Order created the foundations of durable industrial 
collaboration in an integrated Europe under German hegemony. 
In many ways the single most important stipulation in the Armistice was that, to 
safeguard German interests, the greater part of metropolitan France would be partitioned into 
two zones.  The first zone covered the northern half of France, stretching from Lorraine to 
Brittany, including Paris, as well as the entire Atlantic coast, from Belgium to Spain.  This 
area, known as the Occupied Zone, was occupied directly by the Germans, ostensibly to 
guard the Continent against any invasion of British troops.  Germany stated that it would 
reduce its presence in this zone “following the cessation of hostilities with England”.55  The 
text also included the vague provision that “in the occupied regions of France, the German 
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Reich enjoys the rights of the occupying power”.56  This sentence, left open to interpretation, 
would be used to legitimate a gamut of German actions during its occupation of France.57 
The southern, unoccupied zone remained free of German control and under the full 
authority of the French Government, led by Maréchal Philippe Pétain.58  This division of 
France was not merely administrative; crossing from one zone into the other was strictly 
controlled by the German military, and written permission had to be obtained.  This applied 
to all French citizens, including members of the government, which exacerbated the problem 
of the absence of the Government from Paris, where the civil service remained. 
The German occupation of northern and western France, and the imposition of the 
strictly-enforced demarcation line, were features of a broader German policy that eroded 
France’s sovereignty.  In addition to the Occupied and Non-Occupied Zones defined in the 
Armistice, France was partitioned into a further three zones.  The eastern provinces of Alsace 
and Lorraine, which had been part of Germany from 1870 until 1918 under the Second Reich, 
were “restored” to Germany.59  The two northernmost departments of France, Nord and Pas-
de-Calais, were detached from the Occupied Zone by Germany and appended to Belgium, 
where they were administered by the German Military Administration in Brussels.  Lastly, a 
strip of French territory along the Italian border, from Switzerland to the Mediterranean, was 
occupied by Italy, following that country’s belated entry into the war.60  While the French 
Government at least formally governed the Occupied Zone, in these three zones it had no 
powers. 
Concerning industrial production, this redrawing of the map of France was significant 
because it placed the two most heavily industrialised areas entirely beyond the control of the 
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French Government in Vichy.  Most important were Nord and Pas-de-Calais, which together 
constituted the heartland of French manufacturing and were home to its largest coal deposits, 
responsible for two-thirds of prewar domestic production. Nearly as devastating was the loss 
of the coal and steel industries of Lorraine, the site of France’s most modern coal mines and 
the source of one-eighth of French coal in the 1930s.61  Most harmful to French industry, 
however, was the demarcation line that bisected the country.  Raw materials from one zone 
were not allowed to be transported to a factory in the other without prior authorisation.  The 
Germans also used the demarcation line as a political tool, knowing full well that the Non-
Occupied Zone depended on the more industrialised but also more agriculturally productive 
northern regions of the country.62   
The cessation of hostilities between France and Germany had an acute effect on 
French industry.  Following the Munich Accord, French industry had been increasingly 
geared towards the production of war matériel.  From 3 September 1939, when France 
declared war on Germany, virtually all domestic production was redirected for the purposes 
of war.  The termination of Franco-German fighting, however, engendered the immediate 
cessation of such production.63  French factories thus stopped all orders for military purposes, 
but had no others to replace them.  In the uncertain period following the Armistice, French 
industry ground to a halt. 
The paralysis of French industry was exacerbated by another condition imposed by 
the German authorities.  Given that Germany remained at war with Great Britain, the former 
insisted that all trade between France and Great Britain cease.  This extended to the French 
and British empires, despite vehement objections that this would effectively asphyxiate 
certain French possessions that were entirely dependent on goods from the British Empire.64  
Of more direct consequence for metropolitan France was the loss of imports from Great 
Britain.  Throughout the interwar period, France was the world’s largest importer of coal, and 
this was the single most heavily imported commodity from Great Britain, accounting for a 
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full third of France’s domestic consumption.65  From September 1939, coal imports from 
across the Channel had steadily increased, fuelling France’s armaments production.66  From 
the end of June 1940, however, Great Britain began diverting coal shipments initially bound 
for France to neutral or other allied countries.67  From this date, with the loss of imports from 
Britain, France would have to make do with a maximum of two-thirds of its total 1939 supply 
of coal. In addition to the loss of coal, which remained the fuel for virtually all heavy 
industry, the suspension of trade with the British Empire paralysed entire industries that were 
dependent on imports of particular primary goods from British colonies.68   
The need to find new sources of coal quickly became an idée fixe of French industrial 
policy.  Not only was British coal inaccessible, but the two largest coalfields in France, in 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais and Lorraine, had been integrated into Belgium and Germany, 
respectively.  This left only the meagre coal mines in the Loire, which were thoroughly 
exploited.69  Much of the coal extracted from this site was of inferior quality, however, and 
the small, otherwise unusable pieces could only be used when joined together with pitch to 
make briquettes, which were functional as fuel for French ships.  Even this imperfect option 
was complicated by the fact that the pitch required had been imported from Great Britain, and 
was thus no longer readily available.70 
The shortage of primary materials, compounded by the lack of orders for French 
factories, was aggravated by a scarcity of labour.  From the day of Germany’s incursion into 
France on 10 May, increasingly significant areas of the country had been evacuated, which 
meant that factories in the most heavily industrialised areas in France, particularly in Nord-
Pas-de-Calais and Alsace-Lorraine, but also across the northern Occupied Zone, were in 
practice inoperable.  As a result of this exodus of labour and the general disruption of the 
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economy caused by the German invasion, overall French coal production had decreased from 
4.6 million tonnes in April 1940 to a mere 1.2 million tonnes in June.71   
Aside from these direct difficulties imposed on French industry, the restrictions 
placed on the French Government had serious implications for industrial production as well.  
The Government had fled Paris on 10 June as the Wehrmacht closed in on the capital, 
relocating first to Tours, then further southwest to Bordeaux.  When the Armistice decreed 
that Bordeaux would fall within the Occupied Zone, the Government relocated yet again to 
Clermont-Ferrand, before settling on the provincial spa town of Vichy on 1 July.  The town 
had little to recommend it, aside from the absence of any serious political opposition and the 
surplus of hotels, which were quickly transformed into government offices.72  The centuries-
old tendency towards centralisation in France meant that virtually all administrative services 
were concentrated in the capital; the Government’s absence from Paris amounted to 
decapitation.  The Armistice included a provision that the government “is free to choose any 
seat in the Non-Occupied Zone, or even, if it wishes, to establish itself in Paris.  In the latter 
case, the German Government commits to ensure all necessary facilities to the French 
Government and to its central administrative services, so that it will be able to govern the 
occupied and non-occupied territories from Paris”.73  On 8 July, the German administration 
offered to allow the French Government to establish itself in Versailles, with free access to 
central Paris, which would remain occupied.74  On this presumption, and in the hopes of 
reviving French industry, the civil service of the so-called technical ministries, most 
importantly the Ministry for Industrial Production, returned to their offices in Paris, 
anticipating the imminent return of the Government to the capital.  Instead, however, the 
German administration suspended its approval of the Government’s return, claiming that 
“technical reasons oppose it”, but that the Government would ultimately return to Paris.75  As 
it was, the French Government would remain in Vichy until August 1944, when a very 
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different French government, led by Charles de Gaulle, established itself in a Paris liberated 
from the Nazis.   
The absence of the French Government from Paris engendered increasing anxieties 
concerning French sovereignty.  By early July, German industrialists were placing demands 
for war matériel with French factories in the Occupied Zone.76  French industrialists were 
faced with an ultimatum by the German military authorities: they could either fulfil the 
orders, or be replaced by German industrialists and workers who would complete the orders 
themselves.  A flurry of letters from industrialists flowed to Vichy begging for direction from 
the Government.77  The Government’s initial attempts at intervention were of little use, 
although they were unsure whether this was due to German maliciousness or simply 
disorganisation – the French Government’s representative in Paris was unable to discern who 
was responsible for economic questions among the Germans in Paris.78  On 30 June, German 
workers occupied the Renault and Citroën factories in Paris to produce goods intended to 
contribute to the imminent German offensive against Great Britain.79  Germany’s swelling 
control of French industry justified fears that, left unchecked, this would lead to direct control 
of French production by the Reich.  Indeed, in Belgium the German Authorities set up 
Wirtschaftsgruppen, economic offices to oversee branches of industry, like the ones that 
existed in the Reich.80 
The increasing command exerted by Germany over French industry was perhaps most 
shockingly displayed by Germany’s attempts to negotiate a trade agreement between France 
and Yugoslavia – without even informing the French Government.  The French ambassador 
in Belgrade learned of the negotiations and was able to warn the government in Vichy, whose 
objections were sufficient to derail the talks.81  The incident nevertheless highlighted the 
extent to which French sovereignty was threatened by Germany’s actions, both on and 
beyond French soil.  
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The law of 16 August 1940 
In the weeks following the Armistice, French industry had stalled and the 
Government, isolated in a provincial holiday town 300 km from Paris, appeared disorganised 
and powerless.  Meanwhile, German control of the Occupied Zone seemed to be extending to 
industrial production.  Fearing that its jurisdiction could become permanently reduced to the 
rump Non-Occupied Zone, the French Government realised that the status quo was 
unsustainable.  The Government responded decisively by passing the law of 16 August 1940, 
“concerning the provisional organisation of industrial production”.82  With this single page of 
legislation, the French Government fundamentally reorganised French industry and 
established the New Industrial Order that would endure in France for the next six years. 
The law of 16 August 1940 was intended to “reorganise the economy in light of the 
current situation, and to draw maximum profit from the means of production, from the labour 
reserves, and from the primary materials at our disposal”.  The reorganisation was sweeping 
indeed.  National confederations of trade unions and of employers’ associations, deemed too 
political and inefficient, were dissolved.83  The same fate was expressly reserved for any 
organisation that was judged to threaten the state’s plans for efficiency, whether by 
articulating overt opposition or simply by being “incompatible with the discipline and speed 
of the decision necessary”.84  To replace the organisations that had been among the mainstays 
of the economy of the Third Republic, the French Government created so-called Organisation 
Committees.85  These Committees formed the central pillar of the New Industrial Order 
established in the summer of 1940.  Instead of representing either workers or employers, 
these Committees were organised according to particular branches of industry.  For example, 
while steel workers might have belonged to the CGT before 1940 and the owners of those 
steel firms had gathered in the Comité des forges, both groups would henceforth be 
represented in a single Organisation Committee for Steel.  Analogous arrangements were 
made for most industries; while initially limited to 25 vital industries, by 1944 there were 
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over 300 Committees, representing industries as disparate as hairdressers and the 
entertainment industry.86 
In keeping with the notion of organising production according to branches of industry 
rather than by class, the law foresaw the inclusion of representation from employers and 
workers, although this was to be added at a later date.87  Moreover, the text of the law 
specified that “there can be no question of leaving full freedom to the interested parties.  The 
Minister for Industrial Production will determine the composition of each Committee [...] and 
will exert constant control”.88  The reorganisation was thus meant to be fundamentally statist, 
allowing the Government to exert unprecedented control over virtually every aspect of 
industrial production.  In place of the liberal order that had “allowed private, uncontrolled 
organisms to appropriate for their own profit”, the law articulated that “today, all initiatives 
and decisions must be taken by the Government”, and that “all interests and all activities must 
be subordinate to the urgency of the revival of the country”.89 
The Committees were responsible for conducting a thorough inventory of primary 
materials available to each industry.  Based on this information, the Committee would 
organise which orders would be carried out in which factories, and how primary materials 
were to be provisioned accordingly.90  The principal shortcoming of this arrangement, 
however, was that the Committees only had control over the primary materials that were 
already in the stocks of various industries.  To address this limitation, the Government passed 
a supplementary law on 10 September, establishing the Central Bureau for the Distribution of 
Industrial Products (OCRPI).91  This Central Bureau was divided into Sections corresponding 
to branches of industry, similar to how the Committees were organised.  Each Section had 
sweeping powers, and controlled the acquisition, distribution, storage, and consumption of 
particular products.  These powers even included the authority to force producers to sell 
specific amounts of particular products to chosen buyers, and vice-versa.  While the 
Committees controlled industrial production, the Central Bureau managed supply of the 
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primary materials on which industry relied.  At least one member of each Committee was 
also a member of the analogous Section of the Central Bureau, and the Government had a 
representative present at every meeting.92  With this law, the construction of France’s New 
Industrial Order was complete. 
 
Understanding the law of 16 August 1940 
The paralysis of French industry, coupled with the increasing pressure exerted by 
Germany on French industrialists, compelled the French Government to adopt more direct 
control over the economy.  The economic situation in the summer of 1940 does not, however, 
explain why the reorganisation of the French economy took the particular form it did.  
Similar conditions of penury and disorder existed in France in 1944 in the wake of the 
Liberation.  Then, however, the Provisional Government opted to nationalise strategic 
industries outright (beginning with the coal mines of northern France in December 1944), an 
option that was never entertained by French authorities in 1940.93  Indeed, a number of 
different economic models had been implemented since the First World War, from Soviet 
central planning to Roosevelt’s New Deal to the Nazi model based on rearmament.94  The 
path chosen by the French Government was not the only, or even the most obvious one.  The 
reasons for the architecture of the New Industrial Order merit closer attention. 
In the existing literature on Vichy France, there are five discernable explanations of 
why French industry assumed its peculiar form.  First, an important stream of scholarship has 
tended to highlight the continuities between the 1930s and the Vichy era, particularly in the 
field of intellectual history.  This approach draws on the many so-called nonconformist 
journals published in France over the decade preceding the war that gave voice to critics of 
the Third Republic and of economic liberalism more generally.95  Ideas such as economic 
planning were entertained and advocated, particularly after Henri de Man introduced 
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planning in Belgium in 1933.96  Interestingly, a number of individuals who would gain 
prominent positions in the French Government in Vichy published articles in the 1930s 
advocating economic reforms that would be echoed in policies passed in Vichy.  Given these 
continuities, some scholars have concluded that these men implemented a long-fermenting 
programme developed over the 1930s when they rose to positions of power in Vichy. 
In his wide-ranging study, Philip Nord traces continuities in a number of fields 
through the “transwar” period from the 1930s to the 1950s.  On the economic side, Nord 
focuses on mid- and long-term economic planning, advocated by some nonconformist writers 
in the 1930s and later developed under Vichy.  It must be noted, however, that such forward-
looking planning emerged in Vichy only in 1941 (with the first plan appearing in 1942), well 
after the New Industrial Order had been established.97  Moreover, these plans were intended 
for the post-war period and were therefore never implemented by Vichy.  More importantly, 
Nord considers the 1930s writings and actions of future members of the Ministry of Industrial 
Production, including Jean Bichelonne, Pierre Laroque, and François Lehideux, and 
concludes that the way they shaped French industry was informed by their convictions that 
can be traced back to the 1930s, but he overlooks central figures such as René Belin and 
Jacques Barnaud.98  Similarly, Jackie Clarke argues that the creation of the Organisation 
Committees “reflected the demand for an organized economy that had grown among a 
section of France’s elite in the interwar years”, observing that a speech given by Jean 
Bichelonne in 1943 “echoed the language that had already been used at Redressement 
français in the late 1920s”.99  Claire Andrieu also argues that ideas set out in interwar 
nonconformist publications, particularly those of Pierre Laroque, decisively shaped the law of 
16 August 1940.  For Andrieu, “the ideal of a constantly negotiated social peace” as 
described by Laroque in 1938 “was at the doctrinal foundation of the Organisation 
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Committees”.100  This explanation of the origins of the Committees rests on the history of 
ideas, arguing that interwar debates determined the decisions made in Vichy in 1940. 
Interestingly, in his memoirs, René Belin comments on the nonconformist writings of 
the 1930s.  Despite having found them intriguing – and indeed, having written some 
himself101 – he lamented that the usefulness of these articles was tremendously limited: 
“beyond vague principles, nothing concrete, no method, not a shadow of a technique... 
Nothing of what had been said or written in France on the matter was useable in the situation 
in which France found itself [in the summer of 1940]”.102 Moreover, the preamble of the law 
of 16 August 1940 explicitly dismisses “the formulae of ‘industrial democracy’ often 
advocated in recent years. [To adopt such ideas] would be to misunderstand the particularly 
imperious necessities of the moment”.103  This suggests that the economic ideas developed by 
French intellectuals in the 1930s were not themselves determinative of the reforms made to 
French industry in 1940.  It would seem that the conditions of the summer of 1940 demanded 
not the application of idealistic plans from the 1930s, but instead pragmatic action based on 
the circumstances at hand.   
The truth of the matter lies somewhere between the tidy continuities observed by 
Nord and Clarke and the lack of any influence of these ideas claimed by Belin.  It is 
undeniable that the particular context of the summer of 1940 determined the shape of the 
Organisation Committees to a significant degree.  Yet it is also difficult to claim that the 
views held by the architects of this New Industrial Order were immaterial.  Indeed, Belin and 
his collaborators, Barnaud, Bichelonne, and Laroque, had all contributed to nonconformist 
journals in the 1930s and shared a common if woolly notion of how to reform the French 
economy and society.  While these provided them with a general notion of how the economy 
might be organised, the fact remains that these interwar intellectual exercises were hardly a 
practical blueprint for constructing new institutions in urgent conditions. 
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A second explanation of the New Industrial Order’s origins attributes the economic 
decisions to the logic of the National Revolution articulated by Pétain.104  The official 
ideology of the Vichy regime, the National Revolution held that France had grown decadent 
and weak under the Third Republic and had therefore been unable to defend itself against the 
Nazi threat.  France needed a spiritual rejuvenation, a return to the fundamental values on 
which French greatness had always been based.  The Republican motto of Liberté, Egalité, 
Fraternité was accordingly replaced by that of the National Revolution: Travail, Famille, 
Patrie.105 
As part of this vision to renew France, Pétain outlined the characteristics of the 
economic policy that should guide the nation:  “Faced with the failure of economic 
liberalism, nearly all peoples have embarked on the path of a new economy.  We must engage 
in this and, through our energy and our faith, make up for lost time.”  France’s renewal 
depended on the national economy being organised and controlled by the State, thereby 
quashing the selfishness inherent in liberalism by subordinating all economic activity to 
national interests.106  It is not difficult to recognise this anti-capitalist and statist spirit in the 
law of 16 August 1940, in which the State did indeed seize control of the economy and 
reorganise national industry.  But it would be a mistake to argue that ideology preceded 
economics in the summer of 1940.  The quotation above is from Pétain’s speech of 10 
October 1940, and it is on this occasion that the notion of the National Revolution was first 
introduced to the French public – two months after the law of 16 August established the 
Organisation Committees.  It was only after the law of 10 September, establishing the Central 
Bureau and completing the new bureaucratic structures of French industry, was already in 
place that Pétain made any remarks about the organisation of the French economy in any of 
his speeches.107  Barely a month after Pétain had received full powers as Head of State, any 
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ideas on economic policy remained ill-defined.108  In August 1941, Pétain would call for the 
reform of the Organisation Committees to bring them in line with the National Revolution, 
which hardly would have been necessary had they been moulded by the ideology in the first 
place.109  While the National Revolution may have influenced later economic policy, and 
indeed played a decisive role in projects such as the Labour Charter, there is no evidence to 
suggest that it influenced the measures taken over the summer of 1940. 
The confusion surrounding Vichy’s industrial policy and the National Revolution has 
been exacerbated by retrospection that can be found even in government documents in Vichy.  
In his summary report for Pétain prepared three months after the law of 16 August – and one 
month after the first public articulation of the National Revolution by Pétain – René Belin 
applies a veneer of National Revolution rhetoric to his account of the creation of the New 
Industrial Order:  
In your speech, you definitively condemned an economic system in which, because of 
the game played by trusts, not-necessarily-French interests created and stifled work.  
It was therefore impossible to allow such a regime, which perpetuated a situation so 
injurious to the material and moral interests of the nation, to be restored.  It was 
necessary to organise production, to frame it in legal and moral discipline, in which 
the dignity of France and French workers experience the eminent reverence that they 
deserve.  Such was the purpose of the law of 16 August...110 
In this report, Belin implies that the creation of the Organisation Committees was in reaction 
to the address of Pétain on the National Revolution, which in fact took place two months 
later.111  This deceptive retrospection, which took place even in confidential documents mere 
weeks after these events occurred, may explain at least in part why some historians continue 
to view the laws of the summer of 1940 through the lens of the National Revolution first 
outlined that autumn.112 
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 This conclusion is confirmed by Belin in his memoirs, in which he bluntly dismisses 
the National Revolution as “nothing more than a formula, a slogan, maybe a myth... an 
invention of a quadroon of intellectuals who haunted Vichy’s corridors”.113  It should be 
noted that he makes no mention of having framed reports for Pétain in the ideological context 
of this “invention”, but his assertion that Pétain’s programme did not influence Vichy’s 
industrial policy is nevertheless consistent with the narrative that emerges upon close 
examination of the available archival documents. 
 The third explanation is that the model for organising French industry was little more 
than the German model, transposed to France.  Indeed, upon the Liberation of France the 
Provisional Government denounced Vichy’s industrial order as having been “imported on the 
backs of invading tanks”.114  Françoise Berger has argued that Vichy “establish[ed] a 
structure consistent with the German system”, which she specifies “cannot have been a 
coincidence”.115  This view was also advanced by François Lehideux, who admitted that the 
French Committees’ “technical methods were the same” as those of the German 
Wirtschaftsgruppen, and that the French model was modelled on the Reich’s, “without any 
great imagination”.116  Recent comparative studies of the French and German economic and 
industrial systems have shown this to be an oversimplification, however, as the French 
version was much more statist, allowing more direct control over industrial production by the 
Government than was the case in Germany.117  It is worth noting that the model was not 
imposed on France by the German authorities, and that the Reich’s model was not reproduced 
identically in France.  Nevertheless, these studies do not contradict the underlying notion that 
German industrial organisation served as a model for the French Government.   
At the opposite pole is a fourth explanation, or the “patriotic narrative”, which 
emphasises the distinctions between the French and German model by contending that the 
New Industrial Order was created by the French Government in Vichy in reaction to German 
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actions and against the wishes of the German authorities.  This “patriotic narrative” is clearly 
favoured by the actors who created the Organisation Committees, given the obvious appeal of 
distancing the creation of the Committees from the collaboration in which they participated 
during the war.118  Pierre Laroque’s variation on this theme has been particularly popular 
among historians.  Claire Andrieu notes that “the patriotic inspiration of the Organisation 
Committees is hard to contest if we refer to Pierre Laroque’s testimony”.119  Michel 
Margairaz similarly refers to Laroque’s account, noting “the antinomy between the two laws” 
of 16 August and 10 September, identifying the former as a means of defending French 
industry from German exigencies.120  This is consistent with Lambert Blum-Picard’s 
understanding of the New Industrial Order in 1944.  Discussing the Committees within the 
Resistance in Algiers, Blum-Picard argued that “the Organisation Committees as they were 
originally conceived would have been too independent of the Germans. That is why [the 
Germans] pushed for the adoption of a new, more centralised system for allocation”, namely 
OCRPI.121  This distinction between “French” Organisation Committees and a “German” 
OCRPI has remained a part of the historiography on the Committees and figures in recent 
works as well.122   
The fifth and final narrative argues that Vichy constructed the new system motivated 
chiefly by pragmatism, to deal with the pressing challenges confronting French industry.123  
This is also confirmed in the memoirs of the relevant Ministers, who argued that there was a 
sharp divide between politics and economics, and that the latter remained apolitical.124  While 
the pragmatic narrative is largely correct, it ultimately fails to provide a satisfactory 
                                                          
118 In his memoirs, René Belin claims that the creation of the Organisation Committees protected French 
industry and infuriated the German authorities.  See Belin, op.cit., 150. 
119 Claire Andrieu, La Banque sous l’occupation, (Paris: FNSP, 1990), 131. 
120 Michel Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie, (Paris: Comité pour l’histoire économique et financère 
de la France, 1991), 513-4. 
121 “Sous-Commission d’étude des organes directeurs de répartition. Séance du 14 avril 1944”, 14 April 1944, 
CFLN 686, MAE.  This narrative was favoured by Blum-Picard as he was explaining why France ought to 
maintain the Organisation Committees after the Liberation in 1944. 
122 Arne Radtke-Delacor, “La position des comités d’organisation face aux autorités d’occupation: la pomme de 
discorde des commandes allemandes en 1940-1941” in Hervé Joly (ed.), op. cit., 63-72 .  
123 See, for example, Andrew Shennen, Rethinking France : Plans for Renewal, 1940-1946 (Oxford : Clarendon 
Press, 1989), 234-5 ; Richard Vinen, The politics of French business, 1936-1945 (Cambridge : CUP, 1991), 103-4; 
L. Yagil, op.cit., 213-4 ; Julian Jackson, op.cit., 161-165. 
124 Yves Bouthillier, Minister for Finance and the Economy, wrote that “the Armistice was dictated by necessity.  
Things being as they were, governing France in the best interests of the French was an imperious task.  
Accepting the presence of German troops on French soil by no means implied our embrace of the Nazi order.”  
See Bouthillier, Le Drame de Vichy, volume 2 (Paris: Plon, 1951), 4.  René Belin’s memoirs similarly argue that 
he acted out of pragmatism.  See Belin, op.cit. 
43 
 
explanation of why this solution was adopted rather than other, equally pragmatic 
alternatives.  The establishment of a complex system of Organisation Committees and 
Sections of the Central Bureau was hardly the simplest, most obvious course of action, 
especially if it is held that the German model was not consciously emulated by Vichy.  This 
limitation must qualify the value of this narrative and demands a fuller explanation.   
Of course, there is some merit to all of these explanations, and they are by no means 
mutually exclusive.  Indeed, it is entirely possible that Belin and his associates were 
concurrently motivated by their pre-war beliefs, patriotism, and pragmatism.  What all five 
narratives of the establishment of the New Industrial Order have in common is that they take 
16 August 1940 as the starting point.  Formally, of course, this is faultless – it was indeed this 
law that established the Organisation Committees.  The law, by all accounts, was drafted 
hurriedly and was largely improvised.  Moreover, it is agreed that René Belin, as Minister for 
Industrial Production, was the author of the law and the originator of its content.  This is in no 
small part confirmed by Belin himself, who later wrote that “the ligne générale of the law of 
the 16th of August was mine and mine alone”.125  Consequently, historians have tended to 
focus on the Ministry for Industrial Production, on Belin, and on the law of 16 August as the 
source of the Organisation Committees and the consequent reordering of French industry.  A 
thorough analysis of the archival documents available, however, reveals a somewhat different 
narrative.  The first proposal for organising French industry according to branch into 
committees was made on 15 July, the day after Belin was appointed to Vichy’s Cabinet, and a 
full month before the passing of the law that he claimed was entirely his own idea.  
Considering these facts, a new narrative emerges that challenges the five existing 
explanations and reveals why the reforms to French industry took the shape they did.   
 
The prehistory of the Organisation Committees, June-August 1940   
 As we have seen, by June the German occupation authorities were approaching 
French factories individually and forcing them to produce materials for the German military, 
lest they be evicted from their factories.  In an attempt to overcome this dilemma, a proposal 
was made by General Huntziger, the head of the French delegation at the Armistice 
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Commission.126  In a letter to Pétain dated 15 July, he suggested the creation of an 
intermediary body attached to the French Government.  “This organism would receive the 
German government’s orders and distribute them among the French manufacturers, making 
no distinction between the Occupied and Non-Occupied Zones”.127  Huntziger foresaw that 
this body would have jurisdiction over all armaments production, whether destined for the 
Wehrmacht, the Luftwaffe, or the Kriegsmarine.  Already we can identify the ligne générale 
of the Organisation Committees: the creation of a state-controlled organism that would be 
placed between the German occupation authorities and French industrialists, distributing 
orders from the former to the latter.  It is also crucial to recognise that Huntziger foresaw that 
the system would apply equally to both zones.  Until this point, the German authorities had 
not attempted to have factories in the Non-Occupied Zone complete orders for the Reich.  
Combining both zones for the purposes of industrial production would prove to be a double-
edged sword: while it gave the French Government in Vichy control over industry in the 
Occupied Zone and improved industrial production by relaxing the demarcation line, it also 
allowed the German authorities to exert far more influence over the southern zone than had 
previously been the case. 
On the very day that General Huntziger was authoring the text that would be so 
influential on French industry for the next six years, the French Government announced that 
it had named a new Minister for Industrial Production: René Belin.128  While Belin was 
settling into his first days of political office, exchanges between the French authorities and 
their German counterparts continued.  On 21 July, six days after Huntziger’s proposal, Léon 
Noël, Vichy’s ambassador and head of the French Delegation in Paris, sent a letter to Dr 
Elmar Michel, head of the Economic Section of the German Military Administration of 
France, noting that both German and French governments had agreed that their objective was 
to revive France’s economy and to “ensure good use of production capacities in France”.  To 
this end, Noël stated that “each industry will form an office that will have contact with the 
German Economic Delegation” in Paris.129  This marks the first mention of industry-specific 
offices created to deal directly with the German authorities of behalf of French industrialists, 
a defining feature of the Organisation Committees.  The next day, the French Delegation in 
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Paris articulated this design in more detail, outlining a proposal for the creation of a “Liaison 
Office” that would represent the French chemical industry to the German authorities.  The 
document specifies that this office “should be in touch with Liaison Offices of other 
industries, thereby forming the base of a collective organisation that would permit the 
eventual creation of a sort of central exchange commission that would ensure financing and 
facilitate Franco-German compensation”.130  By 22 July, then, a network of inter-related 
offices representing different branches of French industry before the German authorities had 
been delineated by the French authorities in Paris. 
This plan was directly incorporated into the report prepared by Jacques Barnaud, 
René Belin’s Chief of Staff, and presented to the Cabinet in Vichy on 24 July.131  Since the 
ministries’ civil service was based in Paris, while ministers remained in Vichy, Barnaud 
shuttled back and forth between the two cities.  Assigned to compile a report on the status of 
French industry in the Occupied Zone, Barnaud painted a bleak picture emphasising the many 
attempts of the German authorities to seize control over French industry.  While his report 
provided a succinct synthesis of the situation in the Occupied Zone, the most significant 
section of the report was its recommendation: 
A single solution to this agonising situation seems to present itself.  In the face of German 
organisation, we must set up strong [French] organisation.  This cannot exist without the 
grouping together of different economic activities in obligatory and disciplined professional 
organisations.  These organisations must designate responsible representatives for each 
branch of activity whose duty it will be to negotiate alone with the German economic 
authorities.  Nevertheless, these representatives will take direction from qualified French 
authorities beforehand and will remain in contact with them...132 
This constitutes the first recorded mention of such organisation in Vichy.  Although he does 
not identify the origins of the proposal, we do know that Barnaud had met with Célier, Noël’s 
deputy, at the French Delegation in Paris on 22 July and left that meeting with a copy of the 
Delegation’s plans for industrial reorganisation.133  It is therefore probable that with his 
report, Barnaud presented to the Cabinet of the French Government the distillation of what 
French authorities in Paris and Wiesbaden had been steadily developing over the previous 
nine days.  Nevertheless, it would take three more weeks for Belin to present to the Cabinet 
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the draft of the law that would create the Organisation Committees.134  In the meantime, the 
actions taken in Paris would continue to outpace those of the Ministry for Industrial 
Production in Vichy. 
 On 26 July, the French Delegation wrote a letter to Dr Michel, informing him that the 
plans to organise the French chemical industry were now a fait accompli.  They asked that the 
German authorities cease to deal directly with individual French industrialists, and instead 
deal only with the “Professional Office” created for the chemical industry.135  That same day, 
letters were written to French industrialists instructing them to reply to any German orders by 
explaining that the German authorities must instead address themselves to the relevant 
Professional Offices.136  The implementation of effective bodies that would coordinate 
German orders within different branches of industry had begun. 
 By the end of July, the French authorities in Paris had succeeded in reorganising 
French industry in the Occupied Zone.  Certainly, the system that existed at the end of July 
and the one that would exist a month later, after the law of 16 August, had a number of 
important differences.  Most obviously, the Liaison Offices existed only in the Occupied 
Zone, despite having been initially envisaged for both zones by General Huntziger.  
Institutionally, the Liaison Offices existed within the employers’ associations of 
industrialists, which allowed them to be set up in such a short period of time.  The law of 16 
August, however, moved the Offices outside of these employers’ associations, thereby 
ensuring closer state control.  From the text of the law, the Organisation Committees would 
be firmly under state control, would ultimately include labour representation, and would be 
less dominated by industrial interests.  In practice, however, the Organisation Committees 
would be stacked with representatives of large firms and labour representation was 
minimal.137  The Committees were also to be more statist than the Liaison Offices, which 
received direction from, without being controlled by, the Government.  But despite these 
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differences, it is clear that the Liaison Offices are the forerunners of the Organisation 
Committees and thereby constitute the foundation of the New Industrial Order. 
 
Meanwhile back in Vichy 
 Having examined the evolution towards Organisation Committees that was taking 
place in the Occupied Zone, it is worthwhile to compare this with the actions of the Ministry 
for Industrial Production in Vichy in early August.  While industry in the Occupied Zone had 
already been reorganised by this time, René Belin’s concerns seem to have been strikingly 
different. In a report he prepared for Pétain dated 7 August, the Minister reveals himself to be 
perceptibly out of step with the developments made in the Occupied Zone.  Much of Belin’s 
report is simply a repackaging of the descriptions of industry in the northern zone provided 
by Barnaud in his report two weeks earlier, along with a lengthy section on social conditions 
in the Occupied Zone – perhaps not surprising given that Belin had spent his career as a trade 
unionist.  His assessment of the Occupied Zone suggests that he was not aware of the system 
that had already been put in place nearly a fortnight earlier.  He notes that German authorities 
had entered into contact with French industrialists in an effort to “control the economy of the 
Occupied Zone”, but he never mentions any of the measures already taken by the French 
Delegation in Paris.  Moreover, his recommendations for Pétain are of strikingly little 
substance: “It is indispensable that the Government return to Paris and reach political and 
economic agreements with the occupying power.  These two objectives are undoubtedly 
demanded by the current conditions [in the Occupied Zone]”.  To this he adds a short paean 
to Pétain, whom he urges to “examine these problems and take the decisions without which 
the moral and political unity of France will be broken for the foreseeable future”.138  These 
words are not only vague but also unoriginal: the French Government had been trying to 
return to Paris since the beginning of July, and was waiting for the German authorities to 
authorise the relocation.  Meanwhile, his suggestion that the Government reach “political and 
economic agreements”, without specifying what these might contain, is similarly ineffective.  
It is remarkable that only one week before Belin presented the text of the law that would 
reorganise French industry, the Minister seemed to be ill-informed and without vision. 
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 Clearly, something decisive must have happened in that critical week that resulted in 
Belin presenting such an ambitious plan as the law of 16 August.  The turning point was 
undoubtedly the two-day meeting convened by Belin to discuss the situation of French 
industry.  On 9 and 10 August, Belin was joined by Jacques Barnaud, Yves Bouthillier, the 
Minister for Finance and the Economy, and a small handful of other members of Belin’s 
ministry, including Jean Bichelonne, to produce a solution to the problems being faced in the 
Occupied Zone.139  While no records from that meeting exist, we can surmise what took 
place.  Given Barnaud’s recommendation to the Cabinet for the creation of Liaison Offices 
more than two weeks earlier, it is most likely that the idea to establish Organisation 
Committees was his, derived from his experience in the Occupied Zone.  He had been in 
close contact with the French authorities in Paris since the signature of the Armistice and was 
keenly aware of the situation in the Occupied Zone and what measures had been 
implemented.  Considering the weaknesses of the report completed by Belin only two days 
before this meeting, and the conspicuous absence of any plausible solutions to the situation in 
that report, it is indeed improbable that the idea to create Organisation Committees was, as he 
later claimed, his and his alone.  Rather, more plausible is that Belin, who had been the last 
minister named to the Cabinet and had never held political office, was still learning the ropes 
less than a month after his arrival.  In this context, it is logical that the new minister allowed 
himself to be influenced by his Chief of Staff, Jacques Barnaud.  
 While Belin may not have been the originator of the idea, he certainly influenced the 
final shape of the Organisation Committees.  Although his report from 7 August may have 
revealed the absence of any kind of meaningful industrial reorganisation on his part, it also 
demonstrated the degree to which social conditions mattered to him.  Having spent his career 
working in trade unions, and simultaneously holding the Labour portfolio in Vichy’s 
government, Belin clearly gave more consideration to the plight of working people than did 
any other member of the Cabinet.  This preoccupation is clearly detectable in the text of the 
law of 16 August, particularly when juxtaposed with the descriptions of the system of Liaison 
Offices.  While the latter focused exclusively on creating a buffer between the German 
authorities and French employers, the law of 16 August sought to involve workers as well, 
essentially merging employers’ associations with trade unions and arranging them according 
to branches of industry.  These elements are absent from both the system established in the 
Occupied Zone and the recommendations made by Barnaud to the Cabinet in Vichy on 24 
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July, in which the Liaison Offices were simply attached to the relevant employers’ 
associations.  While Barnaud may have initiated the reorganisation of French industry, it was 
almost certainly the Minister for Industrial Production who sought to involve labour in the 
new structure. 
 
A Franco-German Europe? 
 The law of 16 August did not spring forward fully formed from René Belin’s 
forehead, but was rather the culmination of a series of measures taken to resist German 
pressures in the Occupied Zone virtually as soon as the ink on the Armistice was dry.  Given 
how the law of 16 August would appear to derail Nazi plans to occupy or intimidate 
individual firms, it seems remarkable that they did not simply overrule the law by one means 
or another.  Belin later wrote that the law “provoked rage among the Germans, undoubtedly 
since it pulled the rug out from under their feet”.140  This narrative is maintained by Arne 
Radtke-Delacor, who claims that the move “led to a vehement reaction” from the “furious” 
German authorities: they imposed a new requirement that all legislation affecting the 
Occupied Zone be submitted in draft form for German approval beforehand.  This, he argues, 
was in direct response to the law of 16 August, which “came at a very high cost”.141  It must 
be noted, however, that Radtke-Delacor does not provide any archival evidence to prove that 
any Germans officials were angered by the law, other than the fact that they put the new 
requirement in place.142  To the extent that the German Military Administration was upset at 
all, it was principally because from its perspective, the French Government had not followed 
protocol, namely by failing to submit the draft of the law to Dr Michel for approval prior to 
its promulgation.  Indeed, the requirement that Vichy submit all draft legislation affecting the 
economy of the Occupied Zone, formally imposed by the Germans after 16 August, was 
merely a refinement of an earlier German order from 20 July, which stipulated that “all 
economic decisions made by the Delegation or its collaborators be submitted to [Dr Michel] 
for approval”.143 The supposedly angry reprisal of the German authorities after having been 
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outdone by the audacious law of 16 August was in fact merely a clarification that the French 
Government in Vichy should be counted among the collaborators of the French Delegation, at 
least when passing legislation affecting the economy of the Occupied Zone, and therefore 
subject to the order of 20 July.  The German authorities, after all, had been fully informed of 
the establishment of the Liaison Offices, and cooperated with this new regime.  The reason 
for their willingness to work with such a system is explained by the fact that they had their 
eyes on a far more ambitious plan than the mere occupation of isolated factories in northern 
France. 
 At a meeting at the French Delegation in Paris on 20 July, Major Burandt of the 
German Military Administration explained to his French interlocutors that, with Germany 
still at war against Great Britain, industrial production in Germany and in Occupied France 
alike had to be mobilised to this end.  He stated his vision of comprehensive industrial 
planning in the Occupied Zone, including the distribution of raw materials in France by 
Germany.144  To this end, French industry should be rationally organised.  By the first week 
of August, Célier wrote to Dr Michel to follow up on the letter sent on 26 July stating that the 
Liaison Office had been established for the French chemical industry: “I can confirm that the 
French Government desires that relations between French industry and the German 
authorities be centralised, for each industry, by a Liaison Office... This will facilitate the 
establishment of a common plan to make full use of French and German means of production 
and to distribute raw materials.”145  This shows that, for the French Delegation, the 
reorganisation of French industry was done not simply to protect factories from German 
takeovers, but crucially to facilitate Franco-German collaboration.  From the very beginning, 
the Liaison Offices were meant to support collaboration.  
 This reasoning was certainly known to Barnaud.  At a meeting on 3 August, Dr 
Michel stated that he wished “to establish a Franco-German economic collaboration, notably 
through the establishment of a common plan for production and distribution corresponding to 
the needs of both countries and by a certain pooling of raw materials.”146  At a meeting of 
representatives from the French and German textile industries, at which Barnaud was present, 
the Germans put forth the question of “conducting a census of the entirety of stocks and 
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means of production existing in both zones, in order to establish a Franco-German production 
programme and, eventually, a distribution of raw materials that would permit German and 
French factories to work at the same rhythm.”147  At the meeting, it was also recognised that 
the organisation of French industrialists into Professional Offices had already been a success, 
and that both sides were dealing with the Offices increasingly.148 August began with French 
and German governments and their officials in agreement to construct a harmonised Franco-
German production system, founded largely on the Professional Offices that preceded the 
Organisation Committees. 
 On 8 August, the day before the meeting at which the law of 16 August was 
developed in Vichy, another meeting between the French and German economic delegations 
confirmed the willingness of both sides to embrace collaboration.  The German authorities 
“accept[ed] in principle collaboration between the French administration authorities, the 
responsible organisms and their own services for the preparation of an organisational plan 
applicable to the diverse branches of the French economy.”  They also confirmed that as soon 
as this plan was established, the practice of requisitions would cease.  Most importantly, it 
was agreed that “the Professional Offices will study under the authority of the Ministry for 
Industrial Production the stocks and production capacity of firms as well as the needs of the 
French economy”.149  This organisation essentially constitutes the mission statement of the 
Organisation Committees, a week before their creation.  While not all of the elements 
discussed had been implemented yet, French and German authorities in Paris had agreed to 
virtually all the elements of the creation of Organisation Committees, right down to the role 
of Belin’s ministry.  It is almost certain that Barnaud was in attendance at this meeting, 
before returning to Vichy to develop the text of the law of 16 August with Belin over the 
following two days. This meeting shows that the German authorities saw the organisation of 
French industry according to branch not as a threat to German interests, but rather as a 
constructive path towards a German-led European economy.  The French authorities were 
relieved that the practice of requisitions in the Occupied Zone would end with the institution 
of this new system.  The reasoning behind the Organisation Committees was therefore guided 
in large part by plans for collaboration.    
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 This vision of an integrated European economic order was publicly outlined by 
Walther Funk, the German Minister for the Economy, in a speech made on 26 July.  He 
declared that, once German victory had been achieved, the Reich would “apply the economic 
methods that ha[d] brought it such great economic and military success” to France and the 
rest of Continental Europe.  He claimed that “National Socialist economic policy has never 
allowed itself to be governed by rigid dogma in its methods.  We have always used whatever 
methods seemed most expedient at the time... In the same way the New Economic Order in 
Europe will grow out of the existing circumstances.”150  Applied to the French case, this 
would mean that whatever provisional arrangements were enacted would serve as a 
foundation for the post-war order.  Of course, this was not the European integration promoted 
by Briand and Laval a decade earlier.151  Funk made it perfectly clear that the purpose of this 
New Economic Order would be to serve German interests, and that countries such as France 
would serve as export outlets for German goods.152  Nevertheless, it did offer an insight into 
what was in store for French industry.  German victory was not a distant prospect, but was 
understood to be imminent.  The day after Funk’s speech, a report was circulated in the 
French Foreign Ministry noting that Germany had already offered the terms of a negotiated 
peace to the British government, and were still awaiting a reply.153  These terms demarcated 
clear German and British spheres of influence: Germany would control the European 
continent, Britain would maintain its Empire.154  If the British were to reject the offer, 
Germany was ready to attack England “as soon as weather permits”.  The Nazis estimated 
that they would take control of Britain within thirty days of the initial attack.155  While these 
estimates were utterly naïve in retrospect, the French had every reason to believe them.  On 
10 May, the first day of the German attack, France believed that it was protected from 
Germany by the impenetrable Maginot Line; by 10 June, thirty days later, the French 
                                                          
150 Walther Funk, “The economic reorganization of Europe” in Walter Lipgens, Documents on the history of 
European integration. Volume 1: Continental plans for European union, 1939-1945, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 
1984), 65-70, here 66. 
151 On Germany’s economic plans for Europe during the war, the classic study remains Jacques Freymond, Le 
IIIe Reich et la réorganisation économique de l’Europe, 1940-1942 (Paris: Leiden, 1974).  For the “European” 
ideology of the Nazis, see Julien Prévotaux, Un européisme nazi. Le Groupe Collaboration et l’idéologie 
européenne dans la Seconde Guerre mondiale (Paris: François-Xavier de Guibert, 2010) and, for French 
perceptions of German plans for European integration, Bernard Bruneteau, “L’Europe Nouvelle” de Hitler, une 
illusion des intellectuels de Vichy (Monaco, Du Rocher, 2003). 
152 Ibid. 
153 “Presse allemande du 26 juillet“, 26 July 1940, Papiers 1940, Papiers Baudouin, MAE. 
154 “Copie d’un télégramme du 27 juillet de Havas New-York à Havas Clermont“, 27 July 1940, Papiers 1940, 
Papiers Baudouin, MAE. 
155 Ibid.  
53 
 
Government declared Paris an open city, and the capital fell four days later.  After such a 
decisive victory over France, Germany was seen as an invincible force; the choice for Britain 
seemed to be between negotiated peace and certain defeat.  In either event, German victory 
was understood as imminent, and German plans for a post-war European economic order 
were therefore of pressing concern.   Subsequent events would ensure that Funk’s plans never 
progressed beyond their theoretical stages, but in the summer of 1940, they were taken very 
seriously by the French authorities. 
 The French authorities in Paris and the French Government in Vichy were both very 
much aware of Funk’s speech, and summaries of the speech were distributed to French 
officials.156  Five days after Funk’s speech, the French Delegation wrote to Dr Michel that 
“the French Government is ready to collaborate with the German Government to organise a 
planned economy for Continental Europe”.157  Shortly after the law of 16 August had been 
issued, Jacques Barnaud wrote to industrialists to explain that until the Organisation 
Committees were inaugurated, the Liaison Offices would continue to serve as the point of 
contact between French industry and the German authorities.  He further specified that “the 
negotiations taken by these Liaison Offices must fit into the framework of a Franco-German 
economy”.158 This receptiveness of the French to Nazi plans for a united European economy 
led German authorities to abandon the capricious requisitioning that had characterised the 
first weeks of German presence in France, refocusing their energies on restoring the French 
economy so that it could better serve German interests.159  General Huntziger, who had been 
the first to propose creating an entity to coordinate German orders made to French industry, 
argued that producing war matériel for the Reich was inevitable given German dominance, 
and that the Government should at least negotiate concessions in exchange for supplying the 
German military.160  While the Germans themselves had originally foreseen the production of 
component parts of war matériel rather than finished armaments in France, they clearly 
expected France to produce for the German war effort.161  France’s integration into a 
German-dominated Europe stretching from the English Channel to the Soviet border would 
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deepen over the following years and its contributions to the German economy and war effort 
would be increasingly important.  When the Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union in June 
1941, it did so with a number of new, French-made tanks.162 
 The German motivation for accepting the reorganisation of French industry along the 
lines of the law of 16 August was thus tied to Germany’s desire to establish a European 
economy that could be mobilised towards German interests, including the war against Britain.  
German occupations of factories ceased and engagement with the Organisation Committees 
became standard procedure.  A French Government report noted that German “intentions to 
control economic and industrial activity in France is obvious.  It appears, however, that 
whenever the Germans find themselves in the presence of efficient civil servants or 
industrialists, the Germans quite willingly respect their authority”.163  As long as French 
industry served German interests, the German authorities were perfectly willing to allow the 
French to run their own factories.  In other words, there was no need to set up 
Wirtschaftsgruppen in France, as Germany had done in Belgium.164  The desire that French 
industry be coordinated and mobilised to German ends explains the latter’s acquiescence to 
the law of 16 August, despite the French transgression of not submitting the text of the law to 
German authorities before promulgating it.  Indeed, the Germans might also have objected to 
the decidedly statist character of the Organisation Committees, which distinguished these 
organisms from the Liaison Offices approved by the Germans a week earlier.  While those 
offices were based in employers’ associations, the law of 16 August allowed the Minister for 
Industrial Production to designate the composition of each Committee and gave the Ministry 
not only a representative on each committee, but also a veto on virtually all decisions.  Yet 
this “assertion of sovereignty”165 on the part of the French Government was hollow, since it 
constituted part of a broader policy of increasing integration into the Continental European 
economy under German hegemony.  While the law was intended in part to safeguard French 
factories from being taken over directly by Germans, the law itself was entirely compatible 
with Germany’s broader interests.  
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 The reorganisation of French industry was completed with the law of 10 September.  
While the Organisation Committees dealt with industrial production, it was quickly realised 
that an initial distribution of raw materials to the various branches of industry had to be 
carried out, before these allocations could in turn be redistributed by the relevant 
Organisation Committees.  This would be the responsibility of the Central Bureau for the 
Distribution of Industrial Products (OCRPI), created by the law of 10 September.  In his 
memoirs, Belin confesses that, in the haste in which the law of 16 August was written, he had 
not foreseen the shortcoming of the Organisation Committees and the need for the Central 
Bureau.  “For the sake of truth I must say that it was the services of Dr Michel, with their 
long experience with economic planning, that first indicated this flaw to me.  The law of 10 
September... completed our purview of the planned economy”.166  This attribution to Dr 
Michel is confirmed by the head of the economic section of German Military Administration 
himself in a report written at war’s end.  He claims that “the French Government quickly 
recognised the reasonableness of German demands and, on 10 September, the law for the 
regulation of raw materials was promulgated.”  Michel adds that “the Military Administration 
could provide the French Government with practical lessons accumulated over several years 
in Germany.”167  During the war, Michel had described the role of the Military 
Administration as the “management of economic planning” being done by the French; while 
the Germans provided the French with “guidance”, he insisted that “control of the French 
economy remains in the hands of the French State”.168  Michel’s statements belie the degree 
of influence the German authorities exerted over Vichy.        
 Coming from the German authorities, the recommendation to create the Central 
Bureau was certainly not intended to buttress French assertions of sovereignty.  Rather, 
having established that their approval was needed on all legislation affecting the Occupied 
Zone, the German authorities succeeded in appropriating the statist powers that Vichy had 
slipped into the law of 16 August.  In each of the Sections of OCRPI, a representative of the 
German authorities would be present.  While the French Government had secured tight 
control over the Organisation Committees, they themselves were dependent on the initial 
distribution of raw materials by the German-controlled Central Bureau.  This German 
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influence would ensure that the European economy in which France was increasingly 
implicated would be firmly steered by Germany. 
 
Conclusion 
 The paralysis of French industry in the summer of 1940 had necessitated state action.  
While the existing historiography focuses on the law of 16 August and the actions of the 
French Government in Vichy as the starting point of the reorganisation of French industry, 
this approach fails to fully explain why France’s New Industrial Order took the shape it did.  
An analysis of the archival evidence from before 16 August reveals that by far the greater 
portion of the new architecture of French industry was sketched over the month of July in the 
Occupied Zone, rather than in Vichy in mid-August as it is generally held.  Given Barnaud’s 
insistence that “in the face of German organisation, we must set up strong [French] 
organisation”, it is likely that the Organisation Committees were modelled on Germany’s 
analogous bodies, which would also have been eminently pragmatic in the context of a 
defeated France in a German-led Europe.  Moreover, practically every step of the 
construction of this New Industrial Order was approved by the German authorities before 16 
August.  Far from being an audacious stroke that reasserted French sovereignty in the face of 
German economic plans, the establishment of the Organisation Committees occurred in the 
context of a German-led Europe.  Plans for Franco-German collaboration were eagerly taken 
up by the French Government as it sought to secure France a favourable place in the post-war 
European order.  The provisions for close state control included in the law of 16 August were 
in turn appropriated by the Germans for the law of 10 September, which ensured that the 
distribution of raw materials on which French industry depended remained firmly in German 
hands.  By the end of the summer of 1940, the groundwork had been laid for the 
collaboration that would characterise the remainder of the war.  Having set out the legal 
framework of the New Industrial Order, the individual Organisation Committees would have 
to be created, staffed, and contribute to Vichy’s plans for Franco-German collaboration. 
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Chapter Two: 
’Twixt the cup and the lip: Building the New Industrial Order, 1940-1941 
 
By the end of the eventful summer of 1940, the judicial foundations of the New 
Industrial Order had been laid.  The law of 16 August, based on the evolutions made in the 
Occupied Zone during the seven weeks following the Armistice, called for the creation of 
Organisation Committees that would take inventory of existing stocks and rationally organise 
production within each industry.  The law also denoted that these new bodies would be 
tripartite, drawing their representatives from amongst employers, workers, and government 
officials.  The law of 10 September, pushed by the German authorities, created 
complementary bodies in the Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products 
(OCRPI) that would allocate primary materials to the Organisation Committees.  These two 
laws had clearly set out the shape that French industry would take in a German-led Europe. 
 Despite the straightforward clauses contained in these laws, however, constructing 
these new institutions proved more difficult than it had been to describe them.  Indeed, the 
law of 16 August built upon the existing Liaison Offices (or Professional Offices) that had 
developed immediately following the German presence in France.  The greatest innovation of 
the text itself was the addition of labour and the State to a realm that had been the reserve of 
employers.169  The text of the law, which had been hammered out over a mere weekend in 
Vichy, took nearly three months to be applied to the steel industry.  In the meantime, Jacques 
Barnaud, the Chief of Staff of Minister for Industrial Production René Belin,170 instructed 
industrialists to continue using the provisional Liaison Offices until the newly constituted 
Organisation Committees were complete.171 
 On 9 November 1940, the Organisation Committee for Steel was inaugurated.  Given 
the tripartite spirit of the law of 16 August, introduced under former trade unionist Belin, the 
most shocking aspect of the new organisations was the utter lack of labour representation.  
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The Organisation Committee for Steel (CORSID) consisted of four industrialists, with the 
addition of a representative from the Ministry of Industrial Production. In this chapter, we 
will explore how the implementation of the law of 16 August 1940 compromised the 
tripartism present in the text of the law, and consider the continuities between the pre-war era 
and the Vichy period.  We will begin by considering the role of the Vichy government in 
putting the Organisation Committee for Steel in place, before turning to the first actions taken 
by CORSID.  Lastly, we will examine the role of the German authorities in the 
implementation of this New Industrial Order that sought to integrate French and German 
heavy industry. 
 
Industrial organisation under Vichy: “acte révolutionnaire” or “pure façade”? 
 The existing historiography on the early stages of industrial reorganisation in Vichy 
France fails to provide a satisfactory explanation for the rapid fading of tripartism after 16 
August 1940.  This is linked to the debate over the degree to which 1940 marked a true 
turning point for French industry, or whether there was instead considerable continuity from 
the interwar period.  Earlier accounts of Vichy, such as those by Robert Paxton and Alan 
Milward, tended to emphasise the rupture between the Third Republic and Vichy.172  This 
was in no small part nourished by documents that had flowed from the French and German 
authorities during the war, eager to distance the new regime from the liberal republic 
dominated by “trusts”, to use Vichy’s favoured term.  Moreover, these historians did not have 
access to the French archives, which were opened only in the late 1970s, and the German 
archives on which their analyses were based tended to emphasise the Fall of France as a 
breach in French industrial organisation.  The dissolution of the Comité des forges, the 
employers’ association for steel, was singled out in the German press as an “acte 
révolutionnaire”, since the Comité “had become a State within the State”.  Instead, “new 
personalities have entered the scene, and the French [steel] industry is henceforth represented 
not by politicians, but by technicians”.173  Pétain similarly trumpeted the “universal failure of 
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the liberal economy” and the need for France to “embark upon the path of a new 
economy”,174 which was to be achieved through Vichy’s National Revolution. 
 The Comité des forges and the Comité central des houillères de France, the analogous 
grouping for the coal industry, were singled out for dissolution.  Both dating from the mid-
nineteenth century, these were the only two employers’ associations that were explicitly 
disbanded by a decree on 9 November 1940.175  Moreover, their respective leaders were 
excluded from the newly assembled Organisation Committees, a state of affairs that elicited 
bitterness towards the regime from the erstwhile leaders.176  This purposeful targeting of 
these associations for dissolution, and the exclusion of their leaders from the successor 
bodies, would indeed suggest discontinuity from the Third Republic.  The radical nature of 
the law of 16 August, the suppression of trade union confederations and employers’ 
associations, and the introduction of a de jure tripartite industrial order would all suggest that 
the changes made in the summer of 1940 did indeed constitute a decisive break from the pre-
war era.  Yet Philippe Mioche, the most prolific historian of the French steel industry during 
the mid-twentieth century, argues that “CORSID falls within the history of professional 
organisation” through 1940, and that “the men, the debates, and the actions of CORSID 
continue those of the Comité des forges”. 177 He concludes that the institutional changes 
introduced in 1940 were merely superficial. Annie Lacroix-Riz agrees, arguing that the 
decree of 9 November amounted to a “dissolution de pure façade”.178 
 While the German propagandist lauding of the dissolution of the Comité des forges as 
a revolutionary act should be viewed with scepticism, it seems overly simplistic to therefore 
embrace the opposite conclusion, namely that the Comité des forges underwent nothing more 
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than a change of name in 1940.  Given the decidedly radical content of the laws of 16 August 
and 10 September 1940, discussed in the previous chapter, had these been implemented as 
originally articulated, the question of continuity could be answered rather easily.  As we shall 
see, however, there was a significant evolution between the proclamation of the laws of 
industrial organisation and the formation of the bodies foreseen in those laws, over the winter 
of 1940-1941.  These developments, and the influences that caused them, reveal a more 
nuanced explanation. 
 
The creation of CORSID: stillborn tripartism? 
 The law of 9 November 1940 formally created the Organisation Committee for Steel 
(CORSID), along the lines of the law of 16 August.  Four members were named, all of them 
industrialists: Jules Aubrun, who was proclaimed president of the body, Léon Daum, Jean 
Dupuis and Eugène Roy.  This short decree, signed by Pétain and Belin, established one of 
the first of the Organisation Committees.179  The law retained the strong statist element of the 
August law, specifying that the decision of which firms would come under the jurisdiction of 
CORSID would be made by the Minister for Industrial Production.  It was therefore possible 
for firms only marginally involved in steel production to be subject to the Committee’s 
decisions.  The new body would organise output for all firms involved in the production of all 
iron-based metals, not strictly limited to steel.  The law gave CORSID legal personality and 
stipulated that the secrets of the profession must by all means be maintained by the 
Committee180.   
 The same day, two employers’ associations, the Comité central des houillères de 
France and the Comité des forges, were abolished.  Trade union confederations, particularly 
the CGT and the CFTC, were also explicitly dissolved.181  Given that these bodies were to be 
superseded by Organisation Committees meant to represent both industrialists and labour, the 
list of members of CORSID raised both eyebrows and objections.  Within days, members of 
the defunct CGT and CFTC released their famous Manifeste des douze, which openly 
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criticised the Vichy government and the legislation passed by Belin and Pétain.182  Others 
within the labour movement continued to support Belin, hoping that having “one of our own, 
our friend René Belin” at the helm of what were ultimately rather statist bodies would ensure 
that workers’ concerns were properly addressed.183  Hopes that Vichy could be a golden age 
for workers were soon dashed, however, particularly as the National Revolution, with its 
emphasis on artisans and farmers over industrial workers, began to exert an increasing 
influence on policy.    
Meanwhile, the composition of the Organisation Committees was subjected to 
criticism from the right.  Within weeks of the creation of CORSID, an anonymous report was 
submitted to Pétain accusing Belin of syndicalism.184  In the context of Vichy and the 
emergent National Revolution, partisans of corporatism found the structure of the 
Organisation Committees deeply unsatisfactory.  Belin’s desire to resolve class struggle 
through collaboration between the classes and greater consideration for labour issues was 
labelled as syndicalist.  This approach was opposed by doctrinaire corporatists who sought to 
transcend the notion of class altogether in favour of guild-like, industry-specific groupings.185  
Clearly both groups felt that the Organisation Committees could be the vehicle through which 
they could realise their contradictory projects.   In the months that followed, corporatists 
accused Belin of promoting the CGT’s interests within the Vichy Government,186 of being 
part of a supposed “Mouvement Synarchique d’Empire”,187 and of being a freemason.188  One 
letter to Pétain attacked the New Industrial Order whose creation Belin had overseen as “the 
triumphant realisation of the policies of the Popular Front”.189  Another report to the 
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Maréchal in December 1940 accused Belin of appointing exclusively members of “trusts” to 
the Organisation Committees, ensuring that “the management of different branches of 
industry are in the hands of capitalists and not of professionals”.190  After levelling these 
accusations of Belin handing over far too much power to the grand patronat, the authors 
conclude that their report “sheds light on the attitude of M. Belin, which shows that he 
remained in direct contact with syndicalist militants (with CGT leanings) since his 
appointment as Minister”.191  Belin was thus denounced for being at once too accommodating 
to the industrialists, while simultaneously being too close to organised labour.  Such 
accusations continued even after the embattled Minister surrendered the portfolio for 
Industrial Production in February 1941.   
The membership of the new Organisation Committees also excluded small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  In the case of some industries this omission made sense; 
the steel industry for instance was dominated by a rather small number of large companies.  
The omission of SMEs nevertheless led to increasing criticisms, ultimately leading Pétain 
himself to call for SMEs and artisans to be better represented within the Committees.192  Yet 
despite such calls from the head of the authoritarian state, most Organisation Committees, 
including CORSID, remained exclusively in the hands of representatives of large firms.193 
 Why did the tripartism expounded in August fade by November, leaving only the 
industrial elite in positions of power?  In his memoirs, René Belin, himself the former Deputy 
Secretary General of the CGT throughout the 1930s, justified his staffing of the Committees 
against claims that he had handed over control of the French economy to “trusts” and to the 
Germans: “The hundreds of men I needed immediately – I emphasise this word – to take 
inventory and, provisionally, to manage France’s industries, where was I to find them?”194  
He writes that neither civil servants, nor politicians, nor trade unions – “I knew this better 
than anyone” – had the necessary expertise to fill the roles.  “We had at our disposal, aside 
from extremely rare exceptions which were generally unknown to us at the time, only a single 
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source: the men who already had the knowledge of and the experience within their branch of 
industry.”195  For the sake of expedience and effectiveness, then, the grand patronat was the 
only viable choice.  As for criticisms levelled at Belin that he had excluded SMEs from the 
Committees, he responded:  “small- and medium-sized enterprises figured in all the 
Committees.  And they played the role commensurate with their size […] That being said, to 
lead the Organisation Committee for Coal, was I supposed to ask the corner coalman (le 
bougnat du coin)?”196  The first sentence of this statement is demonstrably false, since SMEs 
were clearly not represented in the Committee for Steel.  In light of this, the role of SMEs 
“commensurate with their size” seems to have been nil.  His choice of representatives from 
large firms over the bougnat du coin reinforces his explanation that individuals were chosen 
based on their abilities to administer vast industries. 
 Belin’s claim that the need for experience and expertise left only a very small pool of 
viable candidates, all issued from the patronat, is plausible.  After all, the exclusion of labour 
is perhaps less surprising than it may first appear.  The appointment of René Belin as 
Minister for Industrial Production in July 1940 was unexpected, as Pierre Laval had already 
told Belin that Léon Daum, director general of the Marine and Homécourt steelworks, was to 
be appointed to the Cabinet. The sudden appointment of the former trade unionist, rather than 
the conservative industrialist, to direct French industry was a surprise for Belin as well as the 
public.197  From the time of his appointment, however, Belin was subjected to strong 
criticisms, as we have seen.   
 Meanwhile, the industrialists themselves were by no means eager to welcome trade 
unionists into their innermost circle, especially after the experience of the Popular Front 
government elected in 1936.  The industrialists initially had little enthusiasm for the 
Organisation Committees which had after all been created without their consultation.  Indeed, 
many industrialists simply wanted a continuation of the system that had served them so well 
under the Third Republic.  François de Wendel, who had been President of the Comité des 
forges from 1918 until its dissolution, expressed his disapproval of the reorganisation of 
French industry : “at a moment when everything is disorganised and when when we’re 
lacking all materials, it is clear that only routine and resourcefulness (le système D) can allow 
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firms to survive.  But what do[es the Vichy government] do ?  [It] prevents routine from 
being carried out by publishing a new law or decree every day, and we are prevented from 
fending for ourselves (le système D) by the creation of the Organisation Committees”.198 This 
preference for routine over industrial experiments, coupled with the failure of Belin to consult 
industrialists before issuing the law of 16 August 1940 – not to mention the dissolution of the 
Comité des forges – ensured an unenthusiastic attitude of the patronat towards the new 
Organisation Committees.  Needless to say, the projected inclusion of organised labour in the 
Comité’s successor was similarly unwelcome.    
It would seem, then, that the annunciation of the tripartite ideals in the law of 16 
August was not followed by the birth of a genuinely tripartite industrial order, but instead led 
to greater power for the small group of industrialists named to CORSID, even if the grand 
patronat was initially unenthusiastic about these changes.  Amid vitriolic and contradictory 
accusations that he had, on the one hand, empowered “trusts” with the new organisations and 
that, on the other, he was pursuing the interests of the CGT and the Popular Front, Belin 
stepped down as Minister of Industrial Production in February 1941.  He would nevertheless 
remain Minister of Labour until 1942, during which time he managed to promulgate the 
Labour Charter.199 
 Before turning to the individual members of CORSID, it is worth remembering the 
third party that was to be included in this supposedly tripartite structure: the government 
itself.  In practice, however, this was limited to a single Director, who belonged to the 
Ministry for Industrial Production, and by extension the government, and who served as a 
liaison officer between the Minister and a given Committee.  Technically, the government 
had the power to veto any decision made by any Organisation Committee, although in the 
case of the Steel Committee, there was not a single instance of a decision made by the 
industrialists being vetoed by the representative of the government.  The first Director named 
to follow CORSID’s meeting was Henri Coqueugnot, who had a long career as a steel 
industrialist himself, having worked as an engineer at both Longwy and Schneider before 
becoming Director General of the Société Métallurgique des Terres-Rouges in Luxemburg.  
From 1933 until his appointment to the Ministry for Industrial Production in 1940, he was 
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Director General of the Union des Consommateurs de Produits métallurgiques et industriels 
(UCPMI).  Given that the only person at CORSID’s meetings not representing industrialists 
was in fact an industrialist himself, it is striking how homogeneous the would-be tripartite 
bodies turned out to be. 
With the complete absence of labour representation, and the passive role of the 
government within the Committees, the industrialists controlled the Organisation 
Committees.  Moreover, given Belin’s preference for choosing men of experience who had 
already held great responsibilities over the bougnat du coin, the industries were run by 
representatives of some of the largest firms.  The tripartism that had informed the text of the 
law of 16 August 1940 had quickly subsided, as the pre-war industrial elite maintained and 
even strengthened its control of French heavy industry.  To the extent that the steel industry 
remained in the hands of industrialists, it would seem that there was continuity through 1940. 
 
“Action, dynamism, authority”: the new men for the New Industrial Order  
Despite power remaining in the hands of industrialists, however, the creation of 
CORSID appointed new leaders from among this group.  Only four members were named to 
CORSID, all issued from large steel firms, but none had been a dominant figure in the 
industry before 1940.  Having considered the justifications for why industrialists were 
chosen, it is worth considering these four particular individuals who were appointed to the 
new Committee. 
The Ministry for Industrial Production released a communiqué one month before 
CORSID was created, and this text offers some insight into how the members would be 
selected: 
The [Organisation] Committees […] are neither deliberative assemblies nor 
associations representing professional interests, but rather a mechanism for economic 
action, called upon to make decisions, to decree rules, to impose discipline.  These 
Committees will only be comprised of a few members.  They could even consist of 
only a single member.  These members are not chosen with the worry of ensuring an 
exact representation of the interests of the profession, but rather based on their 
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qualities of action, dynamism, and authority ; in a word, based on their ability to 
decide and to act.200   
This text drips with the exultation of firmness, strength, and action.  These values, which 
would be enshrined as part of the National Revolution, make clear the sort of people Belin 
and his colleagues were seeking.  Above all else, they wanted men of action, who knew the 
industry thoroughly and could be trusted to make sound decisions quickly and firmly.  As the 
war dragged into the autumn, and the prospect of an imminent victory over Britain receded, 
these qualities took precedence over the goal of assuring a more equitable tripartite 
distribution of power in the new committees.  It is also worth noting the presence of the 
Führerprinzip in this passage, reinforced by the suggestion that the supposedly tripartite 
bodies could in fact be comprised of a single individual, provided he was a man of action.  
The suggestion that the Committee could be made up of a single person, and the dismissal of 
the need for accurate representation within the Committee, are early indications that the 
tripartite spirit of August 1940 was rather quickly waning. 
 In his post-war memoirs, Minister for the Economy and for Finance Yves Bouthillier 
describes the men chosen to lead the newly created organisms as “strong personalities who, 
by their previous jobs, by the regular exertion of command, by their capacity to rapidly create 
new services” showed themselves to be efficient men of action.201  This is consistent with the 
statements issued by Vichy at the time, and indeed with the profiles of the individuals 
selected.  It should also be noted that the German authorities insisted on approving the 
members chosen for the Organisation Committees, which suggests that any individuals who 
had been openly critical of Nazi Germany could be excluded a priori.202  In the case of 
CORSID, no objections were raised over the candidates.  If these were indeed the criteria in 
the selection of Committee members, then we may conclude that the four members of 
CORSID were compatible with the ideals of the Vichy regime.  It should also be remembered 
that the Organisation Committees were created with a view to further Franco-German 
economic collaboration.  On 30 October 1940, following Pétain’s meeting with Hitler at 
Montoire, the Maréchal proclaimed that France was “entering the path of collaboration”.203  
This policy led to the resignations of the Minister and Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, 
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but it did not deter the nominees for the emerging Organisation Committees from accepting 
their new positions.204 Given Vichy’s public commitment to collaboration and, more 
importantly, the fact that the Committees were created in part to deepen Franco-German 
cooperation, it is clear that the members appointed to the new bodies were conscious of and 
willing to work within this framework. 
In describing the selection process for Committee members, Belin claimed that he 
sought to “move aside the old bigwigs (vieux bonzes) of the employers’ group, to find 
relatively young men ready to make themselves available to serve the public interest, men 
with no or very limited commitments to political parties or employers’ associations.”205  This 
search for relatively young men, untainted by the partisanship of the late Third Republic, who 
embodied “action, dynamism, authority” yielded four individuals for the steel industry, who 
were given control of one of France’s most crucial industries.   
Jules Aubrun, then 59 years old, was named President of CORSID.  He had risen to 
become Director General of Schneider, France’s second-largest steel firm, from 1921 until 
1929. In 1932 he became Arbitrator for the Comptoir Sidérurgique des forges, a position he 
left in 1935 to become Consulting Engineer for the Lazard Bank in Paris.206  While his 
position at a bank made him a curious choice for CORSID, his experience as an Arbitrator 
made him a strong candidate for president of a Committee whose decisions would have to be 
accepted by all in the steel industry.  He was joined by three high-level members of some of 
France’s most important steel firms.  Eugène Roy, 56, had been Director General of the 
Longwy steelworks since 1931, while Jean Dupuis, 54, was Deputy Director of Chatillon-
Commentry et Neuves-Maisons.  Both companies ranked among the largest in France at the 
end of the 1930s.     
Léon Daum is perhaps the most interesting of the four members.  The son of a 
renowned Nancy glassmaker, Daum married the niece of then president Raymond Poincaré in 
1913.  Daum pursued a successful career in the steelworks of Marine and Homécourt, rising 
to the post of Deputy Director General, and he was groomed as the successor of President-
Director General Théodore Laurent. He was placed in charge of the mines in Saarland after 
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the First World War, and during the French occupation of the Ruhr in 1923, he was called 
upon by then Prime Minister Poincaré’s government to put German heavy industry to work 
for the French economy.207  In July 1940, at the age of 53, he had been chosen to be Vichy’s 
first Minister for Industrial Production, and was personally championed by Pierre Laval.  At 
the eleventh hour, Pétain instead entrusted the portfolio to René Belin, who had only just 
been offered the position of Minister for Labour.  Belin would later recall that Laval had 
ultimately chosen Belin’s inclusion in the Cabinet as a trade unionist to balance out the very 
right-leaning government, a political tendency that the presence of a Poincariste like Daum 
would only have exacerbated.208  Despite narrowly missing an appointment to Vichy’s 
Cabinet, Daum nevertheless thrived under Vichy and participated energetically in the 
activities of the new regime, taking part in the activities of the Conseil national209, a 
consultative assembly created in January 1941 as a simulacrum for the defunct parliament.  
He purportedly also held significant political sway in Vichy, haunting the corridors of power 
and having the ears of ministers.210   
This brief overview of the members chosen for the Organisation Committee for Steel 
reveals several points of interest.  First of all, none of the three largest steel firms in France 
was represented on the Committee.211  While Belin had been criticised for neglecting SMEs 
and labour, he also excluded the principal heavyweights of the industry.  Moreover, none of 
the members were the presidents or owners of their respective firms; rather, they were high-
level employees and potential successors to the current leaders.  In one of the most-cited 
articles on Vichy’s industrial organisation, Henry Rousso claims that the president chosen for 
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any given Organisation Committee was “almost always […] the head of the largest firm in 
the sector”.212  Indeed, Rousso misidentifies Aubrun as “the former President of Schneider” 
and uses this to support his argument that the President of an Organisation Committee was 
usually the sitting president of the industry’s largest firm.213  Yet this was demonstrably not 
the case with CORSID, given that Aubrun arrived to CORSID from the Lazard Bank, more 
than a decade after he had left Schneider.  Furthermore, CORSID’s members were high-, but 
not the highest-, ranking figures from three large, but not the largest, steel companies, with its 
president drawn from a financial institution.  Indeed, the “head of the largest firm in the 
sector” would have been François de Wendel, who was sacked from his position and replaced 
by a Consulting Engineer from an American-owned bank; in the steel industry, we can 
observe the very opposite of the process described by Rousso.  It would also seem that Belin 
had abided by his communiqué from 6 October: “these members are not chosen with the 
worry of ensuring an exact representation of the interests of the profession, but rather based 
on their qualities of action, dynamism, and authority; in a word, based on their ability to 
decide and to act”.214  Belin had thus succeeded in excluding the uppermost echelon of the 
steel industry, the vieux bonzes of who dominated the Comité des forges.  And as for his aim 
to supplant them with “relatively young men”? All born between 1881 and 1887, CORSID’s 
members were decidedly middle-aged, and sometimes hardly younger than those excluded.  
François de Wendel, for instance, was only seven years Aubrun’s senior, although Théodore 
Laurent, head of Daum’s firm, was 77.  In this last goal of generational change, Belin, only 
42 years old himself, succeeded only “relatively”.   
Yet the lack of youth among those appointed to CORSID must not be understood as 
simply the continuation of the old guard.  The highest strata of the industry had been 
excluded – none chosen was president of a firm, and the largest firms were left out.  Early 
intimations of this selection may be detected in the interwar writings of Jacques Barnaud, 
René Belin’s Chief of Staff and the father of the Organisation Committees.  In an article 
published in 1937, he decried the industrialists who were at once the owners and the 
managers of their factories as “le patron du droit divin”.  He observed that: 
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Among the employers, those who naturally understand best are the leaders of the 
public limited companies (Sociétés anonymes) who, most of the time, are not 
shareholders in their companies or, if they do hold shares, they only amount to a 
miniscule amount of the capital.  These, veritable civil servants for the company, 
cannot have the same reaction to the occupation of their factories as a company head 
who is at once manager and owner.215 
This preference for civil servant-like managers over those who had inherited vast family-run 
empires came to fruition with the selection of individuals for CORSID.  Gone were the 
dominant personalities of François de Wendel and the other patrons du droit divin; in their 
stead was placed a group of managerial fonctionnaires who could be expected to deal with 
industrial decisions impartially.216  The four individuals appointed to run the steel industry 
had risen towards the top of their field based on their abilities, rather than their lineage.  It is 
interesting to note that Jules Aubrun and Léon Daum, the only two who attended the Ecole 
des Mines, graduated first and second in their class, respectively.  This can be contrasted with 
Théodore Laurent, for example, who was assured the leadership of Marine et Homécourt as a 
birthright, despite his finishing dead last in his graduating class.217  It would seem that, more 
important than passing the direction of the steel industry to a slightly younger generation, 
Vichy opted for a veritably meritocratic leadership to replace the vieux bonzes who had 
inherited rather than earned positions of power.  This change would endure beyond the end of 
the war, both in general and particular matters: not only would the Fourth and Fifth Republics 
trumpet themselves as explicitly meritocratic, but those who achieved seats at the 
Organisation Committee for Steel in 1940 would retain some of the very highest positions in 
that industry.218  
The tripartite spirit of August 1940, which foresaw the cooperation of organised 
labour, civil servants, and industrialists within the Organisation Committee, quickly gave way 
to the dominance of the industry by only one of these groups.  Yet despite the direction of the 
steel industry remaining firmly in the hands of the patronat, the choice of members for 
CORSID nonetheless marks an important change.  The pre-war stars of the steel industry 
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were explicitly sidelined by Vichy, handing the leadership of the industry to lower-ranking 
individuals from smaller (but still large) firms.  While CORSID and the pre-war Comité des 
forges were dominated by the same class of people, the leadership of the industry had 
changed hands within this class, as meritocracy outweighed tradition and privilege.  The new 
leadership would not wait long before exercising its powers. 
 
First actions of CORSID 
 To effectively administer the country’s steel industry, CORSID decided to carve up 
the map of France and assign each area to one of its members.  The very first decision taken 
by CORSID was to exercise control over the Centre-Midi grouping of the steel industry and 
to place it under Daum’s control.219  He was given responsibility for steel production in 
Centre-Midi, which corresponded to the Non-Occupied Zone of France, in which Vichy itself 
was situated.220  Daum was later given responsibility for Centre-Ouest as well, which was 
roughly equivalent to the Occupied Zone, effectively making Daum responsible for all 
French steel production outside of Alsace and Lorraine.221 
 Early on, CORSID set out to enshrine for itself the powers normally held by the 
Comité des forges.  CORSID’s second declaration announced the creation of the Comptoir 
français des produits sidérurgiques (CPS), effective from 1 December.  Among other 
responsibilities, this body was assigned responsibility for resource allocation.  This 
deliberately assigned the duties of OCRPI, still in the process of being established under 
German tutelage, to the self-appointed CPS, comprised of steel industrialists.222  The 
Comptoir was supplemented with a Commissaire technique in December, then a body of 
commercial experts in January.223  Further repartition duties were assigned to the Commission 
des Charbons et des Cokes (CCC), a CORSID-controlled body established in December 
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1940.224  In early 1941, the Ministry for Industrial Production had to issue a series of 
documents to clarify what the role of OCRPI was indeed to be, and to what extent the powers 
of the Organisation Committees were to be curbed accordingly.  The need for such 
declarations reflected attempts by Organisation Committees to seize more powers than Vichy 
was willing to grant them.  As OCRPI became fully operational over the first half of 1941, 
the CPS’s powers were progressively diminished.225 
 Perhaps more significant than these encroachments on OCRPI’s responsibilities was 
the establishment of a consultative commission, named the Commission générale, in 
February 1941.  Unlike the CPS, the Commission générale’s powers were not defined, aside 
from the provision that the body could convoke Commissions d’Etude to investigate issues 
identified by the Commission générale.  Meetings of the Commission would be called and 
chaired by the President of CORSID, Jules Aubrun, and the members of CORSID could 
attend these meetings.  The rather woolly articulation of the Commission’s duties in 
CORSID’s declaration was juxtaposed with a comprehensive list of the members of this new 
body.  This list included most of the giants of the French steel industry, who had consciously 
been excluded from CORSID by Vichy, from François and Humbert de Wendel to Théodore 
Laurent.226  Curiously, Léon Daum’s name appeared on the first published list, to be 
corrected a week later.227  There were nevertheless two striking absences from this Who’s 
Who of French steel.  Schneider, France’s second-largest steel firm, was not represented.  It is 
extremely unlikely that this could have been mere oversight, especially given that CORSID’s 
president, Jules Aubrun, had worked for Schneider in the 1920s.  The second notable absence 
is Alfred Lambert Ribot, who had served as Secretary General of the Comité des forges until 
its dissolution.  His exclusion could be due to criticisms he had levelled against Vichy after 
July 1940,228 and was likely also done to distance the new Commission from the Comité des 
forges.  Neither explanation is wholly satisfying, however, given that other industrialists had 
also criticised the regime, and that most of the members of the Commission had also 
belonged to the Comité des forges.  François de Wendel, for instance, had clearly criticised 
Vichy and had been President of the Comité des forges.  Despite these two absences, 
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however, the creation of the Commission générale brought back into the fold most of the 
prominent members of the pre-war Comité des forges.  In this sense, there was a certain 
continuity in the administration of French steel. 
These continuities have led some historians to declare that the “dissolution of the 
Comité des forges is a fabrication”.229  While correct in identifying the significant continuities 
in the steel industry, such statements are overly simplistic.  While a body strikingly similar to 
the defunct Comité des forges did emerge, there was nevertheless a rupture from the first 
body’s dissolution in November 1940 to its resurrection in February 1941.  It must be 
remembered that the Commission générale remained a consultative body with no formal 
powers conferred on it by the government.  The leadership of the industry had passed to the 
four “men of action” appointed to CORSID.  Moreover, these new bodies operated within a 
fundamentally different system of organisation, as discussed in Chapter One.  The desire of 
some industrialists to restore a certain routine to the steel industry was outweighed by the 
realities of the New Industrial Order and, increasingly, of the German war economy.  
CORSID indeed sought to expand its powers by creating parallel bodies that would, it was 
hoped, supersede other bodies created by Vichy that would be beyond their direct control, 
such as CPS taking on the role of OCRPI.  This was typical of institutions and individuals 
alike in Vichy France, as newly-created yet ill-defined bodies and positions competed for 
power.  In February 1941, Vichy sent a series of scolding announcements to CORSID, which 
then passed them along to all French steel firms.  A number of firms had been approached by 
their German counterparts, who had proposed various joint projects that would likely be 
highly profitable for the industrialists on both sides.  The French authorities underlined that 
no such transfers could occur without Vichy’s approval.230   
While CORSID’s attempts to claim more power for itself than the Vichy government 
had originally allotted to it inevitably resulted in tension between the two, this must not be 
interpreted as any form of resistance on the part of CORSID.  Resistance, especially in 1940-
1941, was virtually unthinkable to industrialists, and would have amounted to self-mutilation.  
Moreover, only in 1942, with the Wehrmacht encountering difficulties on the Eastern Front 
and following the entry of the United States into the conflict, did it become a reasonable 
possibility that the New Order might not endure after all.  The patronat’s initial aversion to 
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the tripartite scheme proposed in the law of 16 August was not so much resistance as self-
interest – they had no desire to hand over any control of the industry they dominated to either 
workers or the State, especially after the experiences of the Popular Front, in which the grand 
patronat had been at odds with both.231  Most importantly, it must be remembered that 
CORSID generally only disagreed with Vichy when its interests were being threatened, or 
when powers were to be allocated away from CORSID to another body.  This opposition to 
the government’s actions was thus tied to the autonomy and profitability of the steel industry, 
and not based on any principled resistance.  Indeed, the steel industry would prove willing to 
embrace cross-Rhine “economic collaboration” when it suited its interests. 
Vichy and the steel industrialists were by no means always at odds.  When their 
motivations – the quest for contreparties and the desire to keep factories running, 
respectively – aligned, they could agree on a common project.  As early as 13 August 1940, 
when the Liaison Offices cobbled together following the Fall of France had not yet been 
replaced by Organisation Committees, Jean Bichelonne urged French industrialists to engage 
in economic collaboration with the Germans: “we also ask that French industrialists agree to 
supply the Germans with certain [raw] materials of which there are shortages in Germany”.232  
The steel industrialists followed these instructions obediently, agreeing to the first of many 
deliveries to Germany.  That same month, the Liaison Office that preceded CORSID signed a 
contract to send 100,000 tonnes of iron to Germany.233  In this case, Vichy was eager to 
appear cooperative, while the industrialists were happy to keep their factories open and to be 
promised payment for a large order to be sent to Germany.   
 We have seen the actions and motivations of the Vichy government and of CORSID 
in the months following the law of 16 August 1940.  Vichy’s choice of members for CORSID 
marked both an abandonment of the tripartite ideals articulated in August and a deliberate 
change of leadership within the steel industry.  CORSID’s preoccupations, meanwhile, were 
to maintain the independence and prosperity of the steel industry, and to this end it recalled 
many of the members from the Comité des forges to sit on its consultative commission.  This 
circuitous reconstitution of the pre-war Comité does indeed bear marks of continuity, but 
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must be juxtaposed with the significant change of leadership within the industry with the 
appointments of 9 November 1940.  In order to complete our account of the construction of 
France’s New Industrial Order in the steel industry, however, we must now consider the 
actions and motivations of the German authorities.  
 
German authorities and French steel 
As we have seen in Chapter One, the reaction of the German authorities to the law of 
16 August 1940 was far from the anger claimed by René Belin and some historians.  
Accepting the extension of Vichy’s powers in industrial production into the Occupied Zone, 
the German authorities did so on their own terms and took measures that subverted whatever 
sovereignty the French Government thought it might have asserted with the August law.  
Before the end of the summer of 1940, German authorities would hold the reins of French 
industrial production and harness French industry for the aims of the Nazi war economy, with 
the Vichy government willingly contributing to this Franco-German endeavour.   
While Belin and some historians have suggested that Germany’s acceptance of the 
legality of the law of 16 August 1940 represented an acknowledgement that they had been 
outwitted by Vichy,234 this was not the case.  The August law purported to extend the new 
system of industrial organisation over the entirety of French territory, but this did not occur; 
rather, the German authorities accepted that Organisation Committees should oversee stocks 
and production in the Occupied Zone because it enabled the Germans to gain greater control 
over the Non-Occupied Zone by means of OCRPI.  The Germans never entertained the idea 
that this system should be applied to Reichsland, as they called Alsace-Lorraine, which was 
quickly divided and integrated into the Gaue of Baden and Westmark. 
There remains the question of the heavily industrialised northern departments of Nord 
and Pas-de-Calais.  These were severed from the Occupied Zone and attached to Belgium, 
and placed under the control of the German Military Administration in Brussels.  
Nevertheless, Vichy had expected the New Industrial Order to extend to this northern region.  
The fact that the German authorities accepted the law of 16 August, and strengthened this 
new system with OCRPI, gave Vichy reason to hope that northernmost France would be 
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integrated into the system.  The German authorities, however, outmanoeuvred their French 
counterparts.  While Germany had indeed accepted the law of 16 August, this law did not in 
itself create any new institutions.  Although this law outlined the shape of the New Industrial 
Order, the first Organisation Committee was not constituted until September 1940, with those 
for Coal and Steel following in November.  The German authorities took advantage of the 
gap between these laws of August and November to push for the creation of OCRPI, under de 
facto German control.  Once this had been obtained, the German authorities consolidated 
their grip on Nord and Pas-de-Calais by vetoing the applicability to those departments of the 
laws establishing individual Organisation Committees.235  General Lieutenant Niehoff, 
responsible for industrial questions at the Oberfeldkommandantur for the region, wrote to the 
Prefect in Lille in July 1941 informing him that Niehoff “do[es] not permit the execution of 
the laws, orders, and decrees listed below issued by the French Government ” in Nord and 
Pas-de-Calais.236  He then attached a list of each of the laws creating any Organisation 
Committee.  In other words, while the German authorities had accepted the principle of 
Organisation Committees in August 1940, they refused to recognise the formation of a single 
Organisation Committee in the northern region, vetoing each Committee’s applicability in the 
region.  French industrialists in the North were allowed to set up the Groupement des 
industries sidérurgiques du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (SIDENOR), which mirrored the 
functions of the CPS and was able to sustain contact with CORSID.237  For the most part, 
however, CORSID’s powers did not extend to Nord and Pas-de-Calais.238 
 
Wagging the French dog 
While the Germans limited the extension of Organisation Committees beyond the 
Occupied and Non-Occupied Zones, it might be argued that within these two zones, the 
French government and Organisation Committees had won decisive control over French 
industrial production.  But this is to presume that industrial legislation ended in August 1940.  
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As we saw in Chapter One, however, a significant addition was made with the law of 10 
September, which established the OCRPI. 
Belin admits that it was the head of the Economics section of the German Military 
Administration in Paris, Dr Elmar Michel, who pointed out in August 1940 that the newly-
decreed Organisation Committees could only function if another organisation were created 
allocate raw materials to the Committees.239  Michel himself corroborated this claim in an 
end-of-war report, explaining how he offered “practical lessons accumulated over several 
years in Germany” to a France still groping its way towards efficient production.240  While 
this patronising tone might be expected from a high-ranking Nazi official in this context, it 
was echoed by Jean Bichelonne, one of the Secretaries General of the Ministry for Industrial 
Production and the official responsible for the running of OCRPI.  The members of OCRPI 
were visited by their German counterparts from 1941, and Bichelonne urged the French 
industrialists to heed German advice: since “allocation has operated in Germany for seven 
years, the [French] distributors must listen to the suggestions of the German distributors and 
make an effort to integrate the distribution programme into the framework of professional 
organisation.”241 
Given that the Organisation Committees themselves were established to “harmonise” 
Franco-German industrial production,242 this degree of German involvement was perhaps not 
surprising.  Yet it should be remembered that this so-called “harmonisation” was increasingly 
resembling the Germanisation of French industry.  A German analysis from the spring of 
1941 shows the degree to which German authorities projected the view that France was 
adopting the superior German model to foster economic collaboration.  “The French 
economy must integrate itself profoundly into the methods used for the organisation of the 
German economy [which is] already well underway.”243  The author added that the 
Organisation Committees were modelled after the “economic and technological bodies” that 
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existed in Germany.244  He also noted that this economic collaboration would necessarily 
include “an adaptation and an alignment in the distribution of raw materials”, and that 
consultation between the distributors of both countries, which began in February 1941, 
marked “a first step towards permanent collaboration between the related organisations in 
both countries”.245 
Taken on its own, this self-congratulatory extolment of German industry and the 
necessity that France assimilate to the superior model could be dismissed as mere 
propaganda.  Yet it is entirely consistent with the stated aims of French and German 
authorities and with the formal correspondence between French industrialists and authorities.  
While French industrialists would highlight the slight differences between the French and 
German models (the German Wirtschaftsgruppen did not correspond exactly to the French 
Organisation Committees), they too conceded amongst themselves that “in Germany an 
analogous structure has existed for nearly a decade”, and that the Germans were consequently 
a valuable resource for improving French industry.246  The president of one Organisation 
Committee publicly thanked the Reich for “imposing upon us a discipline and […] replacing 
disorganised competition, based on the degradation of conditions, a fertile emulation 
(émulation féconde) based on the improvement of technique and of the quality of the service 
provided”.247  In the case of the French steel industry, this émulation féconde also included 
adopting German specifications for steel products.248  If the New European Order was indeed 
to last for some time, as was still widely believed in the first half of 1941, then assimilating to 
the German model of industrial organisation and collaborating within the New European 
Order was seen by French industrialists to be logical and mutually beneficial. 
The German authorities kept a very close watch on the activities of the Organisation 
Committees.  In 1941, M. Neumann of the German Military Administration in Paris 
confirmed that German authorities had approved each decision made by each Organisation 
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Committee, which reinforced the degree to which CORSID’s actions were compatible with 
German objectives.249  Moreover, Dr Michel insisted that CORSID and other committees 
complete lengthy questionnaires, revealing the most vital information about stocks, 
production, and factories.250  Far from Belin’s claim that the law of 16 August “enraged the 
Germans”251, the German authorities accepted the new system on their own terms.  They 
preferred to introduce their own form of industrial organisation in German-occupied 
Belgium, which included Nord and Pas-de-Calais.252  Despite accepting the principle of 
Organisation Committees, the German authorities thus vetoed the introduction of any such 
bodies in northernmost France.  In the Occupied and Non-Occupied Zones, meanwhile, the 
German authorities were able to gain control over resource allocation, on which all 
Organisation Committees depended.  The Germans approved every decision made by 
CORSID, and were thus able to ensure that the latter’s actions never went against German 
plans.  The New Industrial Order, created to help “harmonise” French and German industry, 
progressed with this aim in part because the Germans exerted considerable control over 
industrial production in both countries. 
 
Conclusion 
The German role in the establishment of the New Industrial Order provides some 
insight into Vichy’s jettisoning of tripartism and the degree of continuity in the steel industry.  
The tripartism in the August 1940 legislation seems to have been sacrificed for the sake of 
pragmatism, a tendency that was exacerbated by France’s dealings with the Germans.  French 
observers quickly noticed that “whenever the Germans find themselves in the presence of 
efficient civil servants or industrialists, the Germans quite willingly respect their 
authority”.253  Eager to maintain French control over French industries, although entirely 
willing to supply the Germans, the Vichy government sought to appoint efficient experts 
based on their “ability to decide and to act” to run the Organisation Committees.254  While the 
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debates between the corporatism extolled in the National Revolution and the “syndicalism” 
expressed in the law of 16 August 1940 would continue to play out in Vichy, notably with the 
drafting of the Labour Charter, CORSID’s priority remained maintaining a productive French 
steel industry.255 
As for the continuity of the Comité des forges through 1940, this must be significantly 
qualified.  The creation of the consultative Commission générale several months after the 
dissolution of the Comité des forges did include many of those who had formed the core of 
the latter body, albeit with a number of important exceptions.  More importantly, however, 
the torch had passed from one group of industrialists to another, leaving high-ranking 
managers of fairly large, but not the largest, steelworks in charge in lieu of the presidents of 
the very biggest firms – a significant change that would prove permanent.  The role of the 
State, another innovation from 1940, also influenced CORSID’s actions meaningfully, even if 
the Ministry’s representative never had to veto any of CORSID’s decisions.  The direction of 
the steel industry was largely determined by the policies set by the government and 
particularly the Ministry for Industrial Production.  As those policies changed, CORSID did 
its best to pursue its interests and keep factories running. 
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Chapter Three: 
Fuelling the German War Economy, 1941-1944 
 
Following the Fall of France in June 1940, French industry was reorganised and 
overseen by newly created Organisation Committees and German-led Sections of the Central 
Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products (OCRPI).  Among the objectives of these 
bodies were to facilitate Franco-German economic cooperation, to “harmonise” the heavy 
industry of both countries, and to help secure France a leading position in a new, German-
dominated Europe.  By November 1940, these bodies were fully operational and led by men 
who understood that their task would be to coordinate French industry to supply the German 
war effort.256   
The National Revolution, the official ideology of the Vichy regime based on the 
principles of “Work, Family, and the Nation”, and particularly its economic tenets were 
largely developed after the legislation establishing the Organisation Committees had been 
passed, yet the National Revolution soon became pervasive and started to exert its influence 
on French industry.  In August 1941, Maréchal Pétain, who enjoyed full powers as Head of 
State in Vichy, intervened to try and reform the Organisation Committees in line with the 
regime’s official ideology.  This doctrine was similarly a driving force behind the 
development of the Labour Charter, published in October 1941, which sought to transcend 
the class struggle.  By 1942, however, the National Revolution had petered out and with the 
return of Pierre Laval to government in April 1942, industrial collaboration became 
increasingly important.  Over the course of 1942, this was realised increasingly by sending 
thousands of French labourers to work in Germany, which had a pernicious effect on French 
industrial output.  The flow of workers to Germany was ultimately reduced in September 
1943 with an agreement between German Minister for Armaments and War Production 
Albert Speer and then French Minister for Industrial Production Jean Bichelonne.  According 
to this agreement, the deportation of French workers to the Reich would be replaced by 
integrating French industry into the German war economy and orienting French output 
towards the Reich’s war effort. 
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Throughout this period and these shifting policies, CORSID did its best to represent 
the interests of the steel industry and to reconcile these with State policy. Based on the 
minutes of CORSID’s meetings from December 1940 until July 1944 – a hitherto unexploited 
archival source257 – this chapter will show that CORSID’s actions were motivated by the 
desire to keep its industry’s factories running, an increasingly difficult task due to the 
worsening shortage of raw materials.  This overarching objective manifested itself differently 
in relation to the various policies pursued by the Vichy government.  Yet throughout the 
period, CORSID produced heavily for the Reich and adopted measures to “harmonise” 
French industry with Germany’s, making such production more efficient.  This chapter 
explores how CORSID’s desire to keep its factories running interacted with the various 
industrial policies pursued by the French government from 1941 until the end of the regime 
in August 1944. 
 
The National Revolution and the Labour Charter 
 René Belin’s appointment as Minister for Industrial Production in July 1940 had come 
as a surprise to virtually everyone, not least Belin himself.258  In his first weeks as Minister, 
he and his senior staff established the legal underpinnings for the ad hoc set of arrangements 
that had sprung up in the weeks immediately following the Fall of France.259  As we have 
seen, Jacques Barnaud and Jean Bichelonne were two key advisors to Belin who played a 
decisive role in the elaboration of the Organisation Committees.  While Barnaud left Belin’s 
service in February 1941 to become Delegate General for Franco-German Economic 
Relations in Wiesbaden, Bichelonne retained central positions in the Ministry for Industrial 
Production for the remainder of the war.  Bichelonne was named one of two Secretaries 
General of the Ministry and following the establishment of OCRPI in September 1940, he 
became the chief French civil servant responsible for it.260  Belin was relieved of his portfolio 
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for Industrial Production in February 1941, with Pierre Pucheu taking his place. 261  Pucheu 
was only Minister for a few months before being succeeded by François Lehideux, who had 
been Secretary General of Renault (and, not coincidentally, Louis Renault’s son-in-law) 
before the war and was named President of the Organisation Committee for Automobiles 
(COA) in the autumn of 1940.262   
Barely a month after becoming Minister, Lehideux faced a challenge from an unlikely 
source.  On 12 August 1941, Pétain gave a speech in which he attacked the Organisation 
Committees, which he claimed were dominated by “trusts”.  This speech came after months 
of complaints about and attacks on the Committees, many of which were sent directly to the 
Maréchal.263  Pétain claimed that the Committees, “created to correct the errors of 
capitalism”, had been founded with the best of intentions.  “Trusts”, however, “sought to 
reassert themselves by using the [Committees] for their own particular ends”.264  Pétain 
reassured the nation that “the provisional statute of the organisation of the economy will be 
rearranged on the basis of the reduction and the merging of Committees [and] of greater 
representation within [the Committees] of small industry and artisans”.265  Having spent most 
of the Vichy period up to that point as President of the the first Committee created and, as 
newly-appointed Minister for Industrial Production, now responsible for the Committees in 
their entirety, Lehideux had indeed been handed a challenge. 
 According to his memoirs, Lehideux questioned Pétain privately shortly after the 
speech, objecting to the use of the “imprecise, demagogic, lethal” term,266 “trusts”, and taking 
issue with Pétain’s “unfair and inappropriate”267 speech.  Lehideux claims that he made an 
impassioned defence of the valuable Committees and offered to resign on the grounds of the 
chasm that existed between Lehideux’s and the Maréchal’s views on the bodies. In 
Lehideux’s version of events, Pétain sheepishly admitted that he had not meant to criticise the 
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Committees so harshly and that “perhaps, he admitted, he had been insufficiently informed 
on a subject of which he understood little”.268 He also reassured Lehideux “that he had 
confidence in [him]. Before leaving, he invited [Lehideux] to come visit him more often”.269  
Conveniently, this was a private conversation during which no notes were taken, so we have 
only Lehideux’s word for the incident.  Given the implausibility of his account (and the 
consistently unreliable nature of his memoirs), however, it is sensible to approach Lehideux’s 
claim that Pétain’s attack on the Organisation Committees and his promises of reform were 
mistakenly articulated and misunderstood with a great deal of scepticism.  Pétain had 
received letters and reports outlining these criticisms of the Committees since autumn 1940, 
when they were first created.  More importantly, Pétain gave a speech on 1 March 1941 in 
which he criticised employers on the grounds that their “selfishness and [their] lack of 
understanding of the proletarian condition were all too often the best auxiliaries to 
communism” and called on employers, workers, and technicians to work together in Social 
Committees.270  In his speech on 12 August 1941, Pétain referred more explicitly to the 
National Revolution and some of its projects, such as the Labour Charter, thereby situating 
his criticisms of the Committees in the broader context of his national project.  Pétain’s 
comments in August 1941 were entirely consistent with the policies he was overseeing and 
the central if still somewhat nebulous project of national revival he was pursuing.   
 Due to the nature of the steel industry, greater representation of artisans and small 
businesses – so revered in the ideology of the National Revolution271 – never made much 
sense, but CORSID did its best to answer the call of 12 August 1941 by adding a member 
from a medium-sized steel firm one month after Pétain’s address.  Pierre Francou was the 
Deputy Director General of Marrel Frères, a Loire-based firm that was somewhat smaller 
than the firms represented by the four original members of CORSID.272  This change was 
well-timed, as a study dated 10 September 1941 – one year to the day after the creation of 
OCRPI – reiterated the criticism that France’s Committees were “led by the industrial elite”, 
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arguing that “some members must be replaced” and that in general “the make-up of the 
Organisation Committees must be revised”.273  The token addition of a fifth member from a 
smaller firm was as far as CORSID went to assuage such concerns.  The inclusion of 
Francou, however, seems to have been entirely superficial, as the minutes of CORSID’s 
meetings suggest that he was not present at a single meeting.274  
  The project that went furthest in realising Pétain’s vision of the renovation of French 
labour was the Labour Charter, which appeared as the law of 4 October 1941.275  Belin began 
work on this Charter in the weeks following 16 August 1940, before the first Organisation 
Committees were even established.  The first draft of the Labour Charter dates from 
September 1940, and subsequent drafts were produced monthly, taking account of feedback 
from different experts, ministers, and occasionally Pétain himself.276  Belin based the Charter 
in part on the Italian Labour Charter introduced under Mussolini in 1927,277 although given 
Belin’s career as a trade unionist, it is perhaps not surprising that his version offers far more 
rights to workers than the Italian document, which was meant largely to entrench the support 
of Italian industrialists for the Fascist regime.  
In these early stages one of the chief architects of the Charter was Pierre Laroque.  
Laroque had joined the Ministry of Labour in 1931, coincidentally during Pierre Laval’s first 
stint as Prime Minister of France. In 1938 he published a study on the relationship between 
workers and employers and he was a key figure in drafting the Law of 16 August 1940, 
assisting Belin, Barnaud, and Bichelonne.278  He continued to work with Belin and 
contributed extensively to the early drafts of the Charter until the autumn of 1940, when he 
had to be dismissed under anti-Semitic legislation passed by Vichy.279  He later joined de 
                                                          
273 “Etude sur les CO”, 10 September 1941, F 37 20, AN. 
274 The minutes are kept in the archives of the firm Marine and Homécourt, particularly AQ 139 82.  These 
meetings were for the Groupement Centre-Ouest, corresponding roughly to the Occupied Zone.  Although 
Léon Daum presided over this grouping, the other original members of CORSID attended nearly every meeting, 
as did the representative of the Ministry for Industrial Production.  Francou’s name does not feature among 
the list of participants for a single meeting. 
275 The best study of the Labour Charter is Jean-Pierre Le Crom’s Syndicats nous voilà! (Paris: Editions de 
l’Atelier, 1995), although the classic study remains Jacques Julliard, “La Charte du travail” in René Rémond 
(ed.), Le gouvernement de Vichy, 1940-1942 (Paris: FNSP, 1972). 
276 These can be found in the dossier “‘Charte du travail’, projets de base 1940-41” in 98J 9, Fonds Belin, IHS. 
277 “Charte du travail italienne, 1927”, (undated, but among Belin’s papers from his first months as Minister for 
Industrial Production in summer 1940), 98J 8, Fonds Belin, IHS. 
278 This is discussed in Chapter One. The study by Laroque is Les rapports entre patrons et ouvriers (Paris: 
Aubier, 1938). 
279 See the dossier “Charte du travail, projets de René Belin avant decembre 1940, dossier de travail de P. 
Laroque” in 98J 7, Fonds Belin, IHS. 
86 
 
Gaulle in London in 1943 and was named Director General for Social Security in October 
1944, where he would come to be known as the father of social security in post-war 
France.280  
The development of the Charter was fraught with difficulties and internal divisions 
over its content. At its core, the document was meant to reorganise French society along 
corporatist lines as a means of transcending the class struggle, a core tenet of the National 
Revolution.  Minister for Finance and for the Economy Yves Bouthillier rejected an early 
draft of the law in December 1940 because it relied too heavily on Organisation Committees 
which, “dominated by heads of ‘trusts’, cannot achieve the social reform” envisaged by 
Belin.281  Such criticisms were brought to Pétain’s attention throughout 1941 by those who 
objected to “class syndicalism” and urged Pétain to push for “the fusion of workers, 
employers and managers in shared bodies”.282  Bouthillier and Foreign Minister Paul 
Baudouin were among the influential members of Cabinet who lobbied for a more corporatist 
model that would abolish trade unions and employers’ associations altogether, much to 
Belin’s annoyance.283 
In October 1941, Dr Michel, the head of the Economic Section of the German 
Military Administration in Paris, wrote to Belin expressing his authorisation of the Charter, 
despite some misgivings: 
Reservations concerning certain parts of the project are withdrawn to avoid delaying 
its publication. The new social organisation must be applied as quickly as possible so 
as to organise collaboration between workers and employers and, notably, to ensure 
the representation of workers’ interests.284 
This long-awaited albeit qualified support from the German authorities allowed the law to be 
published in full.  The Charter was a fundamentally corporatist document and went much 
further than the legislation of August and September 1940 in breaking down the walls 
between the classes.  Labour unions were banned outright, a step further than the dissolution 
of the principal trade union confederations realised in the summer of 1940. Moreover, both 
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strikes and lock-outs were outlawed, removing the most provocative weapons of workers and 
employers, respectively, in the class warfare that had characterised the worst periods of the 
1930s.  Other, somewhat more progressive measures, such as the first guaranteed minimum 
wage in France, were also included in the Charter.285  Crucially, a corporation was to be 
created for each branch of industry, which would include representatives from employers and 
workers alike, while the State would be in control of the corporation.  Industries were also 
asked to create Social Committees that would consist of representatives of employers and 
workers in equal measure. 
 Unlike the creation of the Organisation Committees, the drafting of the Charter was a 
slow process and one imbued with the ideology of the National Revolution.  While the goals 
of the Law of 16 August 1940 were largely limited to industrial questions (i.e. how to ensure 
that French industry could continue to function after the Armistice), the Charter was an 
ambitious project to reorganise French society.  Tellingly, it was undertaken by René Belin 
qua Minister for Labour rather than being a project of the Ministry for Industrial Production. 
As such, Belin remained focused on the Charter after he had left the latter ministry.  Yet the 
project of the Charter was obstructed from achieving its goals by the perceived shortcomings 
of the Organisation Committees that Belin had created the year before.  The Charter 
depended on a certain balance of power between labour and employers. Due to the exclusion 
of organised labour from the Organisation Committees, however, this balance did not exist, 
with the employers dominating all decisions related to the economy.  The Charter was not 
able to redress this, and in these circumstances it is hardly surprising that labour was not 
supportive of Vichy’s attempts to incorporate workers into Social Committees that – if the 
nominally tripartite Organisation Committees were any indication – would also be dominated 
by big business. 286 
Although the final text of the Charter established a broad framework for a new social 
organisation in France, the legislation in fact changed very little.  The law of 16 August 1940 
had created the legal framework for the Organisation Committees, but this skeletal system 
was only fleshed out with the creation of the first individual Organisation Committees in 
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early November.  Similarly, the Charter known as the Law of 4 October – despite the 
numerous changes imposed on the text between that date and its ultimate publication on 26 
October287 – described what would be established.  One important innovation echoed Pétain’s 
speech of 12 August, namely the merging of similar existing Committees into “families” for 
key industries, which would go some way towards addressing his call to reduce the number 
of Committees.  Each “family” was to establish a Preparatory Commission that would be 
responsible for creating the Social Committee for that “family”, which would include mixed 
representation from employers and workers.288  Henri Lafond, one of the two Secretaries 
General for Industrial Production, proposed folding eleven existing Committees related to 
iron and steel into the “family” for the production of metals, which would still be presided by 
Jules Aubrun.289  Aubrun accepted this in principle in November 1941, although specifying 
that he would rather limit the number of Committees within the “family” to eight.290  The 
responsibility for the new “family” was passed on to the President of the largest Organisation 
Committee in each “family”.  Progress was slow, however, and by 1944, 24 of the 29 
“families” had stalled at the level of creating a Preparatory Commission.  In the end, only 
three “families” ended up creating Social Committees at all: mining, clothing, and textiles.291  
The belated creation of an Office for Social Committees in March 1944 did little to alter the 
situation.292 
For all the Charter’s lengthy negotiations and the determined propaganda campaign 
that accompanied its publication, its impact on economic and production issues in the steel 
industry was minimal.  In every draft of the Charter after December 1940, the existence and 
independence of the Organisation Committees were guaranteed, and the final text of the law 
specified that “questions on economic matters will remain, until further notice, in the 
competences of the provisional Organisation Committees created in accordance with the law 
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of 16 August 1940”.293  In discussing the eventual establishment of Social Committees, 
CORSID emphasised that these bodies should remain silent “when it comes to questions of 
allocation” of raw materials within the industry.294  Daum specified that the role of the Social 
Committees would instead be to focus on “questions related to the working conditions of the 
factory, working hours, hygiene, etc.”.295  By restricting the responsibilities of the proposed 
Social Committees, CORSID ensured that it would retain its powers in running the French 
steel industry.    
Having ensured that the Social Committees would not encroach on the Organisation 
Committee’s powers, CORSID displayed a certain enthusiasm in setting up the bodies 
outlined in the Labour Charter.  Léon Daum was an early champion of the Charter, 
emphasising the usefulness of the bodies which would “lead workers and employers to speak 
with each other” and discuss matters of mutual interest.296  He urged industrialists to “not 
delay in setting up this instrument of social peace”.297  Daum was more closely involved with 
the Vichy regime than the other members of CORSID – Pétain had appointed him to the 
Conseil national in January 1941 and Daum had been an early favourite to join the Vichy 
Cabinet as Minister for Industrial Production.298  In October 1942, CORSID announced that 
Daum had been named President of the Organisation Commission for the Professional Family 
of Metal Production,299 responsible for setting up the Social Committee for the “family” of 
which CORSID would be the leader.  Daum claimed that, according to Belin, “the work of 
the Commission should last from six months to one year”.300  Just over a year later, on 24 
November 1943, the Provisional National Social Committee had its first meeting.  Its 
membership included 10 workers and 10 employers, in line with the National Revolution’s 
ideals of social harmony, and at the first meeting, wages and apprenticeships were identified 
as priorities, with commissions being proposed for each.  Although progress was finally 
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being made, the second meeting, on 3 March 1944, proved to be its last.  A permanent Social 
Committee was never established and the incoming Provisional Government of the French 
Republic (GPRF) led by de Gaulle repealed the Labour Charter and its constituent 
institutions.301   
While the Social Committee outlined in the Labour Charter proved to be abortive, it is 
important to note CORSID’s reaction to the initiative.  The Organisation Committee’s initial 
preoccupation was protecting its existing powers.  Once reassured that the Social Committee 
would not have a say in economic questions or in matters of resource allocation, CORSID 
was willing and even enthusiastic to set up the new Social Committee that could treat social 
questions such as working conditions, wages, and apprenticeships.  CORSID’s chief concern 
was ensuring that the steel industry continued to function as optimally as possible given the 
disastrous shortage of raw materials.  This motivation led CORSID to oppose the tenets of the 
National Revolution that would be harmful to its running the steel industry, such as a more 
equitable representation of SMEs to dilute the power of “trusts”, while endorsing the 
elements that would not damage and might even benefit the industry, such as discussing 
social questions with workers and industrialists.  CORSID’s selective endorsement of certain 
aspects of the National Revolution demonstrates its eminently pragmatic attitude, a tendency 
that is even clearer in the case of French workers being sent to Germany.  
 
Working in the Reich 
The spring of 1942 marked an important turning point in the history of Vichy.  On 18 
April, Pierre Laval returned as Head of Government and quickly affirmed that France’s 
overriding policy was to integrate itself into a German-led Europe (l’Europe allemande).  In a 
radio address two days after his reinstatement, Laval described the choice facing France: 
“either we integrate […] into a new and pacified Europe that will flourish after the war that is 
currently unfolding, or we resign ourselves to witnessing the destruction of our civilisation” 
by Bolshevism.302  Laval’s renewed enthusiasm for collaboration with Germany coincided 
with the sputtering out of the National Revolution by 1942.  Under Laval, who had always 
been sceptical of the National Revolution, ambitious plans for a spiritual renewal of the 
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nation were neglected in favour of securing for France a favourable position in post-war 
Europe through collaboration.303  Meanwhile, Germany was facing increasing difficulties on 
the Eastern Front nearly a year after its invasion of the Soviet Union and consequently 
abandoned its strategy of Blitzkrieg in favour of harnessing the economic potential of Europe 
for its war efforts.304   
The central policy pursued by the Reich in building up the German war economy at 
this stage was to deport workers from occupied Europe and force them to work in German 
factories.  Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel was placed in charge of the scheme, and he was soon 
demanding hundreds of thousands of French workers from Laval.  The French Head of 
Government proposed the so-called Relève, whereby France would send workers to 
Germany, with the Reich releasing one French prisoner of war for every three French 
workers sent to Germany.  This arrangement, established in June 1942, saw tens of thousands 
of French volunteers head to Germany, but the numbers fell far short of Sauckel’s demands.  
As a result, Sauckel imposed labour conscription across occupied Europe in August 1942.  
Laval followed suit with the law of 4 September 1942, which established the labour draft in 
France.  In response to further requests for workers from Sauckel, Laval set up the Service du 
travail obligatoire (STO) on 16 February 1943.  Under these laws roughly 650,000 French 
workers were forcibly deported to Germany.305   Overseeing the sweeping changes this would 
bring to French industry was Jean Bichelonne.  In the major Cabinet reshuffle that 
accompanied Laval’s return, Lehideux resigned and Bichelonne, his long-time Secretary 
General, was promoted to Minister for Industrial Production. 
The situation would become even more serious after 8 November 1942, when 
American and British forces landed in Algeria to establish a foothold in the Mediterranean.  
The Allies thus gained a valuable springboard from which they soon worked their way up the 
Italian peninsula.  In response, on 11 November 1942, the Wehrmacht crossed the 
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demarcation line established in June 1940, ostensibly to protect the soft underbelly of Vichy 
France and its apparently vulnerable Mediterranean coast.  Henceforth, the entirety of 
metropolitan France remained occupied by Germany (or Italy, in the case of the small Italian 
zone of occupation) until the D-Day landings in Normandy.  Two days later, Laval secured 
from Pétain the powers to pass laws on his own authority, without the need for the Maréchal.  
As Julian Jackson has appositely put it, “Pétain, whose powers had been compared to those of 
Louis XIV two years earlier, was now more like a Third Republic president”.306  Meanwhile, 
the once seemingly invincible Wehrmacht started struggling in Stalingrad. The Soviets 
launched the first in a series of offensives on 19 November 1942 and by the end of the winter 
the Germans were in retreat.  As the Reich abandoned its Blitzkrieg strategy in favour of 
harnessing the economic potential of occupied Europe for its war effort, it was clear that 
France would have an important role.  
In terms of increasing German armaments production, the STO does seem to have 
been successful.  In Adam Tooze’s assessment, “the foreign labour programme was clearly 
by far the most important contribution that occupied Europe made to Germany’s armaments 
effort”.307  From a French perspective, however, the results were far less impressive.  From 
the time the Relève was first instituted, industrial productivity in France dropped, a trend that 
only worsened as more workers were deported.308  Perhaps more important was the negative 
reaction among the French public.  As Richard Vinen notes, “for the first time, Vichy had an 
obviously malign effect on the lives of millions of French people, not just on those who left 
but also on those who endured risk or hardship in order not to go, and on the relatives of both 
these groups”.309  Among those in the second group, who opted not to go, joining the 
Resistance was the logical alternative, and the maquis in France swelled from the summer of 
1942.  As the Resistance grew in strength and the population turned against the regime, acts 
of sabotage increased in French factories, disrupting production further still.  Of course, the 
STO was not the only factor causing these phenomena: the scarcity of raw materials slowed 
production after 1941, while the increasing probability of an Allied victory convinced many 
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to join the Resistance.  While the scheme proposed by Laval did secure the release and return 
to France of over 90,000 prisoners of war, it had a negative impact on French industry and 
weakened support for a regime already in decline. 
In this broader context, it is worth considering how the Organisation Committees 
reacted to such initiatives.  Based on the minutes of CORSID’s private meetings, it is striking 
not only how staunchly they opposed the idea of sending French labourers to Germany, but 
indeed how early they made preparations to undermine such schemes.  In March 1941, well 
over a year before the Relève was established, CORSID was wary of German attempts to 
poach unemployed workers from steel firms.  By the winter of 1940-41, the shortage of coal 
was seriously affecting steel output, and the inconsistent deliveries of coal led to 
unpredictable periods of underemployment in many firms.  In early 1941, Léon Daum urged 
industrialists to “prepare for the possibility of employing workers for general work”, such as 
clearing wooded areas.  Daum stressed that “we mustn’t be lacking in ideas when we are 
suddenly faced with the question of unemployment.  The witnesses of the occupying army 
are keeping an eye on the availability of our personnel”.310  Indeed, it emerged at the same 
meeting that the German authorities had allocated workers from the Hennebont firm in 
Brittany who were “not very busy” to work at the nearby port of Lorient.  Despite 
Hennebont’s appeals to the local prefecture, the Germans’ decision prevailed.311   
By the end of April 1941, the local prefecture sent a request to a steel firm on behalf 
of the Feldkommandantur that the working week at the firm be increased to 40 or even 48 
hours in order to free up more workers.  The firm was also asked to provide a list of workers 
who had “become available” due to decreased production levels.312  Daum reiterated that 
“labour that might appear to be surplus must be automatically taken on by us”, even if this 
meant assigning them agricultural or forestry work outside the factory.  CORSID was also 
made aware of a circular distributed by the German authorities in March to try to pursuade 
workers to volunteer to work in Germany, in return for higher wages and more hours of work.  
It was specified that such arrangements were done “of the [workers’] free will and apply only 
to unemployed personnel in France”, to which Daum flatly responded “we need to ensure that 
there is no unemployed personnel”.  Daum concluded that “we must get a head start to ensure 
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that any presence of surplus labour not be revealed.  We must also have the charade ready for 
any situations that may result from the precariousness of our supply of coal”.313  Even 
Coqueugnot, the representative of the Ministry for Industrial Production at CORSID’s 
meetings, agreed with CORSID’s measures, stating that “it is not enough to simply inform 
the relevant authorities of the situation; [firms] must develop further initiatives capable of 
preventing the unemployment of their personnel”.314  By early 1942, however, it seems that 
the small-scale work in forestry and agriculture that could be found for French workers 
“appear to be fairly weak compared to the degree of unemployment”.315  By the start of 1942, 
the French steel industry had a growing number of under- and unemployed workers which 
was becoming increasingly difficult to conceal.  Meanwhile, at least one firm was forced to 
hang recruitment posters in its factory encouraging workers to volunteer to work in Germany; 
CORSID admitted that they had no choice but to comply.316   
By the end of 1941, an interesting situation had arisen.  The Audincourt factory found 
itself short of skilled labour and asked whether 50 to 60 rolling mill specialists from other 
firms could be dispatched to Audincourt.  Daum noted that the question was of “theoretical 
interest, to let us know whether we can move 50 workers in France”.317  He encouraged 
factories to send unemployed specialists to Audincourt, observing that “we have at the 
moment factories that are out of work while others are short-staffed, which should mean that 
we can fill the void at Audincourt”.  This example shows how unpredictable production had 
become due to the inconsistent provision of coal.  Although a firm might be suffering from 
underemployment, an important order requiring specialised rolling mill workers could 
suddenly demand 60 specialists.  If the French steel industry hoped to be able to fill such 
orders, it would require sufficient labour when necessary. 
What is striking from these discussions is that CORSID was already trying to 
undermine German attempts to recruit workers for the Reich, more than a year before the 
Relève was formalised.  The lack of raw materials had slowed steel production significantly, 
with an average working week of between 32 and 35 hours in March 1941, being as low as 
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24 hours in some firms.318  CORSID’s preoccupation seems to have been to maintain the full 
labour force and prevent outright unemployment.  The motivations for this strategy are not 
entirely clear; while there could have been a patriotic dimension to refusing to give up 
labourers to the German authorities, the business reasoning against losing one’s workers was 
likely a much stronger factor.  Given how inconsistent coal deliveries had become, it was 
essential that the workforce not be depleted during a shortage of coal, only for industry to 
find itself short of workers when the provision of coal increased.  Richard Vinen has also 
suggested that “social fear” motivated some Committees to oppose labour deportations, citing 
“a general fear among the patronat that if they did not distance themselves from the 
deporation of labour to Germany they would suffer the consequences of the workers’ 
anger”.319  Whatever the motivation, it is clear that CORSID opposed early attempts to 
relocate French workers to Germany, and at the start of 1942, Daum predicted that in the 
months to come, “we will endure phenomena worse than the loss of a few specialist 
workers”.320  With the establishment of the Relève in June and the labour draft later that 
summer, Daum’s warning proved prophetic.  
CORSID’s initial reaction to the Relève was restrained.  Eugène Roy, the Vice-
President of CORSID, observed that the situation “leaves us a certain hope that we will not 
see calls for labour that are too massive”.321  CORSID also ensured that each firm provided 
an updated list of employees who were still prisoners of war in Germany, ranked in order of 
priority for release, with skilled labourers being at the top of the list.322  Given that the terms 
of the Relève promised the release of one POW for every three workers sent to Germany, 
CORSID wanted to ensure that it secured the release of the industry’s most useful workers.  
Following the law of 4 September 1942, which established compulsory labour drafts, 
CORSID decided to gather information from its factories before approaching the government, 
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noting that “information is still imprecise in many cases” and they were not entirely sure 
what impact the labour draft would have on the industry.323  To this end, CORSID issued a 
circular to all factories only hours after the law was passed requesting information so that 
CORSID could establish statistics on the departure of workers to Germany.324  A file was 
opened for each worker sent to Germany in order to keep track of them, and in most cases 
communication was established between the workers sent to Germany and their firm back in 
France.325 
By February 1943, CORSID observed that “important departures [were] underway in 
most factories”.326  Meeting on 16 February 1943, the very day the STO was formally 
established, Baboin, who had replaced Coqueugnot as representative of the Ministry for 
Industrial Production, reiterated his request “that factories inform him of workers who are not 
employed in their area of specialty”, noting that “the answers received so far are 
insufficient”.327  There could be little doubt that such documents would be used to compile 
lists of workers to be sent to Germany.  It is worth noting the evolution of the attitude of the 
Ministry for Industrial Production regarding sending labour to Germany.  While the 
Ministry’s representative had supported CORSID’s efforts to frustrate German attempts to 
acquire volunteers to work in Germany in 1941, the Ministry’s policy by February 1943 was 
to abet the conscription of French workers.328  CORSID’s position does not seem to have 
followed the Ministry’s conversion, however, since industrialists were primarily concerned 
with keeping their factories running, which was hardly compatible with the removal of large 
numbers of their workers.  It appears that CORSID did not cooperate with the Ministry on the 
STO; Baboin renewed his request for lists of workers ripe for deportation again in April, 
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suggesting that little progress had been made since his request at the beginning of the year.329  
Daum seems to have lobbied the Ministry to ensure that steel was recognised an “an essential 
industry to the economic life of the country”, which entitled factories to “be exempt from all 
departures [of workers] that are not immediately compensated” with replacement workers, 
thereby keeping the number of workers as constant as possible.330  In several cases, deported 
French workers were replaced by the German authorities with workers from North Africa.331  
CORSID also pleaded for the release of several categories of workers.  While requests for the 
repatriation of students, farmers, and women were dismissed, the possibility of repatriation 
was granted for the fathers of large families (with five or more children), workers older than 
50, and workers who were seriously ill and deemed unfit for work.332  Although these were 
relatively minor concessions, they demonstrate that CORSID was active in working with the 
German and French authorities in order to alleviate the effects of the STO.  Given how 
CORSID had opposed German efforts to encourage individual workers to volunteer to travel 
to Germany for work in 1941, it is not surprising that they opposed the massive labour 
deportations envisaged by Sauckel.  CORSID used its influence to work within the system to 
ease the symptoms of the STO most debilitating to the French steel industry.  While CORSID 
tried to act as a shield to protect its firms and workers, its interventions were largely 
ineffective.   
 
Franco-German integration under Speer and Bichelonne 
The negative effects of the STO in France, particularly in terms of industrial 
production, were by no means lost on Bichelonne.  Production in France was in steady 
decline: the lack of coal drove down production, which the Germans used to justify sending 
French workers to Germany, reducing production even further.  Moreover, the majority of 
workers removed from French factories never made it to Germany.  Alan Milward calculated 
that by September 1943, “only about ten per cent on average of the men detailed to go to 
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Germany actually arrived there”.333  A significant number of those fleeing the STO opted to 
join the Resistance, leading Vichy to cheekily refer to the maquis as l’armée Sauckel.334  
With shortages of raw material and labour, dwindling production, low morale, and a 
burgeoning Resistance amongst its consequences, the STO was a disaster for French industry. 
It was in this context that Jean Bichelonne travelled to Berlin to meet Albert Speer, 
the German Minister for Armaments and War Production, in September 1943.335  The two 
men had a great deal in common, both generally being described as young, apolitical 
technocrats.336  Bichelonne argued that France could produce far more efficiently for the 
German war economy if French workers could return to French factories and if the labour 
deportations were to cease.  Speer proposed that France focus primarily on consumer goods, 
along with some military equipment, which would enable German factories to replace 
production of such goods with armaments, thereby increasing military output in Germany.  In 
addition, all French factories participating in this scheme would be shielded from Sauckel’s 
labour drafts, giving further incentive for industrialists to take part.337 
This arrangement marked the most explicit attempt to realise “the New Economic 
Order in Europe” outlined by German Minister for the Economy Walther Funk in July 
1940.338  By shifting the production of consumer goods to France, Germany was in effect 
accepting a degree of interdependence with France, rather than considering it as a stable of 
workers that could be plundered at will.  Crucially, Speer and Bichelonne recognised the key 
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role the Organisation Committees would play in this arrangement.339  This is hardly 
surprising, since the Committees were initially created precisely to facilitate this kind of 
Franco-German integration.340  The Committees continued to receive orders from German 
firms and authorities and allocate them to the appropriate French firms.  Given the opposition 
to labour deportations in the French steel industry, CORSID welcomed the agreement and 
cooperated with the scheme by accepting more German orders after September 1943.341  
Moreover, the agreement would ensure more work for French factories, which would prevent 
them from closing and could bring greater profits.342  Crucially, the coal required for German 
orders was meant to be provided by Germany; with Germany itself increasingly short on coal, 
however, the provisions of coal often fell short of what was needed.  Finally, the prospect of 
producing chiefly consumer goods rather than armaments undoubtedly made these orders 
easier to accept, as they could be presented as civilian production.  Of course, in the 
European economy envisaged by Speer and Bichelonne, shifting civilian production to 
France freed up German factories to focus on armaments production and thereby contributed 
significantly to the German war effort.  
Although industrialists welcomed the accord, its success is debatable.  Adam Tooze 
dismisses the arrangement as “a last-ditch effort of little practical significance”,343 although 
he bases his assessment on whether the accord helped the New European Economy compete 
with Allied production, which by September 1943 was far outpacing that of the Nazi Empire.  
Alan Milward concludes that neither the STO nor the Speer-Bichelonne accord was 
successful, “since the level of exploitation of the French economy [by Germany] was so high 
already”.344  Furthermore, since Hitler never abandoned Sauckel’s policy entirely, the two 
remained in competition until the end of the occupation, which undermined the efficiency of 
both schemes.345   Arne Radtke-Delacor, meanwhile, argues that the Speer-Bichelonne 
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arrangement was in fact successful for the Reich, since the amount of French production for 
Germany did increase following September 1943.  Yet the rates cited by Radtke-Delacor are 
far from revolutionary: he calculates that the proportion of overall French production for 
Germany rose from just over 40% in the second quarter of 1943 to between 45-50% by the 
second quarter of 1944.346  We know that production for Germany in the steel industry was 
much higher: in the spring of 1944, a typical proportion of production for the Reich among 
French steel firms was between 75% and 85%.347  Over the period covered by the agreement, 
however, steel production in fact dropped slightly, with the output of Martin steel falling 
from 13,236 tonnes in September 1943 to 12,234 tonnes in May 1944 in the Centre-Ouest 
region.348  This was in large part due to the drastic shortages of coal confronting French 
industry.  Despite taking part in the Speer-Bichelonne programme to produce consumer 
goods for Germany, the French steel industry in Centre-Ouest received only 7,500 tonnes of 
coal for April 1944, which came with the caveat that the entire amount had to be allocated to 
a single factory in order to maximise efficiency.349  This can be compared to 34,000 tonnes 
received in September 1942, which itself was a decrease from previous months.350  Indeed, 
given the circumstances, ranging from ever worsening shortages of coal to increasingly 
frequent Allied bombings of French factories, it is striking how much the French steel 
industry was able to produce, even if there was a real decline in output.  From September 
1943, we can observe an increase in the proportion of production for Germany, even if 
overall output continued to drop amidst the worsening shortages of raw materials. 
More important than the question of whether production levels remained steady or 
whether they either increased or decreased slightly under the scheme is the policy pursued by 
the French government and CORSID at this point.  From September 1943, Bichelonne 
opposed further deportations of workers to Germany and worked to keep them in France.  
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The policy of the Ministry for Industrial Production was therefore to accept as many orders 
for the Reich as possible, thereby contributing to the German war economy by producing 
consumer goods rather than providing workers.  Not surprisingly, this policy was promoted 
by the Organisation Committees that operated under the Ministry.  Indeed, this broad policy 
had been at the foundation of the Committees, which had never been enthusiastic about the 
mass deportations of their workers.  At the governmental level, meanwhile, Laval resisted 
Sauckel’s further requests for labour, signalling support for the Bichelonne-Speer agreement 
as an alternative to the STO.  From September 1943 until the end of the Vichy regime, the 
government opposed further deportations and focused its energies on increasing production 
for the Reich as a way of contributing to, and integrating into, the German war economy.351 
 
Harmonising Franco-German industry  
By February 1942, with the worsening shortage of coal taking its toll on the steel 
industry, officials began discussing, apparently without irony, the prospect of melting down 
the Eiffel Tower to recycle its 7,200 tonnes of steel.352  The intellectual Thierry Maulnier 
went further, suggesting that the much smaller Vendôme Column be recycled as well, not 
only for its raw materials but also “in the name of perspective and harmony”.353  The Column 
was famously made from the cannons captured from German armies by Napoleon at 
Austerlitz, and it was thought that destroying this monument to French victory over German 
forces might please the Nazis.  Fortunately for Paris’s skyline, neither of these schemes came 
to fruition, although French steel mills shipped many times the weight of the Eiffel Tower in 
steel products across the Rhine over the course of the war. 
The majority of the work done by CORSID throughout the war was rather mundane 
and usually fairly technical,354 with its principal task being to distribute the raw materials 
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allocated to the industry by OCRPI to the appropriate steel firms.  Its other main 
responsibility was to receive and process orders from the German authorities, passing along 
the relevant order and the appropriate share of raw materials to a given steel firm.  The 
Committees had after all been established in the summer of 1940 in order to stand between 
individual French firms and intimidating German authorities.  The coordination of German 
orders was assigned to the Comptoir des Produits Sidérurgiques (CPS), created by CORSID 
in December 1940.355  It largely inherited the role of the pre-war Comptoir sidérurgique de 
France (CSF), which had been responsible for receiving and centralising orders and 
deliveries for the industry.  The role that the new CPS played, however, was fundamentally 
different.  The Committees, CORSID chief among them, had been created with a view to 
institutionalise and deepen economic collaboration between France and Germany.  CORSID 
found it useful to adapt the pre-war CSF to this end in the form of the new CPS.  The latter 
would deal extensively with German authorities and industrialists, receiving orders from and 
producing extensively for them.  CORSID even published a bilingual technical vocabulary 
list to help German and French steel industrialists ensure they were placing and receiving the 
correct orders.356   
In addition to receiving German orders, CORSID also oversaw attempts to 
“harmonise” French and German steel production.  In reality, this involved adapting French 
practices to German ones.  This was largely carried out by the Bureau de normalisation de la 
sidérurgie (BNS), another body established by CORSID and placed under the leadership of 
Eugène Dupuy.  Its role was formally to standardise steel production across France, ensuring 
that various steel products were uniform and thus interchangeable.357 This is broadly in line 
with much of the literature that emphasises the technocratic standardisation imposed on 
French industry under Vichy.358 Crucially, however, the BNS took the specifications used in 
Germany as its point of reference, and sought to harmonise France’s steel products in line 
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with these dimensions.  This started in earnest in March 1942, when the BNS informed all 
steel firms of the new “standard dimensions for thin sheet metal (tôles minces)”.359  These 
dimensions were confirmed throughout the war and while they had initially been 
“recommended”, they later became obligatory.  These specifications remained in place after 
the Liberation and were confirmed in April 1945.360   
Adopting German practices and specifications made sense in this context.  Given that 
by 1944 the overwhelming majority of French steel production was geared towards filling 
German orders, it was logical to export products that could be used immediately by the 
German war economy without modification.  Since French factories had replaced German 
ones in producing many non-military goods for the German market, many French steel mills 
had become little more than branch plants of the Reich’s economy by the late stages of the 
war, and so their products were made as if they were in Germany.  Yet these developments 
had been underway for some time, as CORSID received orders from German firms and 
oversaw the adoption of German specifications well before the Speer-Bichelonne agreement 
was reached, since production for the Reich still accounted for the majority of the steel 
industry’s orders.  The BNS had been active in this process of adopting German standards 
since 1941 and by June 1943 the CPS had compiled an extensive list of prices for products 
with German specifications that had been approved by the Reich authorities.361  In December 
1943, by now under the aegis of the Speer-Bichlonne agreement, the Reichsbahn ordered 
large sheet metal (larges plats) made according to German specifications,362 while 
Stahlunion, a subsidiary of Otto Wolff, made numerous orders in 1944 for sheet metal (larges 
plats and tôles fortes, moyennes et minces), all explicitly following German standards and 
specifications.363  The CPS continued to send price lists and other documents to Stahlunion 
until at least mid-July 1944.  In other words, CORSID was continuing to supply the Reich 
with French steel products even as the German army was fighting Allied troops on French 
soil.  In November 1944, two months after the re-establishment of the French Republic, Otto 
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Wolff, one of the leading armaments producers for the Wehrmacht, complained to the CPS 
that one of its orders had still not arrived.364 
In Nord and Pas-de-Calais, meanwhile, the “harmonisation” of French and German 
steel production happened in a far more direct way.  SIDENOR, the organisation analogous 
to CORSID in the two northernmost departments, reported that the German authorities there 
forced all steel firms in the region to adopt the German method for producing Thomas steel.  
Unsurprisingly, the Nazi authorities judged the German production method superior to the 
one used by the French.365  Annexed to Belgium by Germany and in the midst of a crippling 
shortage of coal, Nord and Pas-de-Calais had little choice but to assimilate to the production 
methods imposed on it by Germany. 
This standardisation in the French steel industry was of tremendous significance.  Not 
only did the BNS standardise steel products across France, but it harmonised Franco-German 
specifications (albeit by unilaterally accepting Germany’s), which facilitated the easy transfer 
of French steel products to the German economy.  Importantly, this standardisation occurred 
before the Speer-Bichelonne agreement, demonstrating that even while CORSID was 
protesting against the deportation of French workers, it continued to integrate the French steel 
industry into l’Europe allemande.  Given that the Organisation Committees were first created 
to facilitate the realisation of a “New Economic Order in Europe”,366 their progress in 
standardising French production to German norms is not surprising.  Moreover, by the time 
that Speer and Bichelonne agreed to cross-Rhine economic cooperation, the French steel 
industry was already prepared to produce for Germany.  The advances made by CORSID in 
this respect reveal that while they opposed the deportation of workers to Germany, they were 
entirely willing to produce for the Reich and to “harmonise” the industries of the two 
countries. 
While this was particularly useful in the context of the German war economy, it 
presumably had longer-reaching consequences.367  In a report prepared for Jean Monnet in 
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July 1944, Secretary General for Industrial Production Lambert Blum-Picard described how 
French industry had been integrated into the German war economy.  Admitting that some 
French industries were, “aside from a handful of French models, producing exclusively for 
German industry”, he noted that “these modifications were made for the sole purpose of 
waging war. They did not consist of determining the most efficient factory or method”.368  He 
concluded that “there will be lessons to be drawn [from the German occupation of Europe] 
regarding the organisation set up for economic planning over a vast area. But it seems to me 
that nothing will endure in terms of economic realities”.  However, the remainder of the study 
makes the case for an economic union in Western Europe, including western Germany.  The 
example of the “violent unification of Europe under German domination”,369 as Blum-Picard 
put it, was indeed studied by Monnet and others as they were developing plans for post-war 
France and Western Europe.  In addition to providing a model for Jean Monnet to study, two 
individuals involved in this Franco-German collaboration, namely Léon Daum of CORSID 
and Karl-Maria Hettlage, an advisor of Albert Speer when the Speer-Bichelonne agreement 
was reached, went on to become members of the High Authority of the European Coal and 
Steel Community.370  While the ill-fated attempts to integrate Franco-German industry in the 
final stages of the Second World War proved were unsuccessful, we can observe some 
interesting continuities from the Speer-Bichelonne agreement to the eventual creation of the 
European Coal and Steel Community.      
 
Economic collaboration in the French steel industry 
Given the context of French industry under Vichy, it is hardly surprising that the steel 
industry produced massively for the Reich and the German war effort.  Historians debate the 
exact figures regarding French output for Germany – a conservative estimate is that roughly 
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56% of French steel products were for Germany,371 while a bolder study has claimed that the 
French steel industry was producing 100% for the Reich.372  It is beyond dispute that French 
steel firms produced heavily for Germany, and it was clear from the summer of 1940 that 
industrial production would henceforth be dependent on producing for the Reich.  According 
to Fabian Lemmes, “this does not seem to have caused any serious reluctance among the 
great majority of French enterprises […who] accommodated themselves to the new 
situation”.373  Precisely what form of cooperation this could take is generally divided into 
three categories of economic collaboration: economic collaborationism, driven by ideological 
identification with National Socialism; collaboration for profit, where firms were motivated 
by economic opportunism; and collaboration for survival, where the goal was simply to save 
one’s firm from occupation or closure.374  In the case of the steel industry, there does not 
seem to be any evidence of collaboration driven by ideological affinity, or collaborationism.  
Similarly, cases of outright resistance by employers in the steel industry are rare and 
disputed, as will be discussed below with the example of Schneider.  The primary motivation 
for collaborating in the steel industry seems to have been the protection of one’s firm, with 
profit a secondary but nonetheless important motive.375  For much of the war, these goals 
could both be achieved by producing for the Reich, which provided an income stream and 
kept factories running.376   
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does not apply to the earlier years of the Vichy period. 
373 Fabian Lemmes, “Collaboration in wartime France, 1940-1944” in European Review of History: Revue 
européenne d’histoire, 15:2, 2008, 157-177, 163. 
374 This typology is advanced in Robert Frank, Jean-Marie Flonneau and Robert Mancherini, “Conclusion” in 
Alain Beltran, Robert Frank and Henry Rousso (eds), La vie des entreprises sous l’Occupation (Paris: Belin, 
1994).  This categorisation has been favoured in recent literature, such as Fabian Lemmes, op.cit., 162-3.   
375 The related notion of professionalism among employers is discussed in Renaud de Rochebrune and Jean-
Claude Hazera, Les patrons sous l’Occupation (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1995).  For a recent discussion of 
professionalism in the railway industry, see Ludivine Broch, “Professionalism in the Final Solution: French 
Railway Workers and the Jewish Deportations, 1942-1944“ in Contemporary European History, 23:3, August 
2014. 
376 Some scholars have argued that the final category, collaboration for survival, should not be considered as a 
form of collaboration, since it was not a freely chosen course of action.  The terms “coerced accommodation” 
and “coerced adaptation” have been suggested as alternatives by Philippe Burrin and François Marcot, 
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Despite the central importance of the steel industry for both France and Germany, and 
the undeniable extent to which the industry produced for the Reich, it is striking how little 
attention the industry receives from historians of economic collaboration.377  One of the best 
collected volumes on economic collaboration, edited by Olivier Dard et al., mentions the steel 
industry only in passing over the course of three pages, ignoring the industry in the remainder 
of the book.378  Similarly, Annie Lacroix-Riz’s provocative study of French industrialists and 
bankers during the war dedicates fewer than eight pages to the steel industry.379  Other 
landmark studies, such as Philippe Burrin’s France à l’heure allemande, make only passing 
references to steel firms.380  The historian who has written most extensively on the French 
steel industry in the 1940s, Philippe Mioche, has explained in a number of publications that 
the war was neither beneficial nor profitable for the industry, largely because it was unable to 
modernise or replace its equipment which therefore deteriorated over the course of the war. 
Mioche nevertheless admits that the steel industry did indeed produce heavily for the 
Reich.381  Ultimately, the precise figures detailing how much the French steel industry 
produced for the German war effort are of secondary importance.  What is crucial and 
undeniable is that the French steel industry did indeed contribute massively to the German 
war economy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
respectively.  While these new categories are useful for the discussion of economic collaboration of heads of 
individual firms, they are less helpful for describing the actions of the members of the Organisation 
Committees.  Given that the Committees were created expressly to facilitate Franco-German collaboration, 
and that members of these bodies were not coerced to join, the newer categories are less accurate in 
describing the actions of Committee members.  It should also be noted that there is no evidence of 
collaborationism among any members of CORSID.  See Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande (Paris: 
Seuil, 1995), especially 468-470 and François Marcot, “Qu’est-ce qu’un patron resistant?” in Olivier Dard, Jean-
Claude Daumas, and François Marcot (eds), L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les entreprises (Paris: ADHE, 2000), 
277-292, here 278-80.   
377 The key works in this field include Richard Vinen, The politics of French business, 1936-1945, op.cit.; Beltran, 
Frank and Rousso (eds.), La vie des entreprises sous l’Occupation, op.cit.; Annie Lacroix-Riz, Industriels et 
banquiers sous l’Occupation, op.cit.; Dard, Daumas and Marcot (eds.), L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les 
entreprises, op.cit. 
378 Dard, Daumas and Marcot, op.cit., 248-250.  These references are all contained in Hervé Joly’s contribution, 
“Prosopographie des dirigeants des Comités d’organisation”, 245-259. It is worth noting that his citations 
regarding the steel industry are without exception to Philippe Mioche’s work.  François Marcot’s contribution 
to this volume, discussed above, makes no mention of the steel industry. 
379 Annie Lacroix-Riz, op.cit,, 146-153. Lacroix-Riz asks why the steel industry is looked on positively by 
historians, given that it produced 100% for the Reich by 1944. 
380 Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande, op.cit. In his chapter “Capitaines d’industrie”, Burrin 
mentions that Schneider accepted a representative of the Vichy regime to approve German industrial orders 
(251), and that the largest steel companies in France, de Wendel and Schneider, had lost the majority of their 
holdings with the German victory and annexations (254). 
381 Philippe Mioche advances this argument most clearly in “Les entreprises sidérurgiques sous l’Occupation”, 
Histoire, économie et société, 11:3, 1992, 397-414. 
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  One of the most interesting arguments to have emerged in the recent historiography 
on economic collaboration is that of deliberate underproduction (freinage).  While this had 
been a common defence of industrialists in the early post-war period, it has become popular 
among some historians over the past fifteen years.  The crux of the argument is that certain 
factories consciously chose to slow their production during the war as a means of hampering 
the German war economy.  François Marcot first made the argument in relation to Peugeot, 
which he described as having pursued “a deliberate policy of underproduction by the most 
diverse means”.382  He cites a declaration made by Jean-Pierre Peugeot in September 1945, 
who claimed that the firm’s priorities had been to protect French factories from German 
occupation and to supply work and well-being to its employees.  Raw materials were needed 
in order to keep the factories running, however, and these could only be received from 
Germany if Peugeot agreed to produce for the Reich.  Yet, Jean-Pierre Peugeot claims “we 
arranged that these materials not be transformed into arms”, but that they instead be used for 
non-military production.383   
According to Marcot, the general strategy of the firm can be summarised as to 
produce for the Reich in order to survive, while minimising the amount of war matériel 
produced.  He qualifies the production levels of Peugeot – 90% of its automotive production 
during the war went to the Reich – by noting that wartime production levels were markedly 
lower than those during the interwar period and that many of the orders for war matériel, 
ranging from cylinder heads for German military vehicles to parts for the V1 flying bombs, 
were only partially completed.384  Marcot also notes that producing more for the Reich was 
the alternative to seeing many workers shipped to Germany as part of the STO, and admits 
that Peugeot acted to protect his factory, “his capital, his business relations, his machines, 
[and] his [workers]” by accepting German orders.  While these actions would place Peugeot 
                                                          
382 François Marcot, “La direction de Peugeot sous l’Occupation: pétainisme, réticence, opposition et 
résistance” in Mouvement social, no. 189, October-December 1999, 27-46, 44.  
383 Ibid., 29-30.  The quotation from Jean-Pierre Peugeot is from 28 September 1945. Given that these claims 
were made at precisely the time when industrialists were being put on trial for collaboration (and that Renault, 
Peugeot’s main rival in the French automotive industry, had been nationalised earlier that year), it is worth 
treating such self-exonorating claims with some scepticism. 
384 Indeed, Marcot notes that 80% of the orders for cyclinder heads were completed, whereas production on 
the component parts of the V1 flying bombs, commissioned late in the war, was never completed.  Ibid., 29-
32. 
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in the category of “collaboration for survival”, Marcot concludes that they qualify as having 
been part of the Resistance.385 
This basic argument has been reiterated in the context of the steel industry by 
Christophe Capuano through his case study of Schneider in Creusot.386  He also argues that 
Schneider’s production for the Reich was focused on non-military goods, with only 20% of 
total production devoted to military orders, and that production in the factory “stagnated”, 
despite efforts by the German authorities to increase efficiency.  Capuano attributes this to 
“the patriotic dimension and the refusal to work for Germany” of the directors of the 
factory.387  Accordingly, Capuano argues that Allied bombings of the factory in 1942 and 
1943 as well as the chronic shortage of raw materials were merely convenient excuses to 
conceal the conscious underproduction pursued by Schneider, rather than causes of lower 
production levels.  Like Marcot, Capuano advances that Schneider’s strategy was to accept 
orders from the Reich in order to keep the factory open and prevent workers from being sent 
to Germany, but that production was consciously reduced as much as possible, which he also 
categorises as Resistance. 
There are a number of issues with the underproduction argument.  As Marcot openly 
admits, there is no tangible proof that such actions took place.  On official documents and 
pieces of correspondence from industrialists or from either French or German authorities, the 
reasons for reduced production are identified as serious shortages of raw material, 
particularly coal, and labour, blamed on the STO.  Additionally, Allied bombings and 
occasional acts of sabotage by the Resistance are cited as disruptive factors.  The claim that 
these were merely excuses given to the authorities to mask unverifiable strategies of 
producing less than what was possible is innately difficult if not impossible to prove.  
Moreover, as Richard Vinen has argued, certain acts by employers can be presented as both 
collaboration and resistance.  Keeping factories open and thereby preventing workers from 
being deported to Germany, for instance, can be interpreted as patriotism, while keeping 
                                                          
385 Ibid., 45-46. Marcot describes Peugeot as being among “employers in the Resistance”, who balanced the 
needs of their firms with the values of the Resistance.  Marcot also rejects the label “collaboration for survival” 
in favour of “coerced adaptation”, which he argues better describes the experience of Peugeot during the war. 
386 Christophe Capuano, “Travailler chez Schneider sous l’Occupation, Le cas des usines du Creusot” in Christian 
Chevandier and Jean-Claude Daumas (eds.), Travailler dans les entreprises sous l’Occupation (Besançon: 
Presses universitaires de Franche-Comté, 2007), 187-207. 
387 Ibid., 189-193.  The figure of 20% cited by Capuano is from fairly early in the Vichy period, in January 1941.  
He also notes that at this time 46% of Schneider’s production was for German civilian orders, meaning that 
two-thirds of all production was for the Reich by January 1941. 
110 
 
factories open to produce extensively for the German war effort can be seen as 
collaboration.388   
The worsening shortage of raw materials, and particularly coal, during the Vichy 
period is undisputed. For Capuano, however, the decision of the Director General of 
Schneider to postpone lighting a second blast furnace in 1944, and later to shut off the largest 
blast furnace due to lack of cast iron, was an act of resistance by consciously choosing to 
minimise production, rather than a consequence of the acute shortage of raw materials in 
1944.389  This particular claim can be countered by CORSID’s monthly reports, which 
describe how “the stocks [of cast iron] have decreased [and] factories with Martin blast 
furnaces in operation are encountering difficulties as a result of their provisions in cast 
iron”.390  The following month’s report confirmed that “Creusot had to stop one of its blast 
furnaces due to the lack of cast iron”.391  Moreover, the number of blast furnaces active in 
France fluctuated during the Vichy period as a result of the inconsistent deliveries of raw 
materials.  As a result, the number of Martin blast furnaces active in 1941 varied from an 
average of 14 between January and May, to 12 in June, 10 in July, and 9 in August, only to 
rise back to 12 in November before dropping back to 10 in December.392  Given how much 
the scarcity of raw materials had worsened between 1941 and 1944, it is hardly surprising 
that the number of active blast furnaces had to be slightly reduced, particularly as the number 
of active blast furnaces had varied according to provisions of raw materials throughout the 
period. 
It is also important to note that all the works that advance the underproduction 
argument end their study in the summer of 1944.  Indeed, one of the foundations of the 
argument rests on the observation that production before 1940 was higher than it was 
between the Fall of France and the Liberation, which is then used as evidence that firms were 
                                                          
388 Vinen notes that any activity that was seen to disadvantage the working classes was often interpreted as 
collaboration.  Vinen also dismisses post-war claims by the patronat that they had consciously underproduced, 
concluding that “it was in the interests of the coal industry to produce as much as possible”.  See Richard 
Vinen, “The French Coal Industry during the Occupation”, op.cit., 119 and 117.    
389 Capuano, op.cit., 195. 
390 “Comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie. Région du Centre et de l’Ouest. Réunion du 13 juin 1944”, 13 June 
1944, AQ 139 82, AN.  
391 “Comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie. Région du Centre et de l’Ouest. Réunion du 18 juillet 1944”, 18 July 
1944, AQ 139 82, AN. 
392 These figures are gathered from the minutes of CORSID’s monthly meetings in AQ 139 82, AN. 
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consciously producing less than they could have.393  This argument consciously downplays 
the myriad factors that prevented French productivity from reaching pre-war levels.  The 
most significant of these was the lack of raw materials, which became a crisis from the 
moment that Britain, responsible for a full third of France’s pre-war provision of coal, 
stopped sending coal across the Channel in the summer of 1940.  Impressively, the French 
steel industry was able to match 1938 production levels in the last quarter of 1940, the first 
quarter in which the industry was overseen by CORSID, but firms only achieved these levels 
of production by depleting their own stocks of coal.394  Once these had been exhausted, 
production inexorably declined as coal deliveries dropped further from their pre-war levels.  
The fact that steel production declined in this context is hardly convincing evidence of a 
conscious choice by employers to restrain production. 
In addition to understanding the new circumstances of 1940, it is helpful to extend the 
frame of reference beyond the Liberation – something that no study advancing the 
underproduction argument has done.  If underproduction in early 1944 was due to political 
opposition rather than lack of raw materials, it is reasonable to assume that the change of 
regime that accompanied the Liberation would lead to an immediate increase in production, 
as resistant firms stopped consciously underproducing.  Yet steel production worsened 
following the Liberation, with production in November and December 1944 amounting to 
only 40% of that of November 1943.395  Even by November 1945 blast furnaces remained 
unlit due to lack of coal,396 and the CGT complained about the low levels of steel production, 
which were attributed to coal shortages.397  If the underproduction argument were to be 
believed, it would mean that low production levels in the first half of 1944 were caused by 
conscious opposition to the regime and not an acute shortage of raw materials, while low 
production levels after the Liberation were caused by an acute shortage of raw materials 
                                                          
393 See Marcot, op.cit., 30-32.  Talbot Imlay summarises this point as “if the Germans captured a large part of 
the productive pie, it was a pie that had considerably shrunk”.  See Talbot Imlay and Martin Horn, The Politics 
of Industrial Collaboration during World War II: Ford France, Vichy and Nazi Germany (Cambridge: CUP, 2014), 
267. 
394 “Comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie.  Région du Centre et de l’Ouest. Réunion du 14 janvier 1941”, 14 
January 1941, AQ 139 82, AN.  The production of Martin steel in the last quarter of 1940 in Centre-Ouest was 
actually 101% of that of the last quarter of 1938, although the production of finished products was only 71% 
compared to 1938. 
395 “Note hebdomadaire sur la situation de l’industrie”, 28 December 1944, F 12 10024, AN.  20,000 tonnes 
were produced in both November and December 1944, compared to 50,000 in November 1943 and a monthly 
average of 65,000 tonnes in 1938. 
396 “Note”, 23 November 1945, F 12 10028, AN. 
397 “Note pour Vallon, directeur adjoint du cabinet du général de Gaulle”, 23 November 1945, F 12 10028, AN.  
The note concludes that “the solution is clear: we need more coal from the Ruhr”. 
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which was accompanied by support of the new regime.  Far more plausible is that the penury 
of coal and other crucial resources was the determining factor in both situations.398 
An additional qualification must be added to the claim of industrialists in the 
immediate post-war period, which has been reiterated more recently by Marcot and Capuano, 
namely that focusing on the production of civilian rather than military goods amounted to a 
form of resistance.399  It must be remembered that according to the Speer-Bichelonne 
accords, France would focus on producing consumer goods for the Reich, which would free 
up German factories for armaments production.400  In this case, the fact that civilian goods 
were made on one side of the Rhine and armaments on the other, with all products created 
according to German specifications and destined for the same market, can be seen as the 
realisation of a coordinated Franco-German economy geared towards prolonging the German 
war effort rather than an act of resistance.  The French steel industry’s extensive production 
for Germany thus contributed to the German war effort, regardless of whether the factories 
were producing train carriages or tank armour. 
The only critical evaluation of the underproduction argument to date is by Talbot 
Imlay.  Focusing on Ford France, Imlay constructs “a circumstantial case that Ford [France] 
probably did deliberately under-produce for the Germans”, while recognising that “this 
outcome did not constitute resistance”.401  Imlay observes that Ford France had “to produce 
enough to keep its factories running and to appease the German (and French) authorities, but 
no more”.  Given the lack of incentive to produce more than minimal levels, Imlay argues 
that “one can reasonably conclude that Ford [France] deliberately under-produced during 
1943-4” because this was what best served its business interests.  Imlay stresses that this was 
“never motivated by any principled opposition to the occupiers or by a desire to undermine 
the German war economy”.402  While Imlay’s study is focused on an automotive company, 
his assessment can reasonably be applied to the steel industry as well.  It is entirely plausible 
                                                          
398 According to Klemmann and Kudryashov, French GDP was in fact lower in 1945 than in 1944, despite the 
majority of fighting on French soil, with all the disruption this caused, taking place in 1944. Only in 1946, with 
the Monnet Plan among other factors, did GDP decisively increase, although even in 1948 it remained lower 
than in 1940. See Hein Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov, Occupied Economies: An Economic History of Nazi-
Occupied Europe, 1939-1945 (London: Berg, 2012), 331.    
399 See Marcot, op.cit., 44 and Capuano, op.cit., 193-4. 
400 In August 1940, the German authorities expressed their preference that France should produce component 
parts for war materiel rather than finished military goods.  Speer similarly preferred that armaments be 
produced in Germany rather than in occupied territories.  See “Tatigkeitsbericht”, 10 August 1940, RW 24/15, 
BA-MA and, for Speer’s preference for producing armaments in Germany, Speer, op.cit., and Tooze, op.cit 
401 Talbot Imlay and Martin Horn, op.cit., 20. 
402 Ibid., 243-4. 
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that steel firms produced slightly less than they possibly could have in order to maximise 
profits, while ensuring that they produced enough to please officials in Berlin and Vichy and 
thereby protect their factories.  Similarly, it must be acknowledged that this strategy does not 
constitute resistance, but instead fits rather neatly into the categories of “collaboration for 
profit” and “collaboration for survival”.  Indeed, producing enough to satisfy German and 
French authorities, even if it might have been possible to produce slightly more, still amounts 
to collaboration. 
One vital element missing from both Marcot’s and Capuano’s pieces is any reference 
to the Organisation Committees.403  Both are case studies of particular firms that try to show 
the patriotic actions of particular employers.  Raising our gaze to the level of the Organisation 
Committees, however, the evidence in favour of the underproduction argument becomes far 
weaker.  Given CORSID’s willingness to conceal unemployment levels and to thwart 
German attempts to secure French labour, it may be conceivable that CORSID did the same 
for production levels.  However, there is no evidence that such attempts were made, and they 
were certainly never discussed at CORSID’s meetings, unlike the schemes to disguise 
unemployment levels.  Moreover, CORSID’s efforts to adapt the French steel industry to 
German specifications suggest not only that they were willing to produce for the Reich, but 
that they sought to do so as efficiently as possible.  It must be remembered that the members 
of CORSID willingly joined of their own accord and were in no way coerced into becoming 
members of the new bodies geared towards furthering Franco-German collaboration.  Finally, 
given how CORSID had agonised over the shortage of raw materials facing the industry, it is 
very unlikely that they would have accepted the waste of precious coal in order to produce 
slightly less for the Reich.  Indeed, throughout the war CORSID established a number of 
commissions to improve the efficiency of factories and warned repeatedly against wasting 
coal.  CORSID stated that “any waste [of coal] is severely proscribed”, and explained that 
“for the allocation of coal, we will be forced to choose the factories that make the most 
efficient use of coal”.404  As coal became ever scarcer, it is improbable that CORSID would 
have condoned the squandering of raw materials in order to underproduce for the Germans.  
Given that CORSID had to deal with both French and German authorities, it is likely that the 
                                                          
403 Imlay does discuss the Organisation Committee for Automobiles in his book, although the focus remains on 
COA’s role in the “Ford truck programme”, which saw Ford France producing trucks for Germany.  See Imlay, 
op.cit., 194-245. 
404 “Réunion du Groupe Centre-Ouest du 8 avril 1941”, 8 April 1941, AQ 139 82, AN. 
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Committee did its best to ensure that production for the Reich was being carried out as 
efficiently as possible.    
 
Conclusion 
 Having examined CORSID’s actions in relation to the key policies pursued by the 
Vichy regime regarding French industry, we can consider CORSID’s motivations.  Clearly, 
CORSID did not blindly endorse whatever policies Pétain or Laval chose to pursue; on the 
contrary, CORSID went to considerable lengths to undermine German attempts to recruit 
workers from French steel factories.  In choosing which policies to support and which to 
grudgingly implement (or even try to thwart), CORSID seems to have based its decisions on 
what was best for the French steel industry.  In the case of the National Revolution and the 
Labour Charter, CORSID ignored the woolly tirades about reducing the dominance of 
“trusts” within the Organisation Committees, but does seem to have championed the creation 
of Social Committees outlined in the Charter, once it was made clear that these bodies would 
not impinge upon CORSID’s powers.  This same logic is apparent in CORSID’s efforts to 
oppose the removal of workers from its factories.  As the case of Audincourt demonstrates, 
the inconstant supply of raw materials meant that a factory might suddenly need more 
workers and it was therefore vital that the labour supply not be depleted during quieter 
periods.  Finally, CORSID’s efforts to standardise French steel production to German 
specifications and its increasing proportion of orders for the Reich show that its opposition 
was not to producing for the Reich, but rather that it objected to the removal of its workers.  
In each situation, CORSID acted in accordance with the goal of keeping its factories running.  
With reference to Frank et al., this constitutes one of the three categories of economic 
collaboration.405 
 Aside from the motivations of maintaining its factories’ activity, CORSID’s adoption 
of German specifications at French steel mills reveals the extent to which production was 
geared towards supplying the German war economy under Vichy.  Given that the majority of 
French steel production was for the Reich, it is hardly surprising that they virtually ceased 
producing to French specifications altogether.  Informed by considerations of efficiency, 
CORSID guided the industry into ever closer uniformity with the German model.  The 
                                                          
405 Frank et al., “Conclusion”, op.cit. and Lemmes, “Collaboration in wartime France”, op.cit. 
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Organisation Committees were founded in the summer of 1940 to “harmonise” Franco-
German industry and to facilitate France’s contribution to the German economy.  In these 
tasks the Committee for Steel was remarkably successful.   
The actions of CORSID during the war left an ambiguous legacy.  While it opposed 
the labour draft and some aspects of the National Revolution, it embraced others and actively 
worked to integrate the French steel industry into the “new European economic order”.  
While CORSID was increasing its production for the Reich in early 1944, Charles de Gaulle 
and the other members of the Comité français de Libération nationale (CFLN) were 
discussing what would become of the Organisation Committees after the imminent demise of 
the Vichy regime.  It is to that debate that we must now turn. 
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Chapter Four: 
« Nous serons les successeurs, sinon les héritiers de Vichy »406 : 
Maintaining the New Industrial Order in Post-Vichy France 
 
As the final outcome of the Second World War in Europe became increasingly 
certain, various groups within the French Resistance began to intensify their efforts to 
develop coherent plans for the post-war period.  Whereas the Fall of France had come as a 
surprise to virtually everyone, not least to Germany, and was followed by a flurry of 
relatively improvised legislation over the summer of 1940, the reconquest of France was a 
long-anticipated process, and the country’s post-war economic, domestic, and foreign 
policies had already been debated extensively by the time Paris was liberated in August 1944.  
The standard narrative of this process highlights the re-establishment of the French Republic 
and the abolition of all Vichyste legislation, closing the bracket definitively on the années 
noires.407  Meanwhile, the unity of the Resistance is commended in accounts of the post-war 
programme issued by the Conseil national de la Résistance (CNR) on 15 March 1944, which 
is said to represent “a major trace of the transitory but real solidarity that existed among the 
French resistants”.408  This programme continues to be celebrated as the guiding text that 
shaped post-war France.409  From these accounts, it would seem as though the Resistance was 
unanimous in its commitment to wipe out Vichy’s undemocratic legislation, to re-establish 
the French Republic, and to pursue the policies agreed upon in the CNR Programme.410    
This chapter will examine how the question of maintaining Vichy’s industrial 
organisation figured in the Resistance’s discussions of post-war policy.  By 1943, a debate 
                                                          
406 Louis Vallon, “Note sur l’organisation professionnelle de la vie économique“, 2 June 1944, MAE, CFLN 687. 
407See, for example, Fondation Charles de Gaulle, Le Rétablissement de la légalité républicaine (Paris : Editions 
Complexe, 1996) and Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle. Le rebelle, 1890-1944 (Paris : Seuil, 1984).  Indeed, de Gaulle 
famously claimed that, since Vichy was illegitimate, the Republic had never ceased to exist and therefore did 
not need to be proclaimed.  See Charles de Gaulle, Mémoires de guerre. L’unité : 1942-1944 (vol. 2) (Paris: 
Plon, 1956). 
408 Claire Andrieu, Le programme commun de la Résistance.  Des idées dans la guerre (Paris : Editions de 
l’Erudit, 1984), 135. 
409 For a recent example see Isser Woloch, The Postwar Moment: The Allied Democracies in the Aftermath of 
World War II, forthcoming. 
410 This Gaullist narrative has been challenged, notably in Henry Rousso, Le syndrome de Vichy. De 1944 à nos 
jours (Paris: Seuil, 1987), although Rousso does not discuss the CNR Programme in great detail. 
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had emerged over whether the Organisation Committees and offices of the Central Bureau for 
the Distribution of Industrial Products (OCRPI) created by Vichy in 1940 should be 
abolished or maintained by the new regime.  On the one hand, these bodies were originally 
created to facilitate economic and political collaboration between Vichy France and Nazi 
Germany, with the goal of a harmonised European economy led by the Third Reich.  
Moreover, the Organisation Committees were dominated by the patronat and excluded labour 
representation, while largely overlooking the interests of small- and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs).  Given the profound implication of these institutions in France’s collaboration with 
the Third Reich’s war economy and the widespread unpopularity of the bodies, it was clear to 
many that they should be swept away with the re-establishment of the French Republic.  On 
the other hand, the Committees and OCRPI had been established to deal with conditions of 
penury and chaos following the Fall of France – conditions that would in many respects be 
replicated following the reconquest of metropolitan France.  In this light, a pragmatic 
argument in favour of maintaining the existing institutions until French industry was on 
sounder footing appealed to many.  Despite differing opinions in 1943, by the spring of 1944 
a consensus had been reached within the CFLN, and an uneasy agreement on the question 
was soon reached involving individuals from across the French political spectrum, from 
Communists to former Vichy ministers.  By the time de Gaulle arrived in Paris, the fate of the 
Organisation Committees had long been decided.  
 
Post-war programmes, Organisation Committees, and the division of the French left 
Throughout the Second World War various groups within the Resistance issued 
declarations committing themselves to certain broad policies.411  The first post-war 
programme of any importance was issued by the Comité d’action socialiste (CAS) in January 
1943.  A socialist group within the Resistance, the CAS called for widespread 
nationalisations and the end of “trusts[...], competition, and profits”.412  Despite these 
socialist economic ambitions, however, no mention was made of the Organisation 
Committees or of how nationalised industries were to be organised in the still-hypothetical 
post-war era.  The lack of details on this question is typical of early declarations on post-war 
                                                          
411 This section is indebted to the work of Claire Andrieu, Richard Kuisel, and Michel Margairaz.  In particular, 
see Andrieu, op.cit., Kuisel, Capitalism and the State in Modern France (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), and Margairaz, 
L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion, 1932-1952 (Paris: CHEFF, 1991). 
412“Notre programme”, in Le Populaire, 16 janvier-1 février 1943.  This is included in Andrieu, op.cit. 
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France, issued at a time when a German defeat seemed a distant, even if inevitable prospect.  
By the autumn of 1943, however, the advent of a post-war Europe seemed increasingly 
plausible.  The Allies landed in North Africa in November 1942, and Algeria, still considered 
an integral part of France, was under Allied control.  Over the summer of 1942 the Allies 
took Sicily, and in September landed on mainland Italy.  As the defeat of Nazi Germany, and 
the accompanying fall of the Vichy regime, seemed to be approaching, the post-war 
programmes issued by the Resistance became more detailed in their policies.  As the outcome 
of the war became clearer, more and more civil servants fled the ill-fated Vichy regime and 
joined the Resistance in Algiers, bringing with them their expertise and their intimate 
knowledge of Vichy’s institutions. 
In September 1943, two comprehensive post-war programmes produced by the 
Resistance appeared.  The first, known as both the Laffon Report and the Guizot Report 
(Guizot was the Resistance name of the author, Emile Laffon), is a lengthy document that 
included an economic and social charter for post-Vichy France, as well as recommendations 
for domestic and foreign policy.  The report echoes the CAS’s call for nationalisations and 
the elimination of “trusts”, so much so that Claire Andrieu has argued that Laffon derived his 
report from the CAS programme issued in January of that year.413  While the earlier report 
had remained silent on the question of industrial organisation, however, Laffon was explicit: 
the Organisation Committees and OCRPI must be maintained, lest “France’s depleted 
economy [...] lose itself in anarchy.”  Yet this support was not unconditional: the Committees 
had to be purged of their current leadership, be reduced in number, and be brought firmly 
under the control of the Ministry for Industrial Production.  Furthermore, those who had 
engaged in economic collaboration – left undefined – were to be barred from serving the 
French state after the Liberation.414  This formulation, calling at once for the maintenance and 
the purging of the Organisation Committees, indicates the balance sought by the author 
between economic pragmatism, on the one hand, and the demands of ideology and justice, on 
the other.  The report, including its unequivocal call for the preservation of Vichy’s industrial 
organisation bodies, enjoyed broad support from most of the interior Resistance, trade unions, 
and the remnants of the SFIO.  It was nevertheless vehemently opposed by the Communists 
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and the Front national415, on the one hand, and by the right-wing factions of the Resistance, 
on the other.416  The Communist opposition to the report hinged on the plans to maintain 
Vichy’s industrial bodies, which were condemned as collaborationist.  Despite significant 
support, the plan failed to achieve the consensus hoped for by the leaders of the Resistance. 
That same month, the Confédération générale du travail (CGT) issued its Programme 
d’action d’après-guerre, although the long-standing divisions within the trade union 
confederation made it difficult to articulate a coherent policy.  As with the contemporaneous 
Laffon Report, on the question of Organisation Committees, the CGT remained divided.  The 
Communists within the CGT, known as the unitaires, demanded the “suppression of the 
Organisation Committees, whose malfeasance is obvious to all, and which constitute a 
strengthening of trusts”.417  The confédérés, the more moderate wing of the organisation, 
meanwhile, advocated the reform of the Organisation Committees, while recognising that 
maintaining them would be useful.418  They suggested that the State should exert more 
control over the bodies, and be responsible for choosing Committee presidents from the ranks 
of the civil service.  Moreover, the “trusts” would be stripped of their supposed monopoly 
within the bodies, while a “democratic representation of the elements of production”, with 
members to be named by trade unions such as the CGT, would determine the composition of 
the Committees.  We can therefore perceive a willingness to embrace a model of “industrial 
democracy” in the form of post-war Organisation Committees.419  While this proposal to give 
greater powers to the State and to labour, at the expense of employers and factory-owners, 
won favour with the confédérés who supported Léon Jouhaux and generally backed the 
Socialists, it was unambiguously rejected by the Communist wing of the CGT.  There are 
some significant similarities between the two post-war programmes issued in September 
1943.  In both cases, the Socialists supported the maintenance and reform of Vichy’s 
Organisation Committees, with this proposal also enjoying broad support among the rest of 
the Resistance.  The Communists, meanwhile, refused to endorse such plans, and insisted on 
the abolition of the Organisation Committees altogether.  This division between the 
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Communists and the rest of the French Left on the question of the Organisation Committees 
would replicate itself over the following months. 
That particularly fruitful autumn produced yet another programme for post-war 
France, the so-called Courtin Report.  Issued by the Comité général d’études de la Résistance 
(CGE), it was named after René Courtin, who led the small team of technocrats who drafted 
the document.  The communists were intentionally excluded from this committee, although 
the Left was represented by Robert Lacoste, a socialist who would replace Jean Bichelonne 
as Minister for Industrial Production following the Liberation.  In an earlier draft of the 
report, Courtin touched on the fate of the Organisation Committees and OCRPI: they would 
have to be maintained, despite their unpopularity, out of necessity and because Courtin 
concluded that French industrialists would prefer the maintenance of Vichy’s system to an 
overly statist one.420 The final report, published in November 1943, suggested provisionally 
maintaining the Committees and OCRPI, allowing for their abolition once the economy was 
in a better state.  It was suggested that Vichy’s institutions could be substituted by a Conseil 
des Investissements, “véritable bureau du Plan”, which was described as an independent 
body run by a small team of civil servants that would develop a plan d’équipement for the 
post-war years.421  Yet the Courtin Report also failed to gain broad support: the communists, 
who had been excluded from its drafting, dismissed it as too liberal, as did many socialists, 
while the liberals derided it as overly dirigiste.  The report ultimately failed to gain the 
CFLN’s endorsement and was never directly implemented.  Some historians have criticised 
the report for being plagued with internal contradictions, which could also explain its failure 
to enjoy widespread support.422  It is nevertheless important to note that at this stage, the 
future Minister for Industrial Production, Lacoste, was promoting the strategy of maintaining 
Vichy’s Organisation Committees.  Moreover, the similar recommendations made in the 
Laffon report were generally received favourably by the Socialist wing of the CGT.  Over the 
following months, this argument would increasingly gain traction, as socialists and liberals 
alike opted for the preservation of Vichy’s industrial institutions. 
These post-war programmes are useful for identifying the divisions within the French 
Left before the Liberation of the country.  By the end of 1943, two distinct strategies were 
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being pursued regarding French industrial policy.  On the one hand, the centre-left saw in the 
existing Organisation Committees the tools for realising a strong, State-led economy with a 
greater role for workers in deciding on the direction of the nation’s industry.  On the other 
hand, the Communists remained steadfast in their opposition to maintaining Vichy’s 
industrial organisation, and sought to abolish the Committees upon the Liberation of the 
country.  Indeed, the Communist Party made it clear that the “radical épuration of the civilian 
and military administration” in France was a sine que non for its support.423  Given these 
divergent policies within the Left, it is hardly surprising that the first post-war Ministers for 
Industrial Policy acted in a way entirely consistent with the principles outlined in the autumn 
of 1943.  Socialist Robert Lacoste protected the Organisation Committees and passed 
legislation to reform them lastingly.  Conversely, his successor, communist Marcel Paul, 
seized the opportunity to abolish the Organisation Committees and OCRPI in 1946.  The 
direction of post-war France’s industrial policy was thus foreshadowed by the policies 
advanced by the factions within the Resistance during the Second World War.   
 
The long shadow of Vichy     
The post-war programmes from late 1943 are generally the beacons by which French 
historians are guided in their accounts of the evolution of the Resistance’s post-war 
programmes. The role played by figures who had thrived in Vichy and who jumped ship to 
join the Resistance in 1943, however, has been overlooked.  The examples of two figures – 
Maurice Couve de Murville and Pierre Pucheu – who held key posts in Vichy related to 
industrial production, who fled metropolitan France to join the Resistance in North Africa, 
and who later helped shape France’s post-war industrial organisation is instructive.  In both 
cases, preserving what had been established by Vichy was a priority, and they supported the 
maintenance of reformed Organisation Committees and OCRPI rather than their outright 
abolition.  While many on the centre-left within the Resistance were favouring this option, 
they received vital support and expertise from those who had been immersed in the system in 
Vichy, who made their contributions to the debate in the crucial months before the Laffon 
report and the CGT’s programme were completed. 
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The first of these men who provided continuity from one regime to another was 
Maurice Couve de Murville, who had served as Director of External Finances, a top job in the 
civil service, in Vichy until February 1943.  As the inevitable outcome of the war became 
clear, and as the Allies established themselves in North Africa, Couve de Murville defected to 
Algiers and joined the CFLN, where he was quickly appointed Commissioner for Finance.  It 
was in this capacity that, on 13 May 1943, Couve de Murville presented an early report on 
how the Organisation Committees ought to be reformed.424  While the report dedicates 
thirteen pages to outlining specific reforms that should be imposed on the existing system, the 
most obvious reform is striking in its absence.  Never is the possibility of dissolving the 
existing Vichy institutions entertained.  This is all the more remarkable when one considers 
that, according to a CFLN document written only weeks earlier, the first and most important 
goal unifying all résistants was “the abolition of all Vichy legislation”.425  Couve de 
Murville’s innovation was to replace only the elements of Vichy’s industrial legislation seen 
as incompatible with some of the most obvious ideals of the Resistance, rather than annulling 
the entire canon of Vichy’s industrial legislation a priori.  Having held a senior position in 
Vichy, Couve de Murville was well-placed to judge which elements of the existing system 
could be improved upon, and which should be left in place.  This report reframed the question 
of France’s industrial organisation, and provided a technocratic roadmap for how Vichy’s 
New Industrial Order, first established to facilitate collaboration with the Reich, could be 
adapted for the post-war Republic.   
Couve de Murville’s trajectory after he left Vichy for Algiers was a long and 
successful one, serving as Minister for Foreign Affairs for the first decade of the Fifth 
Republic and briefly as Prime Minister.  His post-Vichy career contrasts markedly with that 
of his one-time associate, Pierre Pucheu.  From 1941, Pucheu had held several portfolios in 
Vichy, notably as Minister for Industrial Production and for the Interior.  After being shuffled 
out of the Cabinet in April 1942, Pucheu contacted General Giraud, a leader of the Resistance 
and then a rival to de Gaulle.426  Pucheu expressed his interest in joining the Resistance, and 
Giraud invited him to North Africa, which Pucheu accepted in 1943.  Such a changing of 
sides was not uncommon at this stage in France, as the case of Couve de Murville shows.  
Pucheu, however, would not be so fortunate.  Upon his arrival in Morocco from Spain, he 
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was indeed met by members of the Resistance – who placed him under arrest for treason.  He 
was imprisoned in Algeria while awaiting trial, which took place in March 1944 under the 
watch of General de Gaulle.  Pucheu did indeed have blood on his hands; as Minister for the 
Interior he passed heinous anti-Semitic legislation.  He was found guilty and executed by 
firing squad on 20 March 1944 – the first case of formal épuration.427 
 The example of Pucheu reveals a number of themes related to épuration: the harsh 
penalty meted out early in 1944 compared to the relatively lighter sentences that were issued 
later in the year, for example, and the glaring dissimilarity between the fates of two Vichy 
figures – one a high-level civil servant, one a minister – who changed sides at approximately 
the same time.428  Perhaps most intriguing of all, however, is just how pervasive the idea of 
preserving Vichy’s industrial order was becoming in Algiers.  At the time of Pucheu’s arrest, 
the CFLN had not formally articulated its position on the post-war fate of the Organisation 
Committees.  De Gaulle was chronically reluctant to make any promises regarding post-war 
policy, insisting instead that only a future assembly chosen by the electorate of liberated 
France would have the legitimacy to pronounce such policies.  To this effect, de Gaulle 
created the Provisional Consultative Assembly on 17 September 1943 to recreate a pseudo-
parliamentary system and strengthen his claims to democratic legitimacy.429  By the spring of 
1944, however, an apparent consensus had been reached within the CFLN to maintain 
Vichy’s industrial committees.  It is therefore worthwhile to examine how the conversations 
between the former Minister for Industrial Production and the CFLN’s leaders may have 
contributed to the latter’s industrial policies for post-war France. 
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In his prison journal, Pucheu recorded that he met with a number of individuals from 
the leadership of the Resistance.  Together they discussed industrial policy for post-war 
France, and after Pucheu’s death and the Liberation of France, some of those individuals 
would accede to key ministerial posts in the Provisional Government.430  Pucheu definitely 
spoke at length with Couve de Murville, and he also had conversations with Leroy-Beaulieu 
and especially René Mayer about how industry should be organised in liberated France.431  
While no transcripts of these meetings exist, Pucheu’s views on industrial questions are 
clearly expressed in his journal, and he is likely to have pursued similar lines of argument in 
his conversations with the CFLN figures.  In his journal, he frames the issue:   
With regard to the economy, what exactly will be France’s organisation following its 
liberation?  If the current framework remains in place, we will be faced with an 
economy that is almost entirely “managed” (dirigée).  In addition to the role of 
relevant ministries, the  system responsible for this economic management consists of 
the Organisation Committees and OCRPI.  These entities were created in August and 
September 1940 [respectively].  Were they in response to the implementation of a 
new economic doctrine?  Not in any way.  They were in response to the exigencies  of 
war, or rather of the Armistice and of the Occupation.  Moreover, the laws that 
created the[se entities] were described as “provisional” in their preamble.  For this 
reason, and notwithstanding  their extreme impopularity […] and the current bias 
favouring the systematic denigration of all that was done by the governments of the 
Maréchal, these cannot be seen – unless we are being intellectually  dishonest – as the 
expression of a doctrine deliberately created or adopted by the men in Vichy.  I can 
say this especially freely as I took no part in the drafting of these laws and as I simply 
inherited the state of affairs that they brought about, when I became  Minister for 
[Industrial] Production several months later, in the final days of February 1941.432 
In 1943, Pucheu made the case for maintaining the Organisation Committees and the New 
Industrial Order that had been erected in the months following the Fall of France.  He 
justified this by appealing to practicality.  First of all, by arguing that the Committees had 
been created out of pragmatism and not ideology, Pucheu advanced that they could be 
maintained because they had not been informed by the ideology of the National 
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Revolution.433  Moreover, by highlighting that he had arrived in the Ministry and used the 
already created Committees to direct French industry, Pucheu argued that the future 
Provisional Government should do the same.  Given the economic constraints in which 
France found itself in the summer of 1940, and which would again be the case following the 
Liberation, the Committees would be an invaluable and practical tool.  He also emphasised 
the depth of experience that those in charge of the Organisation Committees had accumulated 
over four years, and that these would be a precious resource for the new administration: 
If these new men can overcome ideological differences (sectarismes de principes), 
they will have access, in the ministries as well as in the Sections [of OCRPI] and the 
Committees, to an operating staff and to senior and middle management, trained 
through a long and difficult experience […] many of whom will have developed 
sound expertise which could be adapted immediately to the new situation. 
More importantly, rather than beginning from scratch when establishing priorities, 
operating procedures, and action plans, these new individuals responsible for running 
the economy will have at their disposal precious documentation.  Thanks to the 
statistical archives of the Sections [of OCRPI] and the Committees, they will know 
immediately, for all branches of industry and commerce, all aspects of pre-war 
economic activity and also how things have changed under the challenges of the 
Occupation.  With full knowledge of the facts, they will be able to deal with 
immediate challenges and to seamlessly manage the implementation of their own 
economic management model in accordance with the doctrinal pillars they will have 
developed for the post-transitional period.434 
Pucheu advised maintaining the Organisation Committees and OCRPI in order to manage 
French industry at a tumultuous time of regime change and penury.  He emphasised the 
expertise and experience of those who had worked in the Vichy-era bodies of industrial 
organisation, and how these formally apolitical bodies and their employees would be just as 
helpful to any post-war government as they had been to Vichy.  Indeed, when Jean Monnet 
developed his eponymous Plan in 1946, production targets were based on the “precious 
documentation” compiled by the Organisation Committees under Vichy.435  Pucheu also 
noted that the economic tools established by Vichy would need to stay in place until France’s 
coal shortage – more severe in 1944 than it had been in 1940, when the Committees had been 
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created, and which was exacting a heavy toll on French industry and transportation – had 
been resolved.436       
Many individuals who had spent the war in Vichy or working with its institutions 
supported their survival in a post-war France.437  The expertise of those who had run French 
industry, from former Ministers for Industrial Production to leaders of the Organisation 
Committees, were not lightly dismissed by the new leaders of France.438  The claim that these 
bodies were apolitical and improvised pragmatically and not ideologically was made by 
virtually every official who had been associated with French industry during the war.  This 
defence worked to exonerate individuals and institutions alike, and remains the predominant 
explanation in the historiography.439  It should also be noted that it was primarily Pucheu qua 
Minister for the Interior who was tried and convicted in Algiers.  The racist and reprehensible 
laws he passed while responsible for this portfolio contrast with his competent handling of 
Industrial Production, which undoubtedly gave his advice concerning the latter more gravitas. 
 Ultimately, the direct influence of Pucheu on the CFLN’s post-war programmes is 
difficult to measure.  It is clear that he was discussing questions of economic and industrial 
organisation with those responsible for such questions within the CFLN at precisely the time 
when the Resistance was working to develop its own post-war programmes.  While Pucheu 
was discussing Organisation Committees with Couve de Murville and René Mayer, for 
instance, the CGT and Laffon were drafting their post-war programmes.  The CFLN was 
reluctant to publish any plans for liberated France, in large part due to de Gaulle’s insistence 
on democratic legitimacy.  After two aborted committees established at the end of 1943 and 
February 1944, respectively, the Comité économique interministériel (CEI) was established 
by the CFLN at the end of April 1944, more than a month after the CNR Programme had 
been published.  It was within this Committee that the future of French industry was 
discussed until the creation of the Provisional Government in August 1944.  While the 
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exchanges recorded within the CEI are enlightening, no series of documents seems to exist 
today that can clearly demonstrate the CFLN’s attitudes towards the Organisation 
Committees in 1943 and early 1944.  Given these limitations, Pucheu’s exchanges with the 
CFLN are important rather in demonstrating the pervasiveness of the argument in favour of 
maintaining Vichy’s industrial organisation.  Whether the various members of the CFLN 
were influenced by former Vichy ministers, by trade unionists, by socialists, by liberals, or by 
nationalists is ultimately less important than the fact that all these incongruent groups were 
pressing for the same policy.  Regardless of which of these groups was most influential, the 
result was the CFLN’s joining this consensus.  Despite the formal promise to destroy all of 
Vichy’s legislation,440 it was clear that this should not apply equally to all of Vichy’s laws. 
 Both Couve de Murville and Pucheu saw in Vichy’s industrial organisation 
indispensable tools to ensure the proper functioning of France’s economy.  They recognised 
the pragmatic value of maintaining the Organisation Committees and OCRPI and hoped to 
use them to ward off penury and industrial stagnation.  In this respect, they shared the 
motivations of the creators of the New Industrial Order, albeit without the objective of closer 
Franco-German collaboration that characterised the creation of the Committees.  The reforms 
that Couve de Murville and Pucheu proposed were in part technical adjustments to improve 
the efficacy of the system, and in part political concessions to distance the bodies from their 
wartime actions.  We can clearly observe the trend of those who had worked with Vichy’s 
industrial organisation wanting to keep the system in place, albeit with some modifications.  
This would continue to be the case in liberated France, as industrialists such as Jules Aubrun, 
President of the Organisation Committee for Steel (CORSID) for the duration of the war, 
pleaded with the new government to maintain the Organisation Committees and to minimise 
reforms that would make the bodies more representative.441 
 As the year 1943 drew to a close, an unlikely agreement was forming between 
quondam Vichy officials and the more moderate members of the French Left.  Both groups 
saw the value of maintaining what Vichy had erected and using this system to provide a 
relatively smooth transition for post-war France.  Individuals as disparate as Pierre Pucheu 
and Léon Jouhaux embraced this strategy, despite the repeated promises of the Resistance to 
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abolish all Vichy legislation.  These groups would join together with others in the debate that 
would determine the political economy of post-war France. 
 
The first death of the New Industrial Order? 
 Over the course of the year 1943, we can observe a trend within the Resistance 
towards a growing if sometimes grudging acceptance that Vichy’s Organisation Committees 
would need to be maintained after the war.  One illustrative example of this tendency is given 
by General Henri Giraud and his advisor Jean Monnet. 
The first legal measures regarding the fate of the Organisation Committees were in 
fact taken as early as May 1943.  At this time, General Giraud was Civilian and Military 
Commander-in-Chief in North Africa, although de Gaulle would soon displace him as leader 
of the Resistance in Algiers.  On 15 May 1943, Giraud issued a decree abolishing Vichy’s 
“laws and decrees concerning professional organisation”.442  The decree allowed for a 
transition of three months by the end of which the Organisation Committees and OCRPI 
would cease to exist.  This was thought to be sufficient time “to set up a liberal system that 
takes account of the pressing necessities of the moment”.  Giraud justified the decision by 
attacking the law of 16 August 1940, which he argued introduced “into French legislation a 
theory that is foreign to it: that of the Führer in charge, placed at the head of each 
organisation.  We therefore had to abolish these laws”.443  This decree would mean that by 15 
August 1943, almost exactly three years after their creation, the Organisation Committees 
would cease to exist. Of course, this would have come as a surprise to Jules Aubrun, who 
continued to run the Organisation Committee for Steel until October 1944, which continued 
to exist after his forced resignation.  It is unlikely that the leaders of French industry read 
Giraud’s decree, since the “Civilian and Military Commander-in-Chief” had no authority in 
l’Héxagone.  But this decree reflects the prevailing mood of those fighting Vichy in early 
1943.  While small technocratic committees drew up plans arguing for the necessity of 
keeping Vichy’s industrial bodies, and former Vichy officials extolled the benefits of the 
institutions, many in the Resistance remained opposed to prolonging the life of the unpopular 
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Committees.  Giraud was not alone in wanting to abolish the Committees at this stage, and he 
was almost certainly counselled on this decree by his advisor, Jean Monnet. 
 If Giraud’s decree had no effect in metropolitan France, it did matter in the region 
where Allied troops were in control, namely North Africa.   In March 1943, Giraud had 
issued a decree “concerning the validity of the existing legislation in the territories under his 
control”.  These included Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and French West Africa.  The decree 
specified that Giraud’s legislation would have effect in these territories; implicitly, his 
decrees would be meaningless elsewhere, including metropolitan France.444  It is in this 
context that Giraud’s abolition of the Organisation Committees took place, and the decree 
therefore only applied to French Africa.  Indeed, Giraud was successful insofar as liberté 
syndicale was re-established in Tunisia in August 1943.445  This was largely a symbolic 
victory, however.  The Organisation Committees had never had much control over the 
colonies; when CORSID carved up the map of France to assign each member a region to 
oversee, the colonies, including Algeria, were ignored.  Giraud’s decree helped re-establish 
trade unions in Tunisia, which had only been established in 1932, but its effect on the 
workings of the Organisation Committees in metropolitan France was negligible. 
 Given that Giraud’s advisor at this point was Jean Monnet, we can reasonably expect 
that Giraud’s decrees on issues of industrial organisation were in agreement with, if not 
informed by, Monnet.  Indeed, in his memoirs Monnet claims that he “negotiated word by 
word” the text of Giraud’s notable speech on 14 March 1943, in which he denounced the 
Armistice and embraced democratic principles.  Monnet criticised a draft of the speech, 
particularly its treatment of Vichy’s legislation: “it isn’t mentioned that this legislation is now 
considered null and void, which is crucial”.446  If Monnet was pushing Giraud in this 
direction in March, it is likely that Monnet was behind the decree abolishing Vichy’s laws on 
industrial organisation two months later. 
Based on the decrees issued and comments made by Giraud at this time, we can 
assume that in May 1943, Monnet was in favour of abolishing the Organisation Committees 
in French Africa and ultimately in France.  By September 1943, however, Monnet’s opinion 
may have changed.  In a note prepared for him by an associate of his, the case is made for 
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maintaining the Organisation Committees following the Liberation of France.  “However 
desirable the complete abolition of the current measures of economic control would be from a 
psychological, and consequently from a political point of view, it is clear that such a solution 
is certainly inapplicable”.  The note continues by outlining why the abolition of the 
Committees in the short-term would be catastrophic: 
On the one hand, the penury will not disappear in a matter of weeks.  It will therefore 
be necessary to let a large part of the mechanisms for rationing comestibles and 
allocating industrial products subsist.  On the other hand, it would be dangerous to 
want to simultaneously pursue organisational reforms and substitutions of personnel.  
It seems that the latter is more urgent than the former… 
The note concludes that “we are therefore forced to allocate [raw materials to French 
industry] using the bodies created three years ago: we must inevitably begin with the existing 
Organisation Committees”.447  While principled objection to the Vichy regime and its 
purportedly German-inspired laws concerning French industry demanded the abolition of the 
Committees, it would seem that pragmatism demanded the very opposite.  By early 1944, the 
latter argument had gained considerable currency within the Resistance. 
 
Debating the New Industrial Order: “suppression ou transition?”448 
 The first half of 1944 was marked by discussions over the fate of Vichy’s 
Organisation Committees and OCRPI.  There was broad consensus that the Labour Charter, 
René Belin’s crowning achievement as Minister for Labour that sought to implement a 
comprehensive, corporatist organisation of the French economy, should be scrapped, and that 
liberté syndicale had to be re-established.  These changes were proclaimed by the CFLN in 
January 1944.449  This was an uncontroversial decision within the Resistance, since the 
Labour Charter was explicitly developed within the framework of Pétain’s National 
Revolution and had little effect on the running of the French economy.450  For the members 
of the Resistance, the return to republicanism entailed the restoration of liberté syndicale and 
the proper functioning of trade unions and employers’ associations.  On such matters, we can 
indeed observe a unified position of the Resistance. 
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 On the question of the Organisation Committees and OCRPI, however, the debate had 
far more gradations.  As we have seen with the post-war programmes produced in the autumn 
of 1943, unanimous agreement on the question proved elusive.  In January 1944, Leprince 
issued a report on Vichy’s industrial bodies in order to inform the debate within the CFLN.  
He admitted that the Organisation Committees were “anti-democratic [and] the creations 
most characteristic of the Vichy administration”.451  Yet, he asked in his introduction, “ought 
we to destroy them on principle?”452  In the coming months, a significant majority within the 
CFLN would definitively make up their minds.    
By early 1944, a consensus was emerging within the CFLN that maintaining the 
Organisation Committees was the only viable option for France.  The greatest obstacle to this 
plan, however, was the Commissioner for Production and Provisions,453 André Diethelm.454  
An esteemed civil servant in the interwar wars, he was an early supporter of de Gaulle and 
held key positions in the French Resistance from early 1941.  Diethelm mounted a strong 
opposition to the maintenance of legislation from Vichy, and took issue with the policy of 
maintaining Vichy’s industrial organisation towards which the CFLN seemed to be drifting.  
As early as July 1943, he called for the unqualified abolition of Vichy’s Organisation 
Committees during a meeting of the CLFN, and his draft law to enact this was approved by 
the CFLN on 6 July 1943.455    On 9 February 1944, he circulated a report among the CFLN 
that unequivocally demanded the dissolution of the Committees:  
The decree known as the “law of 16 August 1940” established, for both industry and  
commerce, a corporative system that ensures unlimited power for economic 
oligarchies.  The unpopularity of these approximately 300  bodies, their never-ending 
quarrels over [resource] allocation, [and] the tyranny they exert on the small- and 
medium-sized enterprises in their industry leave no doubt as to the answer that the 
Assembly must give to the question of abolishing and liquidating the Committees.456 
If the CFLN had supported abolishing the Committees in July 1943, their opinion had 
become very much the opposite by February 1944.  The very next day after Diethelm’s report 
was issued, the CFLN’s General Secretariat, run by Louis Joxe, produced a response to the 
report criticising Diethelm’s conclusions, and sent it to de Gaulle.  While Diethelm had called 
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for an open debate in the Assembly on whether Vichy’s organisms ought to be maintained, 
Joxe dismissed this idea, claiming that closed-door decisions by the relevant Cabinet 
members were preferable to democratic debate in the Assembly, as only the former would 
present a “clear and precise programme”, while a parliamentary-style debate would only be 
“confused, riddled with contradictions, and would bring no effective contribution to resolving 
France’s current problems”.  The report concluded that it is the role of the Government, and 
not of the Assembly, to consider such questions and to determine the industrial policy of the 
nation.457  On the question of Organisation Committees, Joxe suggested that they be reformed 
or, if they had to be abolished, that they be replaced with similar institutions.  The author also 
argued that OCRPI must be maintained, albeit purged of its current leadership, despite the 
fact that its sections “were and remain the instrument used by the Germans to carry out their 
decrees”.458   
 These rival reports demonstrate the debate over the maintenance of Vichy’s industrial 
organisation.  On the one hand, Diethelm argued that they should be abolished, following an 
open, democratic debate.  On the other hand, Joxe made the case for maintaining the 
institutions regardless of their role in the Nazi war effort.  While de Gaulle did not issue any 
formal endorsement of either position at the time, his actions spoke volumes.  On 3 March, 
three weeks after the two reports had been sent to de Gaulle, Diethelm was relieved of the 
portfolio for Production and Provisions, and given the portfolio for War.  He was replaced by 
Paul Giacobbi, a Radical member of the National Assembly before the war and one of the 80 
who had voted against granting Pétain full powers on 10 July 1940.459  More importantly, 
Giacobbi had previously argued that the Committees and OCRPI should be maintained after 
the war.  With this single reshuffle, de Gaulle had replaced the most significant opponent of 
Vichy’s industrial organisation with one of its more vocal proponents.  By reversing the 
policy of the Minister for Production and Provisions, de Gaulle quietly determined the 
ultimate outcome of the debate within the CFLN.460  Meanwhile, the issue was not raised in 
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the Consultative Assembly until July 1944, when it was announced that the members of the 
CFLN were in “absolute agreement” on maintaining the Committees and OCRPI.461  By that 
point, the Assembly could do little but comment on the fait accompli.  Joxe’s 
recommendation that the decision be taken by the CFLN rather than the Assembly was 
chosen over Diethelm’s calls for a more transparent process.     
 The timing of this reshuffle is highly significant.  Within a fortnight of Diethelm’s 
dismissal, the CFLN agreed upon a post-war programme with the Communist elements of the 
Resistance, the celebrated CNR Programme of 15 March 1944.  This long sought-after but 
until then elusive agreement unified the disparate factions of the Resistance around a 
common set of policies.  Given how divisive the issue of the Organisation Committees and 
OCRPI had proved to be in earlier attempts at post-war programmes and in the ongoing 
debate over France’s political economy, one might expect that the breakthrough in 
negotiations was the result of some agreement regarding these institutions.  In a sense, this is 
true – absolutely no mention of France’s post-war industrial organisation is made in the 
document.  Given how the question of maintaining Vichy’s industrial organisation had 
divided the French Left in its 1943 attempts at producing a post-war programme, and how the 
debate within the CFLN had essentially been decided with the removal of Diethelm from his 
post, it is extremely unlikely that the omission of the question was a mere oversight on the 
part of the signatories.  Far more likely is that its authors recognised the matter as an impasse 
and agreed to kick the question into the tall grass rather than let it obstruct the consensus, 
which was becoming increasingly urgent as plans for the Allied landings in France 
progressed.  The absence of such an important question in such a vital document shows just 
how insurmountable the question was in March 1944.  While communists and liberals, 
nationalists and socialists were able to broadly agree on such controversial questions as the 
nationalisation of France’s key industries, they were unable to concur on whether the 
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institutions created by René Belin in the summer of 1940 ought to be abolished or instead 
maintained and reformed.462   
Given Diethelm’s obdurate position on the matter, he would have sided with the 
Communists in demanding the elimination of the Organisation Committees and OCRPI.  This 
would have put Diethelm at odds with the remainder of the CFLN, consigning the staunch 
Gaullist to the company of unlikely bedfellows in the Communist resistance.  This was 
doubtless an important consideration in his removal from the key ministry for Production and 
Provisions at this time.  With the 15 March post-war programme, the Resistance was united 
under de Gaulle’s leadership, which increased his standing with the Allies and his authority 
over France.  Nevertheless, it was only achieved by having the signatories agree to avert their 
gaze from the elephant in the room.  Meanwhile, Diethelm maintained his hard-line approach 
in his new role as Minister for War during the Liberation.  Indeed, such was his zealousness 
that in September 1944 he had Robert Schuman sacked from his first post-war post, 
demanding the “immediately dismiss[al of] this product of Vichy”.  France’s future Foreign 
Minister and Father of Europe would have to wait until September 1945 for his case to be 
dismissed.463 
After the playing field was tilted with the replacement of Diethelm by Giacobbi, the 
debate on Vichy’s industrial organisation became predictably one-sided; no significant 
opposition to maintaining the Organisation Committees and OCRPI was voiced within de 
Gaulle’s entourage after Diethelm’s dismissal.  This was due in no small part to the exclusion 
of communist members of the Resistance.  Following the successful passage of the CNR 
Programme, two Communists were appointed to the CFLN in April 1944: Fernand Grenier 
was named Commissioner for the Air and François Billoux was named Secretary of State 
without portfolio.  Despite this gesture, no communist members of the Resistance were 
invited to the meetings at which France’s industrial policies were discussed.  At a meeting of 
the Commission d’étude des problèmes économiques d’après-guerre, presided by Lambert 
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Blum-Picard,464 the Socialist Albert Gazier suggested that it might be sensible to invite a 
representative of the PCF to take part in the meetings.  No response to his suggestion is noted 
in the minutes, but the fact that the PCF remained unrepresented in future meetings is a clear 
indication of the reaction of the Commission.465  The exclusion of dissidents on this question 
ensured that the bodies created by Vichy in 1940 would be maintained by the post-war 
regime.466   
The debate in the Provisional Consultative Assembly demanded by Diethelm 
ultimately took place at the end of July 1944, long after the decision regarding the 
Committees had been made by the CFLN.  Giacobbi presented the economic policies of the 
Provisional Government and noted that France “is turning towards a system of a planned 
economy [économie dirigée], regardless of the nation’s thirst for liberty”.467  Crucially, the 
economic policies were presented as a package, based on the CNR Programme that had 
already been endorsed by representatives of all major Resistance groups.  The debate in the 
Assembly was thus not focused on the maintenance of the Organisation Committees alone, 
but on the entire post-war programme agreed upon in March 1944.  It is important to 
remember that no mention of the Organisation Committees was made in that document; 
indeed, the inclusion of a commitment to maintain Vichy’s economic institutions could well 
have scuppered the agreement.  By asking the Assembly to ratify the Provisional 
Government’s economic policies, the GPRF was in fact seeking approval not only of the 
CNR Programme, but also of policies too divisive to have been included in that agreement in 
the first place, namely the maintenance of Vichy’s Committees.  Predictably, a number of 
deputies opposed the maintenance of the Organisation Committees, with Socialist Roger 
Mistral decrying that “it would be madness to maintain [Vichy’s] system. France wants a new 
economic regime”.468   A representative of the PCF criticised the studied ambiguity of the 
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economic policies outlined by Giacobbi, stating that “the Communist delegation can only 
deplore the inadequate precision of these declarations”.469  Despite these reproaches, 
however, support for the CNR Programme and the economic priorities it outlined was 
remarkably strong and the Assembly consequently endorsed the overall economic policies of 
the Provisional Government.  Giacobbi enthused that “all the speakers demonstrated that 
there exists absolute agreement on the foundations of the economic doctrine of the 
Government and of the Nation”.470  Such an outcome would have been unthinkable had 
Giacobbi not replaced Diethelm as Commissioner for Production.   
Within the CFLN, meanwhile, the discussion had long since turned to the nature of 
the reforms that should be implemented on the Organisation Committees, rather than whether 
the Committees should continue to exist at all.471  By mid-April, Pierre Mendès France, by 
now Commissioner for the National Economy, was able to declare that “the CFLN has 
discussed the question and the majority of its members seems to have decided, as I have, to 
maintain these institutions after the [Allied] landing” in France.  He justified this decision by 
noting that “it seems to me that it would be very dangerous to dissolve these institutions at 
the very moment when a planned economy would require us to rely on effective organes 
d’action.  The disappearance of these institutions would create a serious void that could only 
be filled after a long delay needed to reconstruct new institutions that would be impossible to 
improvise”.472  With the removal of Diethelm and the exclusion of the Communists from the 
debate, the decision to maintain Vichy’s undemocratic and unpopular institutions was made 
without opposition.  The debate in the Provisional Consultative Assembly at the end of July 
merely added credibility to the decision, particularly crucial to de Gaulle’s strategy of 
legitimising himself as the rightful leader of the French Republic.473  Within the Assembly, 
meanwhile, even those who questioned the decision to maintain the Committees supported 
the Provisional Government’s overall economic policies. 
In his celebrated account of post-war France, William Hitchcock argues that the fall 
of Mendès France – marked by his resignation as Minister for the National Economy in April 
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1945 – was due to his support of maintaining Vichy’s industrial institutions.474  This claim is 
curious for two reasons.  First, it is strikingly at odds with Hitchcock’s simultaneous 
depiction of Mendès France as the arch-purger within the Resistance – in Hitchock’s analysis, 
the man who pushed steadfastly for a thorough purging of post-war France blatantly betrayed 
his own mission by trying to maintain some of the most disliked institutions Vichy had 
created.  Second, it implies that Mendès France was alone in his defence of the Organisation 
Committees and OCRPI.  According to Hitchcock, “while still in Algiers, [Mendès France] 
had argued in the CEI that the organizational committees established by Vichy to exert 
control over the economy would have to be maintained”.475  Hitchcock continues that “as 
time wore on, it appeared to his colleagues that Mendès France wanted to maintain the same 
kind of control that Vichy had exercised, but now through the means of a powerful Ministry 
of the National Economy.  This was perhaps his greatest sin.  He wanted to use the political 
channels of an outmoded and inefficient administration to institute economic change.”476  For 
Hitchcock, Mendès France’s “greatest sin”, for which the only absolution was his resignation 
as minister, was his desire to maintain parts of Vichy’s “outmoded and inefficient system”.  It 
is difficult to accept this argument, however, given that support for maintaining the 
Organisation Committees was virtually unanimous within the CFLN, as we have seen.  
Moreover, the Organisation Committees continued to operate in France well beyond Mendès 
France’s resignation.  In addition, the State continued to intervene heavily in the economy, 
even more so after the series of nationalisations that only intensified after Mendès France’s 
departure.477  Maintaining Vichy’s Organisation Committees to serve an interventionist 
French state was a broadly shared goal explicitly supported by every major party in post-war 
France – with the significant exception of the PCF.  Hitchcock’s claim that a notable 
minister, namely Mendès France, was forced to resign for holding precisely such views is 
more a reflection of the Gaullist myth of a decisive break between Vichy and post-war France 
than it is of the reality of events.  Indeed, as the case of André Diethelm demonstrates, it was 
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not support for the maintenance of Vichy’s organisms that threatened a ministerial career, but 
rather opposition to their maintenance.   
 
Conclusion 
 By the time the Allies landed in Normandy in June 1944, the French government-in-
waiting had developed a coherent political economy for post-war France.  Rather than 
focussing on the celebrated post-war programme of 15 March 1944, however, it is necessary 
to consider the debates that evolved over 1943 and 1944 to understand the CFLN’s plans for 
France’s industrial organisation.  Throughout 1943, the question of whether Vichy’s 
Organisation Committees and OCRPI should be maintained divided the French Left.  These 
institutions were created to facilitate France’s collaboration with the German war economy, 
and afforded a small handful of industrialists unprecedented power over French industry.  
This was enough for their abolition to be unwaveringly demanded by the Communist 
elements of the Resistance.  Yet the more moderate members of the French Left argued that 
these bodies could be reformed and thereby maintained.  The latter position was increasingly 
shared by virtually all the groups in Algiers, from former civil servants and ministers in 
Vichy to judicious résistants working alongside de Gaulle.  The general himself intervened to 
remove the most significant obstacle to an agreement on the matter, replacing Diethelm with 
Giacobbi.  While the fate of the Organisation Committees was intentionally omitted from the 
15 March post-war programme, barely a month later the CFLN had agreed that Vichy’s 
industrial apparatus would be maintained.  The consensus on this question ran the gamut 
from socialists such as Robert Lacoste and André Philip to pseudo-fascist former Vichy 
ministers such as Pierre Pucheu.  It is also important to note the importance of industrial 
issues at this stage; indeed, the crucial appointment of a new Commissioner for War, 
Diethelm, shortly before the reconquest of France was determined by his discordant position 
on France’s post-war industrial policy.478     
 On 3 July 1944, the CFLN, by now calling itself the Provisional Government of the 
French Republic (GPRF), drafted a law re-establishing the legality of the Republic.  “All laws 
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and decrees” passed by Vichy were henceforth “null and void”.479  This would, of course, 
nullify the laws of 16 August and 10 September 1940, which created the Organisation 
Committees and OCRPI, respectively.  Yet this was not the case.  The CFLN preferred to 
amend these laws rather than to actually abolish them, and the first article of the law of 16 
August 1940 was overturned in January 1944.480  The apparent contradiction of amending a 
law that was declared “null and void” in the first place was deliberately overlooked.  
Anticipating this inconsistency in April 1944, Leprince had suggested that the CFLN could 
“appeal to the law of 11 July 1938, which might mask the fact that we would be using 
Vichy’s organisations from the time of the Liberation”.481  Leprince was right to recognise 
that the French public would not look favourably upon the maintenance of Vichy’s 
Committees.   
The Provisional Government had succeeded in maintaining Vichy’s industrial 
organisation, but it now faced two challenges to this policy.  The Communists, who would 
emerge from the first elections in liberated France as the largest party in the National 
Assembly, never renounced their opposition to these bodies and continued to criticise them 
openly following the Liberation.482  The second threat to the Organisation Committees was 
public opinion – the maintenance of deeply unpopular institutions that were enduring 
symbols of Vichy and collaboration was never destined to please the electorate.  With the 
return of open, democratic debate, the continued existence of Vichy’s industrial organisation 
was called into question.  Ultimately, the Provisional Government’s success in preserving 
Vichy’s New Industrial Order would prove to be similarly provisional. 
  
                                                          
479 “Projet sur le rétablissement de la légalité républicaine”, 3 July 1944, CFLN 603, MAE. 
480 “Rétablissement de la liberté syndicale et épuration des organisations syndicales de travailleurs et 
d’employeurs”, 21 January 1944, CFLN 602, MAE.  The first article of the law abolished national confederations 
of trade unions and employers’ associations, although individual confederations, notably the CGT, the CFTC, 
and the CGPF, were not formally dissolved until 9 November 1940.  The re-establishment of liberté syndicale 
necessitated the removal of this clause, but the remaining articles remained valid. 
481 “Commission d’étude des problems économiques d’après-guerre. Sous-commission des Comités 
d’organisation. Séance du 21 avril 1944”, 21 April 1944, CFLN 686, MAE.  The law of 11 July 1938 “on the 
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these fell far short of what had been established with the law of 16 August 1940.  The 1938 law granted 
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482 Andrew Shennan, op.cit., 274. 
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Chapter Five: 
Conserver la forme en réformant l’esprit483:  
Reforming Vichy’s Industrial Order, 1944-1946 
 
The Organisation Committees created by the law of 16 August 1940, along with the 
Central Bureau for the Distribution of Industrial Products (OCRPI) instituted the following 
month, marked the beginning of the New Industrial Order.  Almost from its inception, 
however, this new system and its components were criticised and demands for reform became 
increasingly frequent, both from within Vichy and without.  By spring 1944, the Comité 
français de libération nationale (CFLN) and its successor, the Gouvernement provisoire de la 
République française (GPRF),484 committed to maintaining Vichy’s industrial institutions, 
but only if they underwent significant reforms.  These reforms fell broadly into two 
categories: on the one hand, the existing Committees and OCRPI Sections had to be purged 
of their current leadership, thereby distancing the post-war offices from wartime 
collaboration.  On the other hand, with the re-establishment of liberté syndicale and the 
strong position of the labour movement within the Resistance, the wartime dominance of the 
Committees by “trusts” was to be tempered with greater representation for organised labour, 
as well as small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).  It was believed that with new 
leadership and a more balanced, tripartite representation,485 the Organisation Committees 
could remain the central pillars of France’s political economy after the war. 
Within weeks of the creation of the first Organisation Committees by Vichy in 
autumn 1940,486 criticism had begun pouring into the spa town’s government offices.  
Doctrinaire corporatists objected to the inherent “syndicalism” of the document and 
condemned the legislation passed by the reactionary regime as “the triumphant realisation of 
                                                          
483 “Si l’on conserve la forme du comité d’organisation, il faut en réformer l’esprit”, in “Maintien éventuel du 
CO du bâtiment et des travaux publics”, by Leprince, 26 January 1944, CFLN 686, MAE. 
484 The CFLN was the principal Resistance body created on 3 June 1943 and led by de Gaulle from 9 November 
of that year.  On 3 June 1944, three days before the Allied landings in France, the CFLN became the GPRF, 
which would rule France until the formal establishment of the Fourth Republic in October 1946. 
485 The term “tripartite” is used in this thesis in the context of labour relations, denoting representation of 
employers, organised labour, and the State.  It should not be confused with the governing coalition of MRP, 
SFIO, and PCF in France from 1944 until 1947. 
486 The first Organisation Committee (for the automotive industry) was created in September 1940, with the 
Committee for Steel (CORSID) created on 9 November 1940. 
141 
 
the policies of the Popular Front”.487  Organised labour attacked the Committees for being 
composed exclusively of industrialists, despite initial promises of labour representation 
following the dissolution of trade union confederations with the law of 16 August 1940.  
SMEs decried their lack of representation in the Committees and successfully lobbied for 
Pétain to support their cause.488  Meanwhile, the Committees oversaw massive production for 
the German war economy.  With the advent of forced labour deportations, which saw 
hundreds of thousands of French workers sent to work in German factories, the already 
unpopular Committees became demonised as the embodiment of collaboration with the 
Reich, even as some Committees opposed the deportations.   
Given their unpopularity in 1940, it is hardly surprising that after four years of 
indigence, industrial decline, and collaboration with the Reich, the Organisation Committees 
were the subject of widespread disapproval among the French population of 1944.  
Discussing French industrial organisation from their headquarters in Algiers, the CFLN noted 
that the bodies were hated and perhaps the most characteristic institutions of Vichy.489  By the 
time Allied troops landed in France, however, the CFLN had agreed that the Organisation 
Committees should be maintained due to their pragmatic value, provided they underwent 
several key reforms.490  These reforms would be a priority of the GPRF upon its entry into 
Paris. 
 One of the most significant shortcomings in the existing historiography on the 
Organisation Committees is that virtually all studies conclude with the end of the Vichy 
regime and the restoration of Republican government in France.  Claire Andrieu has lamented 
“the forgetting of the final act of the drama, namely the survival of the Committees in 
liberated France, from 1944 until 1946”,491 yet this gap remains unfilled.  The only book-
length study of the Organisation Committees, edited by Hervé Joly, focuses on the 
Committees in the context of Vichy’s economy and rarely alludes to the fact that the bodies 
outlived the regime.492  Three of the most important works to consider the French economy in 
1944-1946 in a broader context summarise the debate within the CFLN regarding the 
                                                          
487 Lettre de Jules Verger et Léonce Reynès à Pétain, 14 December 1940, AG 2 611, AN. 
488 See, for example, “Texte de discours de Pétain”, 21 November 1941, F 37 20, AN. 
489 “Maintien éventuel du CO du bâtiment et des travaux publics”, 26 January 1944, CFLN 686, MAE. 
490 See Chapter Four. 
491 Claire Andrieu, La Banque sous l’Occupation. Paradoxes de l’histoire d’une profession (Paris: FNSP, 1990), 
128. 
492 Hervé Joly (ed.), Les Comités d’organisation et l’économie dirigée du regime de Vichy (Caen: Centre de 
recherché d’histoire quantitative, 2004). 
142 
 
maintenance of the Committees, but then each of these studies provides no more than a single 
paragraph to discuss the actual reforms carried out over the next two years.493  Existing 
accounts recognise that the survival of the Committees in 1944 was conditional on their 
reform, yet fail to provide a satisfactory account of these reforms between the Liberation and 
the dissolution of the Committees in 1946.  This chapter thus constitutes the most detailed 
study of the reform of the Organisation Committees under the Provisional Government, 
focusing particularly on the Committee for Steel. 
 
A Newer Industrial Order 
During the war, the Resistance began looking to other countries’ models of industrial 
organisation for inspiration.  Unsurprisingly, the Communist Party suggested copying the 
Soviet model, but also encouraged drawing inspiration from Britain’s Joint Production 
Committees (comités mixtes de production) and Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s innovations in 
the United States.494  Of these options, the British model seemed to inspire the members of 
the Resistance far more than those of the emerging superpowers.  André Philip, who served 
as Commissioner for the Interior in the CFLN, drafted several studies of the Joint Production 
Committees, which were advanced as an alternative to the existing Organisation 
Committees.495  Central to these analyses was the observation that the British bodies were 
tripartite, ensuring representation of and input from workers and industrialists, with the state 
acting as mediator.   
In November 1944, the Secretary General for Industrial Production, Lambert Blum-
Picard, requested copies of William Beveridge’s influential report from 1942 on social 
insurance (known as the Beveridge Report, which led to the creation of Joint Production 
                                                          
493 Richard Kuisel provides one paragraph describing Minister for Industrial Production Robert Lacoste’s desire 
to reform and maintain the Committees despite their unpopularity.  In a similarly brief paragraph, Andrew 
Shennan notes that the CFLN concluded that the Committees could be maintained, provided their number be 
reduced and their form changed to allow for greater State control.  Finally, in his 1500-page study of the 
French economy, Michel Margairaz provides a single paragraph to the reforms of the Organisation 
Committees, and most of this remains focused on the issue of épuration.  See Kuisel, Capitalism and the State 
in Modern France (Cambridge: CUP, 1981), 358; Shennan, Rethinking France (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 272; 
and Margairaz, L’Etat, les finances et l’économie. Histoire d’une conversion, 1932-1952 (Paris: CHEFF, 1991), 
775-6. 
494 “Procès-verbal de la séance de l’Assemblée Consultative Provisoire du 5 janvier 1944”, 5 January 1944, C I 
591, AN. 
495 “Etudes d’A. Philip sur les Comités mixtes de production”, F 60 895, AN; see also “Etude sur les Joint 
Production Committees”, 28 June 1944, CFLN 687, MAE.  Philip was one of the 80 deputies who voted against 
handing full powers to Maréchal Pétain on 10 July 1940 and he joined de Gaulle in London in July 1942. 
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Committees in wartime Britain) as well as his most recent work, Full Employment in a Free 
Society, published earlier that year.  He also requested a copy of the “Bretten-Woods 
accords” (sic) and the Lend-Lease Agreement.  Finally, to make sense of it all, he asked for a 
copy of the Oxford Dictionary.496  He would receive all these documents in February 1945, 
with one curious exception: the Oxford Dictionary proved “impossible to find in England”, so 
the Secretary General had to make do with his tenuous grasp of English.497  Despite the 
language barrier, it is clear that the Secretary General for Industrial Production, as well as 
others in his ministry and in the government, were aware of the British alternative to France’s 
Organisation Committees. 
Some authors have emphasised the influence of the Joint Production Committees and 
of British thinkers such as Beveridge and John Maynard Keynes, suggesting that the post-war 
reforms of France’s industrial organisation were in large part an adoption of British 
innovations.498  This tends to misrepresent the similarities between the Organisation 
Committees as they existed after 1944 and the Joint Production Committees.  Indeed, the 
latter were small-scale groupings that existed within individual factories, gathering workers, 
technicians, and employers “on the shop floor”.  By the time of the Liberation of Paris, nearly 
4,500 such committees existed in the UK, a far cry from the overarching Organisation 
Committees that oversaw entire branches of industry instead of isolated factories.499   
In reality, the post-war reforms in France flowed quite naturally from the early Vichy 
legislation on industrial organisation.  There is far more in common between the Joint 
Production Committees and the Committees foreseen in Belin’s law from 16 August 1940 
than is generally realised – in no small part because Belin and Beveridge had both been very 
interested in industrial and social reform in the interwar years.500  Precisely because of these 
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498 See Richard Kuisel, op.cit., 278 and Andrew Shennan, op.cit., 58-64 and 191-201.  The influence of 
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common interests, the idea of reformed Organisation Committees was compatible with the 
British model being studied within the Resistance.  Indeed, the text of the law of 16 August 
1940 was entirely conducive to the tripartite spirit of the Joint Production Committees, 
perhaps more so than it had been to the spirit of Vichy’s National Revolution, to which a 
more overtly corporatist system would have been better suited.  We shall see that ironically, 
the end result of the post-war reforms, despite the influence of British formulations, 
amounted to a strikingly consistent application of the law of 16 August 1940 itself. 
 
By any other name: unveiling the Professional Offices 
The most conspicuous reform of the Organisation Committees was carried out at the 
beginning of 1945.  Robert Lacoste, Minister for Industrial Production, was briefed on the 
systematic attacks against the continued existence of the Organisation Committees in the 
French press.  Lacoste, “anguished by this state of affairs”, decided to launch a counter-
campaign in the press explaining the necessity of the Committees.  He supplemented this 
strategy with the obvious renaming of the institutions, with the hope that a new name would 
give the institutions a new lease on life.501 It was agreed that at the end of February 1945, a 
decree would rename Organisation Committees, which would be henceforth known as 
Professional Offices.502  Ironically, this was one of the names first used in July 1940 for the 
nascent Organisation Committees, although the reprise of this name by the GPRF is likely 
coincidental.503  An update on the transformation of the Organisation Committees into 
Professional Offices was given in August 1945,504 although staff of the Offices and of the 
Ministry alike continued to refer to the institutions by their Vichy-era names, an embarrassing 
slip exacerbated by the continued use of the Organisation Committees’ letterhead.505  Despite 
the obvious continuities between the Organisation Committees and the Professional Offices – 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Britain in the 1930s (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).  On the French nonconformists and their influence in Vichy and 
post-war France, see Philip Nord, France’s New Deal (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2010). 
501 “Procès-verbal de la réunion des directeurs”, 11 January 1945, F 12 10025, AN. 
502 “Note. Objet: réforme des CO”, 16 February 1945, F 12 10025, AN. 
503 The French Delegation in Paris used this term as early as 26 July in a letter to Elmar Michel, the Head of the 
Economic Section of the German Military Administration in Paris.  The other name used for the proto-
Organisation Committees discussed in Chapter One of this thesis was “Liaison Offices”.  See “Note à Michel”, 
26 July 1940, F 60 1539, AN. 
504 “Réunion des directeurs.  Ordre du jour: Offices professionnels”, 8 August 1945, F 12 10027, AN. 
505 In October 1945, the Professional Office for Steel sent a circular to French steel firms making clear that they 
should use the term “Professional Office” and “OPSID” rather than “Organisation Committee” and “CORSID”.  
See “Circulaire d’OPSID”, 16 October 1945, AQ 139 83, AN. 
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the new name belied the fact that they were in fact the same institutions – the Ministry for 
Industrial Production denied even the most remote similarity between the institutions.  In the 
autumn of 1945, one ministry official insisted to a small-businessman that “the Professional 
Offices have nothing in common with the organisations of the Vichy regime aside from the 
extreme shortage of primary materials that they have to manage”.506  The businessman was 
by no means the only individual who found the purported dissociation of the new 
Professional Offices from Vichy’s Organisation Committees unconvincing. 
While some reforms to industrial organisation were foreseen in the early post-war 
period, it was seen as necessary to establish an Ecole Supérieure d’Organisation 
Professionnelle (ESOP), under the auspices of the Ministry for Industrial Production, to 
“oversee the training of economic executives both for the existing institutions and for the 
establishment of a new organisation”.507  Just as 1944-45 saw the overhaul of Sciences Po 
and the creation of the Ecole nationale d’administation (ENA), the Provisional Government 
decided to create the ESOP to train France’s post-war executives who would be working 
within the Organisation Committees and their successor institutions.  This decision reveals 
that France’s leadership expected Vichy’s system of industrial organisation, with inevitable 
reforms, to last well into the post-war years – it would hardly have made sense to establish a 
school to train executives for bodies that were to be imminently dissolved.  In an influential 
report to de Gaulle in February 1944, CFLN Secretary General Louis Joxe observed that even 
if the Organisation Committees were abolished, the government would need to organise 
bodies “to take over the duties entrusted to the Organisation Committees by Vichy, which 
cannot be surrendered to private initiative”.508  It was clear that the Committees or institutions 
very much like them would endure well into the post-war years. 
 
Reforming Vichy’s Committees 
Politically, the most important reform to be made to the post-war Organisation 
Committees was the removal of the leaders who had collaborated during the war.  This was 
an essential condition of maintaining the Organisation Committees, and was accepted 
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unanimously throughout the CFLN and then the GPRF.509  On 7 October, a government 
decree annulled all appointments to Organisation Committees, effectively sacking the entire 
industrial leadership of the Vichy era, regardless of the extent to which they had engaged in 
various forms of collaboration.510  As their final act, the members of CORSID submitted their 
resignation on 9 October 1944.511  With this simple letter, which merely confirmed the 
government’s decree, the vital step of purging the Committee of its wartime leadership was 
complete.  
Finding successors for the wartime presidents of the Organisation Committees, 
however, proved to be a difficult task.  Nominations were sought within the Ministry for 
Industrial Production, although such recommendations had to include an explanatory report 
justifying the nomination, the candidate’s CV, no less than six copies of the completed 
nomination form, and perhaps most daunting of all, written approval from the CGT.512  
Perhaps due to the stringent conditions involved in the nomination process, civil servants 
from the Ministry for Industrial Production ended up running the Organisation Committees 
for months after the dismissal of the wartime leadership in November 1944.  Furthermore, it 
was routinely highlighted that, in the context of the épuration that marked late-1944, the new 
leaders of the Organisation Committees had to be “unassailable figures” (personnalités 
inattaquables).513  The Ministry ran CORSID, formally renamed OPSID in February 1945, 
until the formal appointment of Alexis Aron as Provisional Commissioner of OPSID on 8 
March 1945.514  Aron had been an original member of CORSID’s Commission générale, a 
consultative commission of steel industrialists established by CORSID in February 1941.515  
In this capacity, Aron was included in the early organisation of the steel industry under 
Vichy.  With the imposition of anti-Semitic legislation by Vichy, however, Aron, himself the 
son of a rabbi, was dismissed from the Commission and he spent the remainder of the war in 
Savoie, which remained in the Non-Occupied Zone until November 1942.  He remained in 
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close contact with CORSID, which sent him money during the war, and they exchanged draft 
projects for the French steel industry.516  He was thus kept abreast of CORSID’s actions, 
participated in the debates on the organisation of the industry, and maintained a close 
personal friendship with Aubrun in particular.517  Given his initial position within CORSID’s 
Commission générale and his ongoing involvement with CORSID regarding the organisation 
of the industry, the appointment of Aron to succeed his friend Aubrun as head of CORSID 
serves as an example of continuity within the management of the French steel industry.   
In March 1945, newly-appointed Commissioner Aron commended the “considerable 
work accomplished by the former Committee” and to the “independence and the courage 
unwaveringly displayed by the Committee in the face of the ever-increasing demands of the 
Occupation authorities”.518  Moreover, he reiterated Aubrun’s pleas from December 1944 to 
maintain “an effective leadership, centralised in the hands of a single, responsible individual, 
namely the Provisional Commissioner”, Aron himself.  He also made the case for “the 
necessity of a strong, uninterrupted Professional Office [with] sufficient latitude” to rule 
itself.519  Aron was perhaps the ideal candidate for those who sought the appearance of 
épuration yet the reality of continuity from the Vichy years.  Undeniably a victim of some of 
Vichy’s most heinous legislation – it must be remembered that Vichy’s anti-Semitic laws 
caused the deaths of roughly 75,000 Jews – Aron did indeed fit the bill as an “unassailable 
figure”.  Yet his involvement with CORSID throughout the war is impossible to ignore, even 
if his formal participation in the Commission générale was forcibly ended in 1941.  His 
unsevered contact with CORSID throughout the war, and his early paean to Aubrun upon 
succeeding him, reveal that Aron sought to continue and defend the work of the Vichy-era 
leadership in the steel industry.520   
While the palpable change in leadership indeed replaced the five wartime Committee 
members with an “unassailable figure”, the changes in staff seemed to end there.  The 
remainder of those who had worked at CORSID during the war retained their roles in the 
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newly-rechristened OPSID.  The Under-Secretary of CORSID, Jean Latourte, retained his 
position and continued to refer to the new Office by its wartime name.  Similarly, Eugène 
Dupuy, who as President of the Bureau de normalisation de la sidérurgie (BNS) worked 
tirelessly to bring French steel production in line with German specifications, stayed put.  The 
technical staff employed by the Committee continued their work, which would be used by 
Jean Monnet as the foundation of his plans for modernising French industry.521  This 
continuation was seen perhaps even more clearly in OCRPI, which remained part of the 
Ministry for Industrial Production.  While the Minister and Secretary General, Robert Lacoste 
and Blum-Picard respectively, arrived at rue de Grenelle from Algiers, OCRPI’s staff 
remained unchanged.  Norguet, who had worked closely with Jean Bichelonne, Vichy’s 
Minister for Industrial Production from 1942 until 1944, now wrote his memos to the former 
résistants.  Even the practice of Christmas bonuses that had developed during the war was 
maintained by OCRPI.522  More troublingly, CORSID’s allocation of raw materials to firms 
remained based on wartime production figures, which resulted in the largest quantities of raw 
materials being sent to the firms that had produced most extensively for the Reich during the 
war.523 
If épuration was indeed an essential condition for maintaining Vichy’s industrial 
bodies, it turned out to be very slight.  All but the members of the Committee itself – a total 
of five individuals – retained their positions.524  Of those five who were forced to resign, none 
was investigated for collaboration, and they were able to continue their careers as leaders of 
the French steel industry.  Indeed, as OPSID became bogged down with reforms, the 
individuals who had managed the industry so well for Vichy now found themselves in high 
demand.   
Jules Aubrun, who had served as CORSID’s only president from its establishment in 
November 1940 until his forced resignation in October 1944, was named President of the 
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Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française (CSSF), a revived version of the Comité des 
forges, that autumn.  While the creation of Vichy’s Organisation Committees had abolished 
and superseded the employers’ associations for coal and steel (as well as the main employers’ 
confederation, the CGPF) and trade union confederations, the re-establishment of liberté 
syndicale in 1944 facilitated their return.  While CORSID under Aubrun had presumed to 
combine the syndicates representing employers and workers alike, in the post-war era he 
contented himself representing only the former.  It is important to note that the interwar 
leaders of the Comité des forges, de Wendel and Lambert Ribot, were not returned to their 
positions in the new CSSF, but that instead Aubrun was maintained as the leader of the 
industry’s employers’ association.  His power within the industry was further increased in 
1946, when the resurrected Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF)525 named Aubrun 
President of its Association for the Steel Industry.  Meanwhile Eugène Roy, the Vice 
President of CORSID, had a similarly successful post-war career.  At the end of 1944, the 
Ministry for Industrial Production asked professionals from various industries to recommend 
representatives for French industry to participate in the work of the Commission d’études 
générales pour l’Allemagne.  An overwhelming endorsement from the steel industry 
converged around Roy, who only two months earlier had been forced to resign from his 
position as Vice President of CORSID.  The ministry accepted the nomination, and Roy was 
given the first of a series of important roles in post-Vichy France.526 
The Ministry for Industrial Production did what it could to temper the attempts to 
purge Vichy-era industrialists.  The director of the Firminy mines was arrested in November 
1944.  The Ministry pleaded for his release, citing his “technical, social, and patriotic role” 
during the occupation.527  Even in January 1944, the CFLN acknowledged that, while factory 
owners had supported the Vichy regime and produced for the Reich, “it would be unjust to 
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l’économie nationale”, 15 December 1944, F 12 10024, AN. 
527 “Note”, 30 November 1944, F 12 10024, AN.  Richard Vinen cites an example of the head of the COH in 
Loire, Perrin Pelletier, who was similarly arrested and put before a Commission Régionale d’Epuration.  Here 
too, Robert Lacoste sent a letter on 30 November 1944 asking for the industrialist’s release on the grounds of 
his “patriotic attitude”.  See Richard Vinen, “The French Coal Industry during the Occupation” in Historical 
Journal, 33:1, 1990, 105-130, here 122-3. 
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consider filling German orders as necessarily expressing an attitude of collaboration”.528  
This fine distinction between “expressing an attitude of collaborating” and producing for the 
Reich while supporting the Vichy regime informed the State-managed purges that followed 
the brief and bloody épuration sauvage and its “divines raisons d’assassiner”529 of the early 
months following the Liberation.530  The claim that the French steel industrialists acted 
patriotically in the war, however, is offset by the selective silence of the industrialists 
themselves on this question.  In November 1944, the Ministry for Industrial Production asked 
industrialists to nominate candidates amongst themselves for the Croix de la Libération and 
the Médaille de la Résistance, decorations to acknowledge patriotic actions associated with 
the Liberation and the Resistance.  The coal industry nominated ten, including Aimé Lepercq, 
Aubrun’s counterpart in the Organisation Committee for Coal who was then briefly Minister 
for Finance before his premature death at the end of 1944.  The chemical industry, despite 
being tainted with its collaboration with the Reich through I.G. Farben and other Franco-
German ventures, nominated nine patriotic industrialists.  The steel industry was unable to 
produce the name of a single nominee from within its ranks.531  While hardly conclusive in 
itself, this example does suggest that the steel industrialists themselves did not see themselves 
or their peers as having participated actively in either the Resistance or the Liberation.  This 
stands uneasily next to the rhetoric surrounding this purportedly “technical, social, and 
patriotic” group.532  
In the autumn of 1944, with the war still raging in Europe and French industry in 
tatters, the Ministry for Industrial Production was clearly more interested in maintaining even 
the minimal levels of production at that time than in purging vital industries of their 
leadership.  The Ministry revealed its more pragmatic reasoning in demanding the immediate 
release of another industrialist a month earlier: “[This arrest] is susceptible to impede the 
                                                          
528 “Rétablissement de la liberté syndicale et épuration des organisations syndicales de travailleurs et 
d’employeurs”, 13 January 1944, CFLN, 602, MAE.  For the historiographical debate as to whether this 
constituted collaboration, see Philippe Burrin, La France à l’heure allemande, 1940-1944 (Paris: Seuil, 1995) 
and François Marcot, “Qu’est-ce qu’un patron résistant?” in Olivier Dard, Jean-Claude Daumas, and François 
Marcot (eds.), L’Occupation, l’Etat français et les entreprises (Paris: ADHE, 2000), 277-292. 
529 Céline, D’un château l’autre, (Paris: Gallimard, 1957), 49. 
530 The best recent overview of l’épuration in France is Jean-Paul Cointet’s Expier Vichy: l’épuration en France 
1943-1958 (Paris : Perrin, 2008).  Philippe Bourdrel’s L’épuration sauvage, 1944-45 (Paris : Perrin, 2002) 
provides regional studies of the early, violent purges of 1944-45, demonstrating the extent to which 
l’épuration varied across France. 
531 “Propositions d’attribution de la Croix de Libération ou de la Médaille de la Résistance”, 30 November 1944, 
F 12 10024, AN. 
532 The issue of economic collaboration is discussed in Chapter Three. 
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proper functioning of this factory, and we therefore ask that he be released without further 
delay, or at least that he appear before the épuration committee immediately”.533  Clearly, the 
value of an industrialist in contributing to timely production outweighed any potential 
punishment for wartime indiscretions.  Henry Rousso has characterised the épuration as 
“incoherent, notably by leaving the most extensive form of collaboration, that is to say 
economic collaboration, out of reach”.534  More recently, Hervé Joly has argued that the 
purging of French business did indeed take place, claiming that while industrial leaders “were 
not rejected by their profession and left with neither employment nor subsistence, they never 
regained their leading positions” within the industry.  According to Joly, the Vichy-era 
leaders of French industry were permanently demoted after the Liberation, amounting to a 
moderate but nonetheless real form of épuration.535  In the case of the steel industry, 
however, the industrialists promoted to leadership positions within CORSID in 1940 
continued to thrive after the Liberation, while the demotion of pre-war leaders proved to be 
similarly permanent.     
Barely a year after the first Allied landings in France, the leaders of the wartime 
Organisation Committees had been fully reintegrated into France’s industrial elite.  On 1 
August 1945, the Tripartite Commission on Steel met in Brussels, with the purpose of 
coordinating the steel industries of the Benelux and France, in terms of both domestic 
production and the policy to be pursued with regard to German steel production.  France 
chose its most qualified representatives from the French steel industry: Jules Aubrun, Léon 
Daum, and Jean Raty.  While Aubrun and Daum had spent the war running CORSID, Jean 
Raty had been President of the Chambre Syndicale des Mines de Fer from 1941.536  The 
French delegation was completed by Aron, Aubrun’s friend, colleague, and successor as 
leader of OPSID.  Together, these four individuals represented France at these early 
negotiations on a coordinated steel policy for post-war Western Europe.  So important was 
their presence at the negotiations that Blum-Picard even wrote directly to the Minister for the 
Interior and to the French police prefecture to ensure that they all received their passports in 
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time to attend the meeting in Brussels.537  Far from being subjected to the de facto épuration 
suggested by Joly – let alone the “radical épuration” demanded by the PCF – the French steel 
industry continued to be managed and represented by the same small group of industrialists 
first promoted to these positions by Vichy in 1940.  This small handful of industrialists would 
negotiate on behalf of France with its Western European neighbours and play key roles in the 
European project. 
In the final assessment, the épuration of CORSID demanded as a condition of 
maintaining Vichy’s Organisation Committees consisted of shifting its leaders to other 
influential positions representing the same industry.  The new Provisional Commissioner, 
Alexis Aron, had indeed fled from Vichy’s repressive and odious anti-Semitic laws.  For this 
reason, he was indeed an “unassailable figure” fit to rehabilitate Vichy’s unpopular 
institutions.  Yet he was himself closely involved with the Organisation Committee, explicitly 
in its early stages, clandestinely for the final years of the war.  He had developed plans for the 
modernisation of the industry in consultation with CORSID and remained a close friend of 
Aubrun throughout the period.  In itself, placing Aron at the helm of OPSID, while keeping 
the rest of the Vichy-era staff in place, was barely more significant than changing the name 
“Organisation Committee” to “Professional Office”.  The wartime leaders of France’s steel 
industry were merely laterally relocated to other key posts within the industry.  Before the 
fighting in Europe had even finished, CORSID’s President and Vice-President were awarded 
plum jobs at the Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française and the Commission d’études 
générales pour l’Allemagne, respectively.   
 
From dictatorship to triumvirate 
As we have seen, a consensus had emerged within the Resistance, and indeed among 
many who had served Vichy, that the regime’s industrial organisation ought to be maintained 
for pragmatic reasons.  This maintenance, however, was conditional on significant reform of 
Vichy’s industrial institutions.  While the Organisation Committees would continue doing 
what they had done since their creation in 1940, the new members had to be drawn not only 
from large firms, but also from organised labour and the State. 
                                                          
537 “Lettre de Blum-Picard au Préfet de police”, 27 July 1945 and “Lettre de Blum-Picard au Ministre de 
l’Intérieur”, 26 July 1945, F 12 10027, AN. 
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The support for these reforms was not unanimous.  Predictably, the loudest objections 
came from the grand patronat, who enjoyed unprecedented power under the Vichy-era 
structure, which disregarded organised labour and SMEs, despite Pétain’s wartime attempts 
to bring them in line with the National Revolution.538  In his new role as President of the 
CSSF, Jules Aubrun did all he could to retain the Organisation Committees as they had been 
during the war.  In December 1944, he argued that any reorganisation of the steel industry 
must only be carried out by the industrialists themselves, who would then place themselves 
under the authority of the State, whose role it would be to oversee the proper functioning of 
the employer-forged system.  Moreover, Aubrun demanded that the profession “remain in the 
framework of the law of 16 August 1940” – in other words, to maintain Vichy’s legislation 
and that regime’s system of Organisation Committees which were dominated by 
industrialists.  In what was perhaps a Freudian slip, Aubrun wrote that “the profession would 
like to see the appointment of a collège dictatorial composed of three people chosen by the 
profession and granted public powers” – the word “dictatorial” was then crossed out in 
favour of “directorial”.539  Trying his hand at compromise, Aubrun noted that if the 
government insisted that Organisation Committees had to include labour representation, then 
he could accept a tripartite representation, but only if the patronat would be assured 50% of 
the seats, with the remaining half to be divided amongst workers, technicians, and the 
State.540  Rejecting talk of a more equally distributed tripartite arrangement, he defended the 
autocratic structure of the Organisation Committee: “we reject the idea of a triumvirate, a 
method that can only weaken the authority of the leader”.541  After having enjoyed 
unprecedented authority under Vichy, the steel industrialists and their unwavering 
representative, Jules Aubrun, were reluctant to surrender any of their power to the State or to 
organised labour. 
                                                          
538 Although Mioche has argued that the Vichy era was not advantageous to the patronat in the steel industry, 
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Aside from the reticence of the patronat to embrace any system in which they were 
not themselves dominant, further difficulties emerged from the trade unions.  Allotting a 
portion of the seats of the new Professional Offices to organised labour ran into trouble quite 
quickly.  The wartime cooperation of the labour movement soon splintered as the antagonistic 
turf wars between the various labour unions re-emerged.  The CGT, although already divided 
between the confédérés and the unitaires, sought to take advantage of the prestige and 
popularity of the PCF in the immediate post-war era, and the leading role of communists in 
the interior resistance.542  Meanwhile, the Catholic CFTC saw that it could increase its 
popularity by aligning itself more closely with the moderate Christian Democrats of the 
MRP, preferring this to collaboration with the CGT.543  As a result, the government’s 
directive that a third of the seats in the new Offices be filled by trade unions opened the door 
to bickering among the CGT, the CFTC, and others, each eager to ensure that its own 
interests were represented in the new organisation.  By April 1945, the Ministry for Industrial 
Production was visibly concerned that the inclusion of labour in the Professional Offices 
could paralyse their development.544  Further difficulties were encountered when trying to 
name representatives from among company executives and employers to the reformed 
Offices.545 
While it had been agreed in the first half of 1944 that such bodies would have to be 
maintained to ensure that French industry continued to function smoothly, the uncertainty 
over leadership and composition prevented the bodies from exerting effective control over the 
industry as they had done under Vichy.  Meanwhile, the re-emergence of employers’ 
associations and strong trade unions – whose functions had initially been folded into those of 
the Organisation Committees – further complicated the role of the Professional Offices.  
External factors played a major role in this as well: Germany continued to fight until May 
1945, nearly a full year after the Allied landings in Normandy.  This made deliveries of 
German coal – essential for French steel production and already insufficient at the most 
collaborative of times under Vichy – drop off dramatically, while imports from the Allies 
                                                          
542 The CGT contained supporters of both the Socialist SFIO and the Communist Party (PCF).  This division had 
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remained inadequate. The worsening shortage of coal for French industry was a constant 
predicament of the Ministry for Industrial Production.  Coal extraction had worsened under 
Vichy, particularly from 1943, and the first trimester of 1944 yielded the lowest amount of 
coal yet.  By the last quarter of 1944, however, liberated France could barely produce 75% of 
that disappointing amount.  This inevitably affected the steel industry, which in November 
1944 could produce only 20,000 tonnes, compared to 50,000 the previous November and 
65,000 in an average month in 1938.546 By 1945, the shortage of coal was so acute that 
swimming pools were closed and rail transport reduced, while blast furnaces at steel mills 
were unable to be lit due to the lack of coal.547  In the short term, the reformed Professional 
Offices were unable to staunch the declining output of the French steel industry.    
 
From autarky to planned production 
The reform of the New Industrial Order was completed with some vital changes to 
OCRPI.  When René Belin first signed the law creating Organisation Committees on 16 
August 1940 Elmar Michel, the Head of the Economic Section of the German Military 
Administration in France, promptly informed him that such bodies would only be effective if 
there were complementary bodies that performed an initial allocation of materials to each 
branch of industry.   Within weeks, OCRPI was created, which oversaw the allocation of 
resources to each branch of industry before the individual Organisation Committees 
distributed the resources to its various firms.  OCRPI was closely controlled by the Germans, 
who were thereby able to influence French industry throughout the war.548   
  Germany’s influence over OCRPI informed Blum-Picard’s stance towards reforming 
Vichy’s industrial organisation.  In Algiers, he had championed maintaining the Organisation 
Committees, arguing that these were “created by the French”.  OCRPI, however, was 
“imposed on France by the Germans” as a means of controlling French industry, and he 
argued that it should consequently be abolished.549  As Belin had discovered in the summer of 
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1940, however, it was not possible to have the Organisation Committees without a body 
responsible for an initial allocation of materials to the various branches of French industry, 
and OCRPI was maintained.  In October 1944, the sections of OCRPI were placed directly 
under the control of the Secretary General for Industrial Production, Blum-Picard.550  Despite 
his earlier objections, he readily assumed control over OCRPI and oversaw their reform.  It 
was also agreed that a representative of the Ministry would sit on each Section, and have a 
right of veto.551  While the Organisation Committees were always meant to have a State 
representative equipped with a veto, in practice the veto was never used.552  OCRPI, 
meanwhile, had always had a veto-wielding representative of the State – albeit of the German 
State rather than Vichy.  The reforms thus restored the powers originally provided for the 
Organisation Committee in the law of 16 August 1940, while handing the veto power within 
the OCRPI Sections from German to French representatives.  
Further reforms were prompted in 1945 when OCRPI’s directors and distributors 
noted that the system of allocation established during the war was somewhat backward.  They 
observed that in other countries, industrial planning begins with the finished industrial 
products desired, then traces what raw materials would be needed for this outcome, and allots 
those to the appropriate industries.  The existing system, on the other hand, took note of the 
limited amount of raw materials, and apportioned amounts based on the importance and 
needs of various branches of industry, who were then obliged to produce what they could 
with what they had been allotted.  Indeed, Richard Kuisel has described “economic survival” 
as “the dominant motive of Vichy’s political economy”.553  By the spring of 1945, this 
approach was condemned as the “fundamental error” of the wartime system, and the 
alignment of allocation with production goals was agreed.554  This greater emphasis on 
“manufacturing programmes” fit quite well with the increased interest in post-war industrial 
planning already being developed by Jean Monnet and others.  This also marked a shift away 
from Vichy’s autarkical political economy, which took a shortage of raw materials as its 
starting point, and sought to manage the scarcity as effectively as possible.  The switch to a 
production-based political economy was only possible, however, once France had access to 
massive export markets. As Frances Lynch has pointed out, the French steel industry 
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emerged from the war with the capacity to produce 12 million tonnes of steel, even if barely a 
quarter of this amount was produced in 1945.555  In these circumstances, increasing steel 
production fourfold could be accomplished simply by increasing the amount of coal at that 
industry’s disposition.  The German policy initially pursued by de Gaulle and the Provisional 
Government was in large part motivated by the desire to ensure that the defeated country’s 
coal production would nourish the revival of French heavy industry.556  While France was 
forced to do without coal imports from Britain and most other countries during the war, the 
Liberation of France gave the country renewed access to Allied markets and, by 1945, a 
measure of influence over German coal production.  Freed from its wartime constraints, the 
French economy could be reoriented towards large-scale production rather than wallowing in 
autarkical penury.  The OCRPI Sections were well-suited to harness this change of direction, 
and the reformed bodies contributed to France’s post-war recovery.  It is worth remembering 
that this shift in French political economy occurred in 1945, well before the instauration of 
the Marshall Plan.557  Alan Milward notably argued that the French economy had already 
begun its recovery before the implementation of this celebrated programme.558  While the 
reform of OCRPI in 1945 facilitated the success of the Marshall Plan from 1947, the broader 
political economy generally associated with that plan dates from as early as 1945. 
 
Consolidating Vichy’s Committees 
One of the central reforms demanded by the Resistance as a condition of maintaining 
Vichy’s Organisation Committees was that their number be drastically reduced.  This idea of 
reducing the overall number of Organisation Committees by integrating related committees 
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into larger ones was by no means new.  It had figured in Pétain’s notorious 12 August 1941 
speech, less than a year after the law creating the Committees had been passed, and in late 
1941 Henri Lafond circulated plans to concentrate the spiralling number of Committees into 
six “families”, corresponding to six key sectors of the French economy: water, gas, and 
electricity; metals and minerals; quarries; petrol; coal; and steel.  The steel “family” would 
consist of eleven Organisation Committees related to the production and sale of steel and 
steel-related products, and thereby help reduce the overall number of Organisation 
Committees.559  This project was endorsed by Jules Aubrun, president of CORSID, although 
he requested that the Committees dealing with mechanical industries such as automobiles and 
bicycles not be included in steel’s “professional family”.560  
The eventual reduction in the number of Organisation Committees must be seen for 
what it was.  Henry Rousso has suggested that slashing the number of Committees from its 
peak of over 300 down to a more manageable size of a few dozen reflected a shrinking of 
their power, and that many industries were consequently freed from control by the wartime 
Committees.561  This strictly quantitative approach belies the reality that although the number 
of Committees was reduced, this was done by consolidating several related Committees into 
fewer yet much more powerful ones.  The elimination of ten of the eleven Committees related 
to steel would not free the industry from central organisation; on the contrary, it would hand 
additional powers to the surviving Committees, which could henceforth function even more 
efficiently with their increased powers.  In the end, this concentration of powers took place in 
October 1944 under the auspices of the Provisional Government of the French Republic.  
Finally, six Organisation Committees were folded into the new Organisation Committee for 
Steel (CORSID), which created a stronger, centralised body to control the whole of France’s 
steel industry.562 
Moreover, it is interesting to note that the idea of concentrating on six “core 
industries”, such as coal, steel, electricity, and petrol, did not originate with Jean Monnet ex 
nihilo, but was rather a central part of Vichy’s industrial plans from as early as 1941.  
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Similarly, the concentrated “professional families” that would be realised in the reformed 
Professional Offices would survive in the form of the Modernisation Commissions of the 
General Comissariat for the Plan, the central office of the Monnet Plan.563 
 
Return to first principles: applying Vichy’s laws in post-war France 
To assess the degree of reform that actually took place following the Liberation, it is 
worthwhile to re-examine the text of the law of 16 August 1940.  The preamble emphasised 
the pressures on French industry with the division of the country, the Nazi occupation of 
northern and western France, the sudden stoppage of military production following the 
Armistice, and the virtual cessation of trade imposed on the country.  In this context, “it was 
not possible to immediately establish a system that ensured effective and complete 
representation of employers and workers”, but reassuringly “we will strive to ensure [such 
representation] later”.564  Citing the current difficulties facing French industry, Belin justified 
the “statist character” of the proposed organisation, which for the time being was necessary 
instead of a system “more oriented towards the formulae of ‘industrial democracy’ often 
advocated in recent years”.  Again, the law alluded to future reforms, promising that “[o]nce 
the current difficulties have been overcome, it will certainly be possible to increase the role of 
the interested parties in the management of the economy”.565  
Indeed, an earlier draft of the law included a stipulation that there must only be “a 
single employers’ association and a single workers’ union” for the whole of France, and 
which would participate in the Organisation Committees.566  While this article was omitted 
from the final text of the law, it does reveal that the authors of the law were considering a 
formalised representation of both employers and workers within the new system, as would 
ultimately emerge in 1944.  The allusion to future reforms of the law that would bring the 
French system more in line with the ideas of “industrial democracy” would come to fruition 
with the GPRF’s reforms.  Belin himself had favoured such reforms in his pre-war writings, 
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notably in the journals Syndicats and Nouveaux cahiers.567  Given his career in the CGT and 
his pre-war writings, it is probable that this expressed desire to increase workers’ 
representation within the Organisation Committees as soon as this was feasible was indeed 
genuine.  
Notably, the anticipated representation of workers in the Organisation Committees 
contained in the law was picked up by the CFLN during their discussions on industrial 
organisation in post-war France.  A report from January 1944 which was discussed by the 
CFLN that spring even claimed that the law foresaw the participation of employers and 
workers “within several weeks”568 – an overly generous estimate that is not actually 
contained in the text of the law published in the Journal officiel.  Leprince, the author of the 
report, insisted that the reforms desired by the CFLN could be carried out within the 
framework of Belin’s legislation.  He argued that “if we maintain the form of the 
Organisation Committee, we must reform the spirit; we must abolish the exclusively 
employer-led model and hand leadership to a Government Commissioner surrounded by 
others.  This would be possible simply by applying the text of the Vichy law”.569  
Surprisingly, he was absolutely correct.  While the report did not provide further details, a 
close reading of the 16 August law reveals that just such provisions were included in the 
initial legislation.  Article 3 of the law declares that “in the event of inefficiency on the part 
of the Committee, the Government Commissioner will assume all the powers held by the 
Committee”.570  Following the forced resignation of Aubrun and the other members of 
CORSID, the Government Commissioner from the Ministry of Industrial Production indeed 
assumed the powers of the Committee.  Similarly, the eventual addition of workers’ 
representation on the Committees was foreseen in and legitimated by the text of the law itself, 
although this provision was not applied under Vichy.  In this sense, while the CFLN reformed 
the spirit of the Organisation Committees as they existed in 1944, they did so in accordance 
with the spirit of the law that had created those bodies in the first place.  
                                                          
567 See, for example, “La compréhension ouvrière sera acquise aux nécessités de l’Exposition” in Syndicats, 25 
February 1937, and reprinted in Nouveaux cahiers, 15 March 1937.  An extensive array of Belin’s pre-war 
writings on industrial relations can be consulted at the Fonds Belin, IHS. 
568 “Maintien éventuel du CO du bâtiment et des travaux publics”, 26 January 1944, CFLN 686, MAE. 
569 Ibid.  Given how problematic supporting Vichy legislation could be for the new regime, Leprince suggested 
that the Provisional Government could appeal to a 1938 law related to French industry in order to “mask the 
fact that we would be using Vichy’s organisations”.  See “Commission d’étude des problèmes économiques 
d’après-guerre. Sous-commission des Comités d’organisation. Séance du 21 avril 1944”, 21 April 1944, CFLN 
602, MAE. 
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The restoration of liberté syndicale was the most notable reform of the Committees, 
and the one that explicitly departed from the text of the law.  Although labour representation 
within the Committees had been anticipated, the text of the law itself precluded their 
inclusion.  For this reason, the CFLN agreed to “suppress Article 1 of the law known as the 
‘law of 16 August 1940’, which dissolved” national trade unions and employer’s 
associations.571  As we have seen, however, this reform is consistent with the CFLN’s reading 
of the law as outlined by Leprince.  More important is the fact that the remaining nine articles 
of the law were left untouched, and that only the first article was repealed.  The CFLN had no 
qualms with abolishing Vichyste laws and decrees with which they disagreed – the Labour 
Charter, seemingly Belin’s crowning achievement as Minister for Labour, was abolished 
altogether, as was the corporatist organisation of agriculture that had been implemented by 
Vichy.572  The fact that the CFLN abolished only the first article of the law of 16 August 
reveals that they sought to keep the remaining sections intact.   
The remaining reforms implemented in 1944 and 1945 were entirely in accordance 
with the August 1940 legislation.  It is incredibly unlikely that Belin had foreseen that 
hundreds of Organisation Committees would be created within four years; no numbers are 
explicitly mentioned in the law, and fewer than twenty Committees had been created by the 
end of 1940.  The concern that there were already too many Committees was voiced by 
Pétain in 1941, and plans to concentrate of similar Committees into “families” were 
developed during the war, as we have seen.  By whittling down the number of Committees 
closer to the number established under Belin’s watch, the GPRF ended up closer to the spirit 
of the August law. 
The half-hearted shuffling of CORSID’s members to other key positions within the 
steel industry, and placing a close collaborator of theirs at the helm of the Committee, was 
similarly done in accordance with the 16 August law.  The legislation stipulates that members 
of the Committee could be suggested by unions and employers, but that the individuals would 
be appointed by the Government, who would make the decision unilaterally.  Moreover, 
sitting members could be removed from the Committee at the Government’s discretion.  This 
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572 "Ordonnance déclarant nuls les textes relatifs a l'organisation corporative de l'agriculture", 25 April 1944, 
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process was followed with the forced resignation of the five wartime members and the 
subsequent appointment of Aron as Provisional Commissioner, as well as the invitation to 
trade union confederations to recommend representatives to sit on the reformed Organisation 
Committees. 
The remaining reforms taken in 1944 would certainly have appealed to Belin in 1940, 
but they were simply impossible in the context of a defeated and half-occupied France.  The 
measures set out in the 16 August law were intended to control industry in all of France, 
including occupied and even annexed regions, but in practice this was vetoed by the German 
authorities.573  Similarly, the establishment of OCRPI under German tutelage precluded the 
possibility of having the Sections under the direct authority of the Ministry for Industrial 
Production; rather, the German representative in each section enjoyed the most power.  Yet 
the law itself only mentioned veto power for the French representative.  The extension of the 
Vichy-era legislation to all of French territory as it was reconquered by the Allies, and the 
replacement of a German veto with a French one, were desired by the authors of the law, but 
impossible in the context of a German-dominated Europe. 
Lastly, the guiding principles behind Belin’s law were echoed within the CFLN.  
Blum-Picard recalled that in reforming Vichy’s industrial organisation, they “must not forget 
the difficulties of the pre-war system”.574  De Gaulle himself promised in March 1944 that his 
government “will not tolerate coalitions of shareholders, private monopolies, trusts”,575 using 
language that echoes the rhetoric of Pétain and the National Revolution.  Belin and his 
colleagues were critical of the pre-war, laissez-faire system, and ruled out “giving a free hand 
to the interested parties […] to re-establish a destroyed equilibrium”.576  The law denotes that 
“only the State has the means and the authority”577 to run this industrial system, and the 
CFLN confirmed their adherence to this shift away from pre-war liberalism, noting that 
“France’s economy will remain managed (dirigée) for quite some time”, even if liberals 
within the Resistance “conceded regretfully that such economic management would be 
necessary” in the years following the Liberation.578  A return to the economic status quo ante 
                                                          
573 In practice, CORSID’s jurisdiction extended to the Occupied Zone as well as the Non-Occupied Zone, but did 
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bellum was simply not on the table, and maintaining Vichy’s dirigiste industrial order was an 
effective way of pursuing a statist political economy. 
 
Conclusion 
In early spring 1944, André Philip succinctly summarised the consensus within the 
CLFN regarding the reform of Vichy’s industrial order.  “We recognise that we must reduce 
the number of Committees, assure the authority of the State and the effective participation of 
labour unions”.579  To this list, we must add the épuration of the Committees, replacing those 
tainted by their palpable collaboration with the Vichy regime with “unassailable figures”.  
This programme of industrial reform was agreed upon by the CFLN before the Allied 
landings in Normandy, and would be carried out by the GPRF under de Gaulle. 
On the surface, it would seem that the GPRF did indeed succeed in realising these 
objectives.  The wartime membership of CORSID was swept out, to be replaced by an 
industrialist who had survived the heinous anti-Semitic legislation of the loathed regime.  The 
number of Committees dropped from hundreds to dozens and the bodies were overseen by a 
veto-wielding representative of the Ministry for Industrial Production.  Liberté syndicale was 
re-established, and organised labour was included in the Committees, ending the 
longstanding monopoly of employers.  It would seem that the bodies created by Vichy had 
indeed been purged of any incriminating elements and that the parenthesis could be closed on 
the années noires. 
Yet this narrative, however expedient for the leaders of the GPRF, does not withstand 
close scrutiny.  The épuration of CORSID amounted to shifting wartime leaders into other 
similarly prestigious and influential positions, in which they continued to represent the 
industry both domestically and internationally.  The “unassailable figure” of Alexis Aron 
who succeeded Aubrun at the helm of CORSID had participated actively in the undertakings 
of the Committee throughout the war, and from 1945 he carried through with the programmes 
he and the members of CORSID had developed under Vichy.  Meanwhile, the consolidation 
of Organisation Committees into a smaller number of more powerful bodies, first envisaged 
in 1941 during François Lehideux’s time as Minister for Industrial Production, was finally 
realised by the GPRF.  With the withdrawal of German forces from French territory, the role 
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exerted by the representative of the French Ministry for Industrial Production could finally 
match what had been foreseen in the law of 16 August 1940.  With some slight circumstantial 
changes, all of these reforms could just as well have occurred under Pétain as under de 
Gaulle.  
Studying the reform of the Organisation Committees following the Liberation, which 
no study has yet done adequately, reveals a significant degree of continuity in industrial 
organisation through 1944.580  It also shows that the most important reform carried out in 
1944, and the only one that wavered in any significant way from the text of the law of 16 
August 1940, was the restoration of liberté syndicale.  Not only did this permit the existence 
of national labour union confederations – notably the CGT and the CFTC – but it also opened 
the door for the resurrection of the national employers’ confederation.  From their 
establishment in autumn 1940, the Organisation Committees had superseded national trade 
unions and employers’ associations yet were run almost exclusively by employers.  The 
return of liberté syndicale and the inclusion of labour in the Committees transformed them 
into properly functioning tripartite bodies – and marked a notable break from the Vichy 
era.581 
Even this substantial reform, however, was not without foundation in the Vichy law 
itself.  The law did foresee the inclusion of workers’ representation, but at a later date, once 
the immediate and extraordinary challenges facing French industry had been resolved.  The 
fact that these conditions – foreign occupation, virtual cessation of trade, excruciating 
shortage of raw materials – endured for years rather than months meant that the provisional 
composition of the Committees remained unchanged until the Liberation.  Only then could 
the inclusion of labour representation and the steps towards “industrial democracy” alluded to 
in the August 1940 law be realised.  While this marked an important step in the development 
of French industrial relations, it was hardly the radical programme of a group that had 
declared all of Vichy’s legislation “null and void”.582  Rather, it was the politically expedient 
solution of an administration desperate to rebuild French industry and prevent civil war.  In 
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this context, the strategy first proposed by Leprince to reform the New Industrial Order 
“simply by applying the text of the Vichy law” emerged triumphant.583        
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Chapter Six: 
From Organisation Committees to Monnet’s Modernisation Commissions, 1946 
 
The legislative elections of October 1945, the first since the Popular Front’s victory in 
1936, heralded significant changes for French industry.  With the Communist Party (PCF) 
emerging with more seats than either the Christian Democratic MRP or the Socialist SFIO, it 
was inevitable that the far left would exert unprecedented control over French policy.  Given 
the PCF’s longstanding opposition to the maintenance of the Organisation Committees 
inherited from Vichy, it was not surprising that they sought the definitive abolition of Vichy’s 
New Industrial Order.  This project was facilitated by the appointment of Communist Marcel 
Paul as Minister for Industrial Production in November, which gave him control over the 
Organisation Committees and OCRPI, the complementary network for the allocation of raw 
materials to French industry.  With Paul in charge of these institutions, the consensus that had 
emerged the previous year – namely that these reformed bodies ought to be maintained584 – 
was seriously threatened.  
Meanwhile, ambitious plans for the modernisation of French industry were being 
drawn up by Jean Monnet.  In December 1945 he submitted these plans to de Gaulle, who 
approved them on 3 January and announced them a week later.  Monnet’s plans relied on the 
existence of Organisation Committees or analogous institutions – these had existed in France 
since 1940 and their survival was confirmed by the CFLN and the Provisional Government in 
1944.  By the end of 1945, however, the dominance of economic portfolios by the PCF 
threatened not only the direction but the very existence of the crucial Committees.  Under 
these circumstances, Monnet opted to create parallel bodies, christened Modernisation 
Commissions, which would take the place of the Committees.  These aped the beleaguered 
Organisation Committees in structure, responsibilities, and even membership.  By the time 
the PCF realised its enduring ambition to dismantle Vichy’s industrial institutions, Monnet 
had already erected their successors to carry on their work under his own auspices.  While 
1946 marks the formal end of the Organisation Committees (formally renamed Professional 
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for the Organisation Committees and OCRPI is elaborated in Chapter Five. 
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Offices in 1944) created under Vichy in 1940, it also constitutes the seamless transition of 
these bodies into the keystones of the Monnet Plan that would revive French industry under 
the Fourth Republic.   
 
Who lost the Ministry for Industrial Production? 
The October 1945 legislative elections saw the PCF take the largest share of the vote, 
winning 26.2% of the ballot and 159 seats.  Given the outcome of the elections, PCF leader 
Maurice Thorez demanded for his party at least one of what they perceived to be the three 
most important portfolios: Foreign Affairs, National Defence, and the Interior.  De Gaulle, 
who as President had the delicate task of forming a government following rather 
disappointing election results, flatly refused Thorez’s demands.  He announced in a radio 
address that he could not surrender to the Communists control of any of “the three levers that 
control [France’s] foreign policy: diplomacy that expresses it, the army that supports it, the 
police that covers it”.585  De Gaulle instead offered to the PCF portfolios that he considered 
of secondary importance, namely “only the ‘economic’ ministries”.586  This in part reveals 
how secondary economic matters were to de Gaulle.  In the end, the PCF was given control 
over four ministries, the same number as the SFIO and the MRP.  In the elected government 
of post-war France, Communist members were named as Ministers for the National 
Economy, Labour, Armaments Production, and Industrial Production.  The Ministry of 
Finance, meanwhile, remained firmly in the hands of liberal René Pleven.  In addition, 
Maurice Thorez was named one of four Ministers of State, raising the total number of 
Communist members of government to five.  Despite the PCF’s decisive victory in the first 
post-war legislative elections, de Gaulle had succeeded in limiting the fruits of this mandate 
by ensuring that the “three levers that control [France’s] foreign policy” remained firmly in 
republican hands.587 
Although unsuccessful in securing the most prestigious portfolios, the PCF was 
nonetheless able to make the most of the economic portfolios they had dismissively been 
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586 Ibid., 327. 
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given by de Gaulle.  Marcel Paul was named Robert Lacoste’s successor as Minister for 
Industrial Production.  Paul’s brief tenure in the position marks the only interruption in that 
ministry for Lacoste, who otherwise held the portfolio from the days of the CFLN during the 
war until 1950, providing an unusual degree of stability. A passionate defender of the 
Organisation Committees created under Vichy, Lacoste secured a consensus within the 
Resistance and the Provisional Government that the bodies should be maintained yet 
reformed following the Liberation.588  Consequently, the wartime leadership of the 
Committees was replaced, labour representation drastically increased, and the myriad 
Committees were consolidated into fewer but more powerful ones.  In response to their 
ongoing unpopularity, Lacoste also rechristened the Committees “Professional Offices”, a 
move that met with very limited success, not least because the Minister and his associates 
continued to refer to the bodies as “Organisation Committees”.589  Despite his longstanding 
relationship with de Gaulle and his proven capabilities as Minister, however, Lacoste had to 
relinquish his position in order to give the PCF their due representation within the Cabinet.  
The outcome of the October 1945 elections initially paralysed the Ministry for 
Industrial Production. As the various parties wrangled to allot portfolios in the soon-to-be-
created coalition government, ministries were unable to make key decisions without knowing 
who their minister might be.  Lambert Blum-Picard, who had worked closely with Lacoste in 
Algiers and then served as Secretary General for Industrial Production, kept his position as 
the chief mandarin in the Ministry.  Nevertheless, he had to postpone important decisions 
until Lacoste’s successor was named.  At the end of October, he received a proposal to 
dissolve the Organisation Committee for Salt.  While he agreed that this particular Committee 
ought to be dismantled, the decision was postponed “until the general policies of the future 
government with regard to professional organisation have been decided upon”.590  Expecting 
a change of some importance with the impending arrival of a minister with a very different 
political agenda, the Ministry was unable to continue the route it had charted for itself 
following the Liberation.  This state of uncertainty was dissipated on 21 November with the 
appointment of Marcel Paul as Lacoste’s successor.  
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The conversions of Paul: nationalising French industry 
The arrival of Marcel Paul at rue de Grenelle marked quite a change.  The ministerial 
archives demonstrate a palpable shift in style; while every month under Lacoste contains 
hundreds of notes, reports, and letters, under Paul fewer than 70 pages exist for the first three 
months of 1946.591  It is not clear whether this is due to drastically less communication 
between Paul and his civil servants, or whether Paul kept or destroyed most of the files that 
passed through his hands.  Whichever the reason, we can clearly detect a change in the 
working relationship between the Minister and his staff. Moreover, Paul lacked the 
longstanding personal relationships with his senior staff enjoyed by his predecessor.  While 
Lacoste and Blum-Picard had worked together in the overseas Resistance and the CFLN in 
Algiers, Paul had no such connections.  Despite not having been in North Africa, Paul’s 
credentials as a résistant were nevertheless impeccable.  A trade unionist and a member of 
the PCF since 1923, he fought in the infantry in 1940 before being captured by the Nazis.  
After escaping, he organised a series of resistance acts, culminating in a failed assassination 
attempt against Hermann Göring in August 1941, for which he was arrested and tortured by 
Vichy in November.  He spent the remainder of the war in custody, being transferred to 
Auschwitz in April 1944 and to Buchenwald the following month.  Yet Paul’s experiences 
during the war associated him far more with the Communist-dominated interior Resistance 
than with the exterior Resistance led by de Gaulle.  Despite the truce reached by these 
factions in the form of the CNR Programme of March 1944, the fundamental differences 
between them became increasingly visible once peace was restored to France.592 
Given the stated policies of the CNR Programme, it was no surprise that Paul pursued 
an agenda of the “return to the State” of France’s key industries.593  The first wave of 
nationalisations had been completed over the winter of 1944-1945, with the State taking 
control of the coalfields of Nord and Pas-de-Calais, Renault’s factories, and a number of 
smaller companies.  In collaboration with the Communist ministers given economic 
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portfolios by de Gaulle, Paul oversaw a second wave of nationalisations representing a 
significant swathe of the French economy.594  On 2 December 1945, less than two weeks 
after being named Minister, Paul voted to nationalise the Banque de France and the country’s 
credit organisations, creating the Conseil national du crédit.  This was followed by the 
nationalisation of insurance companies on 25 April.  As Minister for Industrial Production, 
Paul’s most significant project in early 1946 was the nationalisation of electricity and gas and 
the concomitant establishment of EDF and GDF.595  Paul also extended the nationalisation of 
France’s northern coalfields to those of the entire country, with the creation of Charbonnages 
de France to oversee national coal production.596  These nationalisations troubled many in the 
private sector, and in January 1946 Jean Monnet argued that “it is essential that the 
government quickly and definitively draw up a list of industries to be nationalised” on the 
grounds that investment in the modernisation of industries would be stifled if there was a 
chance that they would soon be nationalised.597  Eventually, the elections of June 1946, 
which saw the MRP emerge as the largest party, brought the second wave of nationalisations 
to an end.598  
Through the nationalisations of 1944-1946, the steel industry was spared in large part 
due to the deft diplomacy of the industry’s representative: Jules Aubrun.  Already President 
of the Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française (CSSF), he was appointed President of 
the Commission for Private Enterprise of the Conseil national du patronat français (CNPF), 
France’s resurrected employers’ confederation.  This Commission’s chief task was to oppose 
“all the ravages resulting from the idea of nationalisation and étatisation, and to study all the 
consequences, direct and indirect, on the sectors that are still free, of the already executed 
nationalisations”.599  Aubrun had long argued against the nationalisation of the steel industry 
– one of the most strategic industries in France, and therefore an obvious candidate to be 
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“returned to the State”.600  Indeed, calls to nationalise the industry were voiced at the very 
first meeting of the Provisional Consultative Assembly, the forerunner of the reconvened 
National Assembly, in Algiers in January 1944.  André Marty, a leading PCF representative, 
denounced the leaders of the steel industry as opportunists who had collaborated with and 
supported Vichy, whom he alleged were only beginning to support the CFLN in early 1944 as 
the outcome of the war was becoming increasingly certain.  He encouraged France to follow 
the Soviet model, claiming that “what they have achieved there we could achieve here, if 
only fewer of the leaders of our economy belonged to the Schneider group”, referring to the 
second-largest steel company in France.601  He also insisted that the Commissariat for 
Production and Provisions – the GPRF’s department analogous to the Ministry for Industrial 
Production – must have absolute power, and that “no other department must intervene in this 
domain”.602  It is interesting to note the PCF’s defence of sweeping powers for the Ministry 
for Industrial Production, the control of which was given to a PCF member nearly two years 
later.  Nationalisations were a key part of the CNR Programme of March 1944, endorsed by 
all parties, and a review of the economic policies of the government-in-waiting in July 1944 
confirmed cross-party agreement to “limit the power of trusts” and to pursue “nationalisations 
in certain cases”.603  Aubrun’s success in keeping steel private undoubtedly aided his 
candidacy to preside over the new CNPF Commission.  He continued to argue for the 
maintenance of the Vichy system in post-war France, in part as a means of preventing 
outright nationalisation of the steel industry.604  
In February 1945, while nationalisations were proceeding apace, Aubrun and the 
CSSF celebrated the supposed independence and patriotism of the steel industry before and 
during the war.  They argued that they had actively supported the Third Republic in its final 
years, but their project remained unfinished in 1940, and they sought to continue their work 
that had been interrupted by the war.  They claimed to have acted in the collective interest of 
France, and maintained that they should therefore be accorded a free hand to run the 
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industry.605   Aubrun’s intervention proved to be effective: two days later the PCF tabled a 
motion to nationalise the steel industry, along with the chemical industry and the merchant 
marine, but the Assembly never voted on it.606  Aubrun’s line of argument was reiterated by 
Alexis Aron once he was named head of OPSID, as CORSID was renamed, in March 1945.  
He commended the “independence and courage” of the wartime leaders of CORSID, Aubrun 
chief amongst them, and insisted on “the necessity of a strong Professional Office” with 
“sufficient latitude” to run the industry.607  The Commission de sidérurgie meanwhile argued 
that the nationalisation of the steel industry was inadvisable, because of the significant 
differences that existed between the industry in the Loire and in Lorraine.  Rather than trying 
to forcibly harmonise the two, it would be far better to let each region be run in its own way 
under the guidance of industrialists.608  Similar arguments did not dissuade the government 
from nationalising the French coal industry, beginning in Nord and Pas-de-Calais before 
enlarging the strategy to include the entire country. 
Once nationalised industries were firmly in State hands, Paul proceeded to issue some 
clearly politically-motivated orders – in September 1946, for instance, he introduced 
legislation forcing all nationalised companies to rehire all certified workers (salariés 
licenciés) who had been sacked following the strike of 30 November 1938.609  Government 
involvement with such directives infuriated French employers, who by 1946 had organised 
themselves in the revived CNPF.610  Paul’s decision stoked the embers of the class warfare 
that had raged in the final years of the Third Republic.  Predictably, the leaders of French 
industry were at odds with the Communist Minister for Industrial Production.   
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The end of the New Industrial Order? 
As we have seen, throughout the period 1944-46, the need to revive key industries 
quickly during a chaotic period led to many Vichy-era officials remaining in their posts for 
the sake of expediency.  Just as the PCF had pleaded all along for a deeper épuration 
following the collapse of the Vichy regime, Paul insisted that the new management be drawn 
from the Resistance.611  Practically, the best way of doing this would be to remove the 
existing system of Organisation Committees maintained by Lacoste, which left the 
representatives of the wartime patronat with considerable control of French industry, even if 
labour representation had increased under the Provisional Government.  This fit nicely with 
the PCF’s broader agenda of thoroughly purging France of Vichy’s individuals and 
institutions.612  The Communists continued to criticise the Organisation Committees under 
Lacoste.613  Despite having agreed to leave the fate of the Organisation Committees out of the 
CNR Programme, the PCF never renounced their wartime condemnation of the bodies and 
now that the party held four key economic portfolios, including the one directly responsible 
for industrial organisation, they had the ideal opportunity to implement their desired reforms. 
The morning of 23 April 1946, only four days after the National Assembly had 
approved the nationalisation of the country’s coalfields, Marcel Paul requested an immediate 
debate on his proposal to abolish the Organisation Committees and OCRPI.  The motion 
referenced a number of proposals advocating the dismantling of the bodies from across the 
political spectrum: Albert Rigal, of the PCF, Edouard Frédéric-Dupont and Jean-Marie 
Bouvier O’Cottereau, both of the moderate right Parti républicain de la liberté (PRL), and 
Jean Palewski of the MRP.  Palewski’s proposal made the case for abolishing the existing 
order and to instead “establish a system based on liberty”. 614  The debate that followed was 
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remarkably one-sided.  Bouvier O’Cottereau was the only person to take the floor to speak in 
favour of the proposal, claiming that “we are all in absolute agreement that the Professional 
Offices that succeeded the Organisation Committees should be abolished”.615  His brief 
remarks justified the need for a debate, rather than to simply pass the legislation without 
discussion, noting that a question “as important as the reorganisation of our economy must 
not be treated lightly”.  Yet the call for a parliamentary debate proved to be a mere formality, 
since not a single voice was raised to oppose the motion.  As the Speaker of the Assembly 
confirmed, “nobody else wishes to speak?” – a query that was met with silence – he 
proceeded to read aloud each of the 17 articles of the law, which were then adopted 
unanimously.  The first article, stipulating the “abolition of the Organisation Committees 
[and] of OCRPI and its Sections”, seemingly sounded the death knell of what remained of 
Vichy’s New Industrial Order.616  It was agreed that the existing system would remain in 
place for up to six months, until legislation to replace it had been passed.  The discussion then 
swiftly moved on to the issue of publicly posting transcripts of certain speeches made in the 
National Assembly, which soon descended into representatives trading accusations of having 
supported Pétain.617  In such an Assembly, the issue of abolishing Vichy’s Organisation 
Committees was an uncommonly calm and widely supported affair.    
The introduction of the text, and particularly the insistence that the motion be 
discussed immediately and voted upon that same day, could suggest that Marcel Paul and his 
allies may have been seeking to take advantage of favourable absences from the Assembly 
that day to push through the legislation.  Yet only six members were reported to be absent on 
23 April, meaning that such erstwhile defenders of the Organisation Committees as Robert 
Lacoste and André Philip were indeed in the Assembly that day.618 Moreover, it was standard 
practice at this time for a proposal to be introduced, debated, and voted upon in a single day.   
On 25 April, for example, two days after the law abolishing the New Industrial Order was 
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discussed, there were 10 separate requests for immediate discussion of a draft bill.619  The 
complete and utter absence of opposition to the legislation shows that it was not a 
controversial measure to be squeezed through the legislature by a single, decisive vote, but 
rather that by April 1946 it had become unanimously accepted that the Organisation 
Committees ought not to remain part of France’s industrial organisation.620 
While nationalisations and dictated hires figured among the chief complaints of the 
patronat in 1946, the abolition of the Organisation Committees gave rise to exceptional 
objections.  The action was denounced by employers as a blatantly political move by the 
Ministry for Industrial Production.  They were stunned by “the abrupt decision, obviously 
based on electoral considerations, to abolish, over the course of the month of June, a great 
number of Organisation Committees and [OCRPI] Offices”.621  Employers believed that the 
system established under a regime to which electoral considerations were of no importance 
favoured the employers far more than the emerging one did, particularly with a Communist 
Minister for Industrial Production.  The employers decried Paul’s actions, although the 
Socialist Léon Blum received more than his share of opprobrium in the minutes of the 
CNPF’s first General Assembly.622  It is worth noting that the decision to abolish the 
Committees, like the decisions to create and later to reform the bodies, was taken without 
consulting the patronat.  
Despite the shock at the sudden abolition of the Organisation Committees, the 
recently reconstituted CNPF was soon able to make the most of the legislation to increase its 
members’ powers. While Paul’s draft law called for the abolition of the remaining Vichyste 
industrial bodies, it did not outline what bodies if any would succeed them.  However, Article 
7.2.b of the legislation stated that, “for large firms, sub-allocation (sous-répartition) is 
entrusted to the most representative employers’ association”, a clause that was not lost on the 
CNPF.623  By nature of the industry, virtually all steel firms fell under the provisions for 
“large firms”, although separate ones were advanced for SMEs and for nationalised 
industries.  This was good news for the employers’ association for the steel industry, the 
CSSF, and particularly for its president, Jules Aubrun, who regained control over sub-
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allocation after the reforms of Vichy’s industrial organisation.  Within six weeks of the 
introduction of the legislation, the CNPF was able to celebrate that they had “secured a 
number of amendments which ensure[d] a greater role for employers’ associations in the 
functioning of sub-allocation”.624  The CNPF was also convinced that “this law will not be 
applied without many delays (atermoiements) by the Minister for Industrial Production”, 
which allowed industrialists time to adapt to the changes.625  Despite the evident worries 
engendered by a Communist Minister and by what they saw as rash legislation, the employers 
succeeded in securing a decisive role in the sub-allocation of raw materials to their industry, a 
power that had previously been in the hands of the tripartite Organisation Committees.  For 
Jules Aubrun, this was a particularly ironic turn of events.  Aubrun had been forced to resign 
as President of CORSID in October 1944 as part of the épuration of the wartime leadership 
of the Committees.  In April 1946, some of the most crucial powers of the Organisation 
Committees were returned to Aubrun as head of the CSSF.   
This deft manoeuvring by the CNPF undercut some of the expected advantages of 
Paul’s project.  The PCF’s opposition to the Organisation Committees was in large part based 
on their perceived dominance by “trusts” and big business.  But this longstanding opposition 
failed to take into account the significant reforms the Committees had undergone in 1944 and 
1945.  Far from being bastions of power of the grand patronat, as they largely had been 
under Vichy, they were by 1946 regulated, tripartite bodies under the control of a Communist 
Minister in which trade unions had a significant voice.  Yet the abolition of those loathed 
bodies ended up handing more power directly to employers’ associations, which represented 
the patronat exclusively.  Moreover, it returned key powers to the wartime President of 
CORSID, who had been forced to resign them in October 1944.  Ironically, organised labour 
had more control over sub-allocation as long as the reformed Organisation Committees 
continued to exist.  With the dismantling of the Committees, the responsibilities previously 
shared between employers and workers were transferred to the former exclusively.  Despite 
his intentions, Paul’s legislation ended up weakening the voice of organised labour while 
strengthening that of the largest employers in France.626  
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This notable victory for the CNPF was not lost on the Socialists, who soon regretted 
the disappearance of the Organisation Committees and OCRPI.  In December 1946, André 
Philip, a long-time supporter of maintaining Vichy’s industrial bodies, admitted that “we 
committed a grave error in accepting Marcel Paul’s proposal to abolish the Organisation 
Committees.  They have resulted in the State no longer controlling allocations [of raw 
materials], and this power being passed to employers’ associations.  Dirigisme remains the 
only solution to this problem”.627  For Philip, by then Minister for the National Economy, and 
the SFIO, the lengthy reforms to the Organisation Committees overseen by Robert Lacoste to 
ensure labour and the State a proper portion of industrial control had come to nought; Paul’s 
move to abolish the remnants of Vichy’s industrial organisation had paradoxically 
strengthened the hand of the patronat at the expense of the State and labour.  In this context, 
dirigisme, particularly the economic planning being undertaken by the General Commissariat 
for the Plan (CGP), represented the best way of salvaging what the SFIO and their allies had 
achieved with the reformed Committees.  This gave mourners of defunct Organisation 
Committees further reason to support the most promising embodiment of dirigisme – the 
nascent Monnet Plan. 
 
The Monnet Plan 
Much has already been written on the supposed Vichy origins of Monnet’s Plan de 
Modernisation et d’Equipement.  These claims have focused principally on the Délégation 
générale à l’équipement national (DGEN), established by François Lehideux in 1941, which 
produced two plans for the French economy: the Plan for National Equipment, a ten-year 
plan produced in 1942, and the Tranche de Démarrage completed in early 1944.  Richard 
Kuisel was the first historian to suggest that these projects drawn up under Vichy should be 
seen as “a crucial step in the history of economic planning” in France.628  This claim has been 
challenged by Adrian Jones, who has argued that these two isolated plans are rather “the 
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exception that proves the rule”, since neither plan was treated with great interest by any 
Vichy ministers and that the regime eschewed economic planning overall.629  Seemingly the 
most promising monograph on the subject, Philippe Mioche’s Le plan Monnet: Genèse et 
élaboration 1941-1947, purports to trace the origins of the Monnet Plan from the early days 
of Vichy.630  The study is disappointing, however, not least because fewer than 20 pages are 
devoted to the Vichy period.  Mioche, like Michel Margairaz, emphasises the roots of 
Monnet’s plan in the French Resistance and downplays the importance of Vichy’s fruitless 
plans.631  The consensus today seems to be that these planning documents drafted by a minor 
office under Vichy were not decisive in shaping Monnet’s plans,632 although the detailed 
statistical data gathered by the Organisation Committees facilitated the successful realisation 
of the plan.633  It is also important to note that the DGEN’s plan ignores the steel industry, 
preferring to focus on textiles, automobiles, and chemical products.634 
It is certainly true that in May 1944, Vichy technocrats at the DGEN produced their 
Tranche de démarrage.  This set out how, after the end of the war in France, the nation’s 
economy could be revived, yet the plan was ignored by the Vichy leadership. Interestingly, 
this technocratic plan was received by Jean Monnet, who found much to agree with in its 
pages.  He circulated the document approvingly in November 1944, with only one subtle 
change.  While the title and the content of the plan remained intact, he cautiously changed the 
date of the document from May 1944 to November 1944, presumably to avoid the plan being 
associated with the previous regime.635   
The historiographical debate, however, has focused on continuities in economic 
planning as such from Vichy to Monnet.  What is overlooked is the role of the Organisation 
Committees in the development of the Monnet Plan.  As we shall see, the Organisation 
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Committees served as a model for Monnet’s Modernisation Commissions, which took over 
the responsibilities, documents, and staff of the moribund Committees in 1946.  The Tranche 
de démarrage consulted by Monnet focuses on imports and production levels, while ignoring 
questions of internal organisation of particular industries.  Given that it was drafted under 
Vichy, there is no reason to suppose that its authors had envisaged an alternative to the 
system of Organisation Committees.  Similarly, when this project was championed by 
Monnet in late 1944, the survival of the Organisation Committees had received strong 
endorsement from the Provisional Government.  The implementation of such a plan to revive 
French industry would necessarily rely on the Organisation Committees established under 
Vichy and maintained after the Liberation.  Given the consensus on the survival of Vichy’s 
industrial organisation at the time when Monnet was developing his ambitious plans for 
French industry, it is almost certain that Monnet based his plans on the assumption that these 
bodies would be maintained.  In the event that they were threatened, he would need to create 
analogous bodies to carry on their work.  With growing partisanship among the nation’s 
political leaders and the victory of the Communist Party in the October 1945 elections, this is 
precisely what Jean Monnet did.  
 
Building the Commissariat Général du Plan 
Shortly after Marcel Paul’s appointment as Minister for Industrial Production in 
November 1945, Jean Monnet submitted a proposal to de Gaulle for the Plan de 
modernisation et d’équipement – better known as the Monnet Plan. The text made the case 
for using the context of post-war reconstruction to effect a rapid modernisation of French 
industry.  This would facilitate an increase of domestic consumption, but more importantly 
allow France to pay for its imports of raw materials – particularly coal – by increasing its 
exports of industrial products.636  Perhaps most convincing for de Gaulle was the warning 
that if France failed to embrace such a rapid modernisation the country would “be reduced to 
the rank of a second-rate power”.637  By strengthening France’s economic clout, Monnet 
claimed that his Plan would strengthen the nation’s hand in international power politics.  He 
found in de Gaulle and his famous obsession with France’s grandeur a receptive audience.   
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The first weeks of 1946 proved decisive for Monnet’s initiative.  On 3 January, de 
Gaulle formally approved the Monnet Plan and the establishment of the General 
Commissariat for the Plan (CGP).  Reading the text of Monnet’s proposal, it is easy to see 
how the project was couched in terms certain to appeal to de Gaulle.  The CGP, which would 
oversee the organisation and implementation of the Monnet Plan, would operate outside the 
jurisdiction of any partisan minister and would act in accordance with the national interest.  
De Gaulle’s own political philosophy stipulated “the nation requires a regime where power is 
strong and continuous.  Political parties are obviously incapable of providing such power”.638  
Moreover, following the October 1945 elections, he believed that “not one political party 
believes that it represents the general interest” of the country, with even the largest party 
having secured barely a quarter of all votes.639  Monnet’s prospect of having a powerful, non-
partisan Commissariat acting with only the national interest in mind to organise French 
industry could hardly have been more appealing to de Gaulle, particularly once Monnet 
added that France’s international standing as a great power could only be secured by reviving 
the national economy.640  Furthermore, having just given the PCF four economic portfolios, 
de Gaulle must have been intrigued by Monnet’s plan to co-opt the heart of their powers.  
Industrial organisation in France would no longer be in the hands of a Communist minister 
motivated by “electoral demagogy”641 and allegiance to Moscow, but would instead be run by 
a rational, non-partisan body doing what was best for the nation.   
The text approved by de Gaulle set out how the Plan and the CGP would operate.  
Given the importance of the success of the Plan for France, it was imperative that “the entire 
Nation take part in this effort”.  It was therefore “indispensible that all vital elements of the 
Nation participate in its elaboration.  It is for this reason that the proposed organisation will 
bring together, for each branch [of industry], the Administration in charge, the most qualified 
Experts, and Representatives from professional Syndicates (workers, management, and 
employers)”.642 These representatives would together constitute a Modernisation Commission 
for each branch of industry.  In addition, “a representative from the General Commissariat 
will sit on each Modernisation Commission as President, Chairperson, or Secretary to ensure 
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the coordination of the Commission’s work”.643    One cannot ignore the striking similarities 
between the proposed Modernisation Commissions and the existing Organisation 
Committees.  In both cases, a body was organised for each key branch of French industry that 
included representation from employers, management (les cadres), and workers.  Also in 
both cases, the body was completed with the addition of a representative of the State.  The 
crucial difference, however, was which part of the State that individual represented.  In the 
Organisation Committees, he represented the Ministry for Industrial Production and was 
responsible to the Minister – by now Marcel Paul.  In the emerging Modernisation 
Commissions, however, the representative would be from the General Commissariat for the 
Plan, led by Jean Monnet and directly responsible to the President of the Republic.  The 
formation of Modernisation Commissions alongside existing Organisation Committees 
therefore marks the creation of rival committees with essentially the same functions and 
representation, but overseen by the purportedly apolitical and purely technocratic CGP 
instead of the Ministry for Industrial Production, whose leadership was susceptible to change 
depending on the results of the latest elections.   
Signing the decree creating the CGP was one of de Gaulle’s most significant acts in 
the opening weeks of 1946, but his involvement by no means ended with his signature on 3 
January.  In a document written by Monnet, marked “secret” and addressed only to his two 
closest collaborators, Robert Marjolin and Etienne Hirsch, he detailed the significant work 
that had to be completed on an unusually pressing deadline.  The document, dated 13 
January, specified that the membership of the Council for the Plan, which would involve a 
number of relevant ministers as well as Monnet and his staff, would need to be finalised and 
prepared as an ordinance for de Gaulle to sign by 17 January, only four days later.  The first 
five Modernisation Commissions then had to be “constituted, their presidents chosen and 
confirmed, their chairmen appointed”, for Saturday 19 January.  “Jean Monnet must present 
the constitution of these commissions to General de Gaulle for his signature on this date”, 
with the content of the document to be announced to the Council for the Plan at its first 
meeting, scheduled for 21 January.644  The haste in which these documents would have to be 
drawn up recalls that surrounding the drafting of the law of 16 August 1940, particularly 
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when one considers that Monnet had been able to work for several weeks in December on the 
text of the initial proposal signed on 3 January.645 
 The frantic pace at which the fundamental institutions of the CGP were developed 
was determined quite clearly by a decision that de Gaulle claims in his memoirs he made on 1 
January 1946: to resign as President of the Republic. 646  Clearly, between de Gaulle’s formal 
approval of the creation of the CGP on 3 January and the secret note Monnet drafted on 13 
January, a Sunday, the two men agreed on a very tight schedule during which the essential 
components of the CGP would be formally endorsed by and backed with ordinances from the 
President.  These had to be presented to de Gaulle for his signature on 19 January for a very 
simple reason: the following morning he resigned as President.  One of his very final acts as 
President was therefore the approval of the establishment of the first Modernisation 
Commissions, which were presented to the Council for the Plan as a fait accompli the day 
after de Gaulle’s resignation.  At that meeting the Commissions were described as “the 
specific and essential apparatus of the whole project”.647  Just as de Gaulle’s quiet removal of 
André Diethelm from his post in the CFLN assured the survival of the Organisation 
Committees following the Liberation,648 de Gaulle’s cooperation with Monnet in the final 
days before resigning as President ensured that the Monnet Plan and its keystones, the 
Modernisation Commissions, would survive long after de Gaulle’s resignation. 
In light of this apparent challenge to the Ministry for Industrial Production, involving 
the creation of parallel Organisation Committees under Monnet’s control rather than Paul’s, it 
is worth considering whether this was done in consultation and coordination with the 
Ministry.  To assess this, it is worth looking at the relations between Jean Monnet and Marcel 
Paul.  Paul was named Minister for Industrial Production on 21 November 1945 after weeks 
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of negotiations following the October elections.  In the weeks following his appointment, 
Paul made repeated requests to meet with Monnet to discuss the development of his Plan – to 
no avail.  On 4 December, two weeks after Paul’s appointment, Monnet sent his proposal for 
the establishment of the Plan to de Gaulle; by 13 December de Gaulle had responded with a 
draft memorandum summarising Monnet’s plans.649  Meanwhile, Paul charged Blum-Picard, 
Secretary General for Industrial Production, with the task of arranging a meeting between the 
Minister and Monnet.  This meeting never came about.  On 10 January 1946, a week after de 
Gaulle had approved the Monnet Plan, details of the project including a description of the 
Modernisation Commissions were made public.  Meanwhile, by 18 January Blum-Picard was 
still unable to arrange any kind of meeting between Monnet and Paul.  An exasperated Blum-
Picard informed Paul that Monnet “seem[ed] to systematically evade any meeting with” 
either Blum-Picard or Paul.650  Of course we know that on 18 January Monnet was 
scrambling to finalise all the ordinances that de Gaulle would have to sign the next day.  In 
this context, Monnet would have had little time for meetings that he would consider 
superfluous.  More important, however, is the fact that Monnet proceeded with such an 
ambitious project that so obviously implicated issues of Industrial Production – and created 
rival Organisation Committees in the form of the Modernisation Commissions – while 
systematically avoiding any kind of meeting with the Minister for Industrial Production.  
Marcel Paul was one of 12 ministers who attended the first meeting of the Council for the 
Plan on 21 January, and it was only then that he was briefed on the creation of the new 
Modernisation Commissions created two days earlier.  
In his very first meeting with Monnet after succeeding de Gaulle as President, Félix 
Gouin informed Monnet that he planned to modify the statute of the CGP by attaching it to 
the Ministry for the National Economy.  Politically, this made more sense than it would have 
a month earlier, since Gouin had given that portfolio to fellow Socialist André Philip, who 
replaced Communist François Billoux on 26 January.  Monnet flatly told the new President 
that attaching the CGP to the Ministry would be “a mistake that would compromise the 
success of the whole undertaking”.  The principal reason he gave to justify his argument was 
that “it is always bad to modify the conditions in which a project operates once it is already 
underway”.651  In other words, the decrees signed by de Gaulle during his last day as 
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President created a fait accompli which Monnet seized upon and defended.  Indeed, Monnet 
drafted a letter of resignation to Gouin in case the President went ahead and placed the CGP 
under the auspices of the Ministry for the National Economy.  Faced with this ultimatum, 
Gouin reconsidered and, in June of that year, was succeeded as President by Georges Bidault 
of the MRP.  As Gouin had done, Bidault swiftly appointed one of his own party colleagues, 
François de Menthon, as Minister for the National Economy.  The fact that the first six 
months of the year saw this portfolio change hands from a Communist to a Socialist to a 
Christian Democrat does indeed lend credibility to Monnet’s insistence on “placing the CGP 
above these [partisan] polemics”.652  Aside from the justification of the Commissariat’s 
structure, it is important to note Monnet’s strategy in creating the CGP, namely rushing the 
plans so that they could be signed into law by de Gaulle, then defending the status quo 
against challenges by de Gaulle’s successor.  It proved to be a successful formula and one 
that ensured the independence of the CGP vis-à-vis the Ministry for the National Economy.    
There are a number of explanations for Monnet’s strategy.  Monnet may have been 
motivated by the simple desire to secure the widest possible jurisdiction over French industry 
for himself.  A more generous interpretation could be that he genuinely believed that France 
needed its industry to be overseen by a benevolent and thoroughly non-partisan group of 
experts, rather than by a Ministry whose fundamental direction could change according to the 
caprice of the electorate.  The results of the October 1945 elections, and especially the 
naming of Communists as Ministers for Industrial Production and for the National Economy, 
may have further influenced Monnet in this direction.  He was certainly distrustful of the 
PCF, which he claimed “became more aggressive the faster elections approached”.653  
Irrespective of Monnet’s personal beliefs, having a Communist in charge of these two key 
ministries certainly strengthened his case with de Gaulle for handing the reins of French 
industry over to a republican technocrat.   In his memoirs, Monnet unsurprisingly claims that 
his actions were patriotic and selfless.  He explains that the “success of the Plan depended on 
its structure and on the position it would have in the political and administrative life of the 
country”.  Monnet insisted that the CGP be placed under the direct authority of the President, 
despite the fact that “tradition demanded that the Commissioner be under the supervision of 
an economic ministry, and all the administrative ponderousness pushed [the Plan] towards 
this state of subordination”.  He only insisted on his preferred structure because “no 
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ministerial post could have given me as vast a field of action as the one afforded me by the 
indefinable job of Commissariat of the Plan, Delegate to the President of the Government”.654  
Although it remains unmentioned in his own recollections, the fact that the main economic 
ministries were all controlled by PCF members undoubtedly influenced this line of thinking.  
This likely influenced his decision to include so many ministers in the Council for the Plan.  
The fact that the two portfolios most central to industrial organisation – namely Industrial 
Production and the National Economy – were held by Communists would have encouraged 
Monnet to include as many ministers as possible so as to dilute the influence of the PCF 
within the Council for the Plan.  As a result, Monnet proposed inviting 10 ministers, 
including those for the Colonies, for Foreign Affairs, and for Communications.655  By the 
time de Gaulle authorised the creation of the Council on 3 January, this had increased to 12, 
with the addition of the Ministers for Transportation and for Public Works, as well as the 
Commissioner for German Affairs.656  While the inclusion of such a range of Cabinet 
members is consistent with Monnet’s claim that the CGP’s work transcended many ministries 
and was a collective national effort, it also conveniently put PCF ministers in the minority, 
despite their holding the two most crucial portfolios. 
 
Institutional metempsychosis: from Committees to Commissions 
Given how Monnet had replicated the Organisation Committees under the CGP and 
ensured that they would remain beyond the reach of any ministry, we may well ask: to what 
extent were the Modernisation Commissions merely duplicates of the similar bodies created 
under Vichy?  In 1945, a note was given to Blum-Picard regarding the future of the 
Organisation Committee for Steel (CORSID).  The author stressed that “regardless of 
political developments in the months ahead, it will always be necessary to maintain bodies 
equivalent to [CORSID] in order to execute its functions”.657  This recognition of the 
necessity of an Organisation Committee, or an analogous body, to organise French steel 
production is telling.  The note also observed that the State must “invest tens of thousands of 
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francs to reorganise and modernise the steel industry, for this, we will need such an 
institution [CORSID]”.658  This note reveals the view that, while CORSID could indeed be 
dissolved due to “political developments in the months ahead” – that is, following the 
legislative elections that would see the PCF emerge as France’s largest party – a successor 
institution with essentially the same powers and mandate would still be needed.  It is clear 
that by the time Marcel Paul assumed his responsibilities as Minister, his Secretary General 
was aware of the argument for the necessity of maintaining the bodies created by Vichy, or at 
least replacing them by analogous bodies. 
Already in 1942, Etienne Hirsch, who along with Robert Marjolin was Monnet’s 
closest assistant in building the General Commissariat for the Plan and what would become 
known as the Monnet Plan, had proposed a reorganisation of French industry.  Despite being 
labelled a neo-liberal, Hirsch recommended that French industry be overseen by corporatist 
bodies that included employers and workers, but were directed firmly by civil servants and a 
powerful Ministry for the National Economy.  Socialist André Philip, a notable advocate of 
State planisme, found this model to be too similar to the existing one established by Vichy, 
while Socialist Georges Boris found it overly corporatist.  Richard Kuisel has described 
Hirsch’s proposals as “technocorporatist”.659  Curiously, Hirsch’s plans were deemed too 
Vichyste in 1942, yet proved to be predictive of the system that would emerge after the 
Liberation.  Moreover, we can see already in 1942 one of Monnet’s principal associates 
supporting a vision of French industrial organisation strikingly similar to the one enshrined in 
the Monnet Plan. 
On 9 March 1946, barely two months after the creation of the CGP, the Modernisation 
Commission for Steel was created.660 This was one of the first Commissions created within 
the CGP, following the creation of the first five by de Gaulle the day before his 
resignation.661 Moreover, steel was highlighted as the single most important industry by 
Monnet, who granted it “absolute priority” for access to coal and insisted that “in effect, it is 
steel that controls all other activities”.662 Its composition mirrored that of the reformed 
Organisation Committee: five of its 15 members were managers of steel firms, with the 
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remaining members being drawn from labour (three), management (two), experts (two), and 
administrators (three).  The leadership of the Commission contains some familiar names.  
Eugène Roy, who had served as Vice-President of CORSID for the duration of the war, was 
promoted to President of the new Commission.663  Jean Latourte, who had worked as Under 
Secretary of CORSID and remained in that role in the renamed OPSID, was named Chairman 
of the Modernisation Commission.  Bureau, another CORSID veteran, was poached from 
OPSID and named Vice-President of the Commission.664  Given that the three top positions 
were given to individuals who had worked together closely within CORSID under Vichy, it 
was hardly surprising that the Commission bore more than a passing resemblance to that 
institution. It was also stated that the Commission would work closely with two other 
institutions: the Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française (CSSF), of which Jules Aubrun 
was still President, and OPSID, still led by Alexis Aron.665  This arrangement thus reunited 
the President and Vice-President of CORSID along with their wartime ally Aron to 
coordinate and manage the French steel industry as they had for the duration of the Vichy 
regime.666  It is worth remembering that the appointment of Aubrun and Roy to the leadership 
of CORSID marked a decisive break from the pre-war Comité des forges, which was led by 
François de Wendel. The replacement of factory owners by managerial directors from the 
industry proved to be an enduring change, as Aubrun’s and Roy’s post-1944 careers 
demonstrate.667  
In the first six months of the GPRF, the preoccupation of steel industrialists was the 
modernisation of their machinery.668   After four years of strenuous production with limited 
access to spare parts, let alone the latest innovations in production, the industry’s hardware 
was in poor shape.  While the period during the Second World War had been one of great 
technological innovation, particularly for the Allies, France had been shut out from such 
advances.  To bring France up to speed, the Ministry for Industrial Production commissioned 
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the Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS) to work with researchers in London 
to learn the latest technological advances, including in industrial methods.669  When the 
Government announced the creation of the CGP and the Monnet Plan on 10 January 1946, 
Monnet stressed that “the reconstruction of France does not merely mean repairing the 
destruction from the war, but also the modernisation of our equipment and our production 
methods”, concluding that “modernisation and reconstruction must be pursued 
simultaneously”.670  This mission imbued the CGP and its constituent Modernisation 
Commissions.   
The role of the Modernisation Commissions was defined by Monnet as “to 
coordinate, to manage (diriger), but at all costs not to suffocate or sterilise the efforts of the 
technicians”.671  Within ten days of its creation, the Commission for Steel was given the task 
of “defining all measures that would permit [the French steel industry] to produce … 6 
million tonnes of steel in ingots and 1 million tonnes of pig iron (fonte brute) for direct 
consumption”.672  They were also to develop a plan to enable the industry to increase that 
production to 10 million tonnes in ingots and 2.5 million tonnes of pig iron within three 
years, thereby matching 1929 production levels.  After another two years, the industry would 
be expected to increase production to 12 million and 2.7 million tonnes, respectively.673  This 
resolution recognised that the single greatest obstacle to increasing French steel output was 
“the insufficient coal supply, in particular imports of coke and coke fines from the Ruhr”.674  
The Modernisation Commission was therefore advised to “take into consideration the 
necessity of minimising the use of coal and labour as much as possible”.675  The Commission 
for Steel would issue its first report, including projected output and recommendations for the 
modernisation of the industry, in November 1946.676  Given that the leaders of the 
Commission had spent the war running the industry while struggling with shortages of both 
coal and labour, their 74-page report continued the work done by CORSID during the war.  
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They emphasised one conclusion in particular: “Of course, in waiting for the realisation of 
this long-term endeavour, which after all remains merely a possibility, France can and must 
continue to rely on the Ruhr, as before the war, for the fuel needed for our steel industry”.677  
This central recommendation was presumably not lost on Monnet who would propose the 
pooling of the French and German coal and steel industries in May 1950.    
Jean Monnet had succeeded in creating the first five Modernisation Commissions, 
which replicated the work of the Organisation Committees, and they were signed into law by 
the President on 19 January 1946.  Five days later, Monnet was already moving to resolve 
this redundancy by having his Commissions replace the Committees altogether.  He noted 
that there was a “psychologically disastrous environment which risks indirectly 
compromising [France’s] economic recovery”,678 alluding to the unpopularity of the 
Committees and of certain measures still in place, such as price controls.679  Explaining the 
situation, Monnet recognised “the legitimacy of the maintenance, at least provisionally, of 
certain regulations”, but added that “the French are unanimous in objecting to the 
maintenance of many of these regulations more than a year after the Liberation [and] to the 
administrative carelessness of the Offices responsible for their application”.  The solution, he 
concluded, was “the abolition or at least the transformation of certain regulations” which 
could be done “immediately or in the very near future”.  Referring to the various 
“administrative offices” responsible for allocating materials to different industries – in other 
words, the Organisation Committees and OCRPI – Monnet called for a “transfer [of 
responsibilities] to bodies that are genuinely professional and democratic”.  Monnet 
recognised that the “profession will not reform itself”, and proposed the creation of a 
“provisional Commissariat with absolute powers”, whose leader could, “for a period of four 
to five months”, introduce “all the simplifications he deems necessary”.680  While this last 
suggestion was not endorsed by the Council for the Plan, it does reveal that Monnet was 
trying to convince the Council, which included all ministers related to the French economy 
and industry, of the need to “simplify” the existing system of industrial organisation.  By 
referring to the measures which were maintained after the Liberation – including the 
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Organisation Committees – and adding that the population unanimously opposed their 
continued existence, Monnet was making the case for abolishing the Committees.  His 
suggestion that the system be “simplified” by transferring their powers to “genuinely 
professional and democratic” bodies is a clear reference to the Modernisation Commissions 
he had just established, which he consistently described as democratic and representing the 
interests of the industry as a whole through the “essential collaboration of the State, workers, 
and [employers in] the industry”.681  Having created Commissions that replicated the existing 
Committees and ensuring that the new institutions would be under his control rather than tied 
to any ministry, Monnet suggested that the Committees be dispensed with altogether.  In this 
Monnet found common cause with the Communist Minister for Industrial Production, Marcel 
Paul. 
The morning of 23 April 1946, Marcel Paul proposed in the National Assembly that 
the Organisation Committees be abolished, a motion that received unanimous support.  This 
agreement was undoubtedly helped by Monnet’s suggestion to the key ministers from all 
parties that the Organisation Committees ought to be abolished and their powers transferred 
to the Modernisation Committees.  The day that this vote took place, Monnet wrote a lengthy 
note explaining “the necessity of maintaining the Council for the Plan and the Modernisation 
Commissions”.  The ordinances signed by de Gaulle had in fact created only a provisional 
Commissariat and provisional Modernisation Commissions.  Monnet had admitted in 
February that “the Administration only accepted this method because it knows that the 
Commissariat and the Commissions will disappear in six months […and] because they 
consider them to be temporary”.682  The very day the Organisation Committees had been 
abolished by the National Assembly, Monnet argued that “it is necessary to maintain the 
Council for the Plan and the Modernisation Commissions and to give them permanent 
status”, and that they continue to operate within the CGP. It is not clear to whom this note 
was sent, but it was apparently effective, as Monnet’s demands were met and his 
Modernisation Commissions permanently replaced the Organisation Committees that were 
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abolished that same day.683 As with his resistance to Gouin’s attempts to attach the CGP to 
the Ministry for the National Economy, Monnet was again able to ensure the survival of his 
preferred system on the grounds of defending the status quo. 
Despite the striking institutional and individual continuities between the Organisation 
Committees and the Modernisation Commissions, Monnet insisted on the novelty of the Plan 
and its Commissions in his memoirs.  “I took nobody’s place… I occupied a territory that had 
until that time been with neither name nor master”.684  According to this account, the 
Commissions therefore had entirely novel functions – while in reality they replicated those of 
the existing Organisation Committees. He also claims the innovation of the tripartite 
composition of the Commissions: “administration, producers, and workers had never been 
gathered around the same table.  If they ever did negotiate, it was in a climate of 
confrontation.  There was a winner and a loser, to the detriment of production or the 
currency”.685  This last formulation is reminiscent of the bitter labour disputes of the late 
1930s, which pitted employers and workers against each other.  Monnet claims that he had 
observed the Working Parties of wartime Britain, which had gathered industrialists, 
technicians, and labour union representatives, but he found them “seriously limited by the 
absence of civil servants representing the public interest and by the lack of general 
objectives”.686  He claims that he was the first to gather labour union representatives, 
employers, and civil servants around the same table to discuss and plan their common 
industry.  In his memoirs, Etienne Hirsch makes an almost identical reference to Britain’s 
Working Parties and adds that “it was necessary to add […] representatives from the civil 
service.  This is how the concept of the Modernisation Commissions came about, which 
constitutes the originality and indeed the foundation of French planning”.687  Monnet 
consciously, and rather conveniently, ignores the Organisation Committees of 1944-46, 
which indeed gathered administration, producers, and workers around the same table, along 
with civil servants.  The expunction of the Committees from his narrative certainly makes his 
own efforts seem all the more revolutionary, yet it ignores the important and very real 
continuities in industrial organisation in l’entre-deux-républiques.   
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Monnet’s version of events is certainly understandable, given that admitting 
continuity from Vichy’s loathed Organisation Committees to his Modernisation Committees 
could very well have been fatal to his Plan.  Similarly, Monnet does his utmost to stress how 
innovative his project was, downplaying any possible continuities from what came before.688  
But this perverted narrative is also advanced in most of the historiography on the subject. 
Most key works fail to consider this question of continuity altogether.689  One of the very few 
works to consider the continuities from the Organisation Committees to the Monnet Plan’s 
Modernisation Commissions is an article by Henry Rousso written in 1983.  He feels 
compelled to justify even the consideration of such a question, admitting that the comparison 
of Vichy’s and Monnet’s institutions “may seem incorrect”.690  He also underlines the 
fundamental differences between the two institutions, describing the Commissions as 
“tripartite”, in contrast to the “exclusively employer-led” Committees.691  Yet this distinction 
ignores the significant reforms imposed on the Committees between the end of the Vichy 
regime and the establishment of the CGP.  By 1946, when the first Commissions were 
established, the Organisation Committees had long ceased to be “exclusively employer-led”, 
and had instead become “tripartite”.  While the chasm between the Committees of 1944 and 
the Commissions of 1946 is clear, it is discernibly bridged by the reforms of the Committees 
overseen by the GPRF.  Rousso’s argument against the institutional continuities between the 
Committees and the Commissions rests on ignoring the entire period of the Provisional 
Government, as virtually all studies of the Organisation Committees do.   
Rousso also seeks to downplay the continuities in personnel between the Committees 
and the Commissions.  Adopting a purely quantitative approach, he calculates that “of 57 
individuals placed at the head of the Modernisation Commissions, only 5 came from 
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Organisation Committees”.692  This quantitative analysis suggests only negligible 
continuities, with fewer than 9% of Commission presidents having served in Vichy’s 
Committees.  Yet a more qualitative approach shows that the opposite is true in the case of 
the steel industry: the Commission’s president was the Committee’s vice-president from 1940 
to 1944, having held an important post advising the French government on German industry 
between the two appointments.  Moreover, Rousso focuses on the heads of the Commissions 
and the very limited leadership on the Committees, which obscures the fact that the 
Commission’s Vice-President, Latourte, and Chairman, Bureau, both held important 
positions in CORSID’s secretariat.  Additionally, the post-war roles of Committee presidents 
is overlooked – Jules Aubrun, for instance, was quickly appointed President of the CSSF, in 
which he was called upon to collaborate with the newly-formed Modernisation Commission 
for Steel.  Furthermore, Aubrun gained further powers of sub-allocation from the 
Organisation Committees following their abolition, as we have seen.  The Modernisation 
Commission for Steel asked the CSSF for a briefing on the latter’s latest work programmes 
and expressed its desire “to associate to our work the great majority of the personnel of the 
steel industry”.693  While never formally part of the new Commission, Aubrun was 
nevertheless invited to play an active part in its activities.  The institutional and individual 
continuities between the Organisation Committee for Steel and the analogous Modernisation 
Commission are thus apparent, despite attempts by Monnet to decouple the two, and 
historians’ unwillingness to date to debunk Monnet’s claims.694 
One lesson that Jean Monnet seems to have learned from the decline and fall of the 
Organisation Committees is the importance of securing public support for key institutions and 
projects.  Despite their pragmatic value, of which Monnet was well aware as early as 1943, 
the Committees were the target of merciless criticism from politicians and journalists alike.  
No matter how practical or even how technical and seemingly apolitical an institution might 
be, public opposition could force their abolition, as the fate of the Committees revealed.  
Consequently, convincing the public of the value of the Monnet Plan and of the 
Modernisation Commissions in particular was a priority for Monnet from the very beginning.  
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In his secret note to Marjolin and Hirsch on 13 January 1946, Monnet outlined what needed 
to be contained in a briefing note on the Modernisation Commissions.  The third item on the 
list was “publicity”.695  In June 1946, Monnet outlined the need “to bring into public opinion 
and to make the Government accept a number of ideas”, notably that private industry “such 
as the steel industry” should execute the elements of the Plan already agreed upon.  He also 
singled out the Modernisation Commissions, writing on the need to “make them popular 
among the public and within the administration”.696  By December 1946, Monnet was 
developing strategies for promoting the Plan to the public, including the distribution of “a 
popular leaflet on the Plan” and “propaganda in schools”.697  Clearly, Monnet was willing to 
go to great lengths to ensure that his initiative enjoyed broad public support, from 
government ministers to school children.  Monnet’s insistence that public opinion be 
“informed” of the virtues of the Plan quickly reached Félix Gouin, who in March stated that 
“we will elicit the enthusiasm and cooperation of the country, provided we define and explain 
to French opinion what we expect of the [Plan] that we are asking them to support”.698  
Having witnessed the fate of the Organisation Committees, Monnet ensured that his Plan and 
indeed his later initiatives would be accompanied by wide-ranging publicity campaigns to 
shore up public support. 
 
Conclusion   
With the victory of the Communist Party in the first legislative elections after the fall 
of the Vichy regime, the post-war consensus on the fate of Vichy’s industrial organisation 
became uncertain.  This was exacerbated by de Gaulle’s decision to hand control of four 
economic portfolios – including the one directly responsible for overseeing the Organisation 
Committees – to the PCF in order to deny them influence over France’s foreign affairs.  
Marcel Paul’s time as Minister for Industrial Production was marked by a determined wave 
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698 “Discours prononcé par M. Félix Gouin, Président du Gouvernement provisoire de la République française, 
le 16 mars, à l’occasion de la première séance du Conseil du Plan”, 16 March 1946, AMF 2 4, FJME. 
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of nationalisations and, in April 1946, the realisation of a long-standing PCF goal: the 
abolition of the Organisation Committees and OCRPI created by Vichy in 1940.  While 
employers were initially furious, particularly as they had not been consulted beforehand, they 
quickly manoeuvred the power vacuum left by the removal of the Committees and OCRPI to 
gain further control over the allocation of raw materials to their industries.699  The Socialists, 
meanwhile, soon regretted having supported Paul’s motion as it became apparent that, 
paradoxically, the Communists’ insistence on destroying Vichy’s bodies in fact gave more 
power to the grand patronat. 
Meanwhile, Jean Monnet was crafting his Plan de Modernisation et d’Equipement, 
which had always presupposed the continued existence of Vichy’s Organisation Committees 
and OCRPI.  As this came under threat with the appointment of a Communist Minister for 
Industrial Production openly hostile to their preservation, Monnet created parallel institutions 
that assumed the responsibilities, the data, and even the staff of the existing Organisation 
Committees.  Placing these within the CGP and directly under the auspices of the President 
rather than any ministry appealed to de Gaulle, who approved the plan days before 
announcing his resignation from what he saw as an unbearably partisan system.  This was 
done while Monnet systematically cut off communication with Paul and his ministry.  By the 
time the Organisation Committees were officially closed down in 1946, their work, their 
structure, and their leaders had been seamlessly maintained in the form of the Modernisation 
Commissions set up under Monnet’s CGP.  As part of the CGP, they were shielded from the 
changing fortunes of electoral politics and were instead allowed to pursue their work in 
technocratic peace.  In this form, they oversaw the modernisation and the revival of French 
industry.  Moreover, they advised Monnet to find a way to secure more coal from the Ruhr 
for the French steel industry, a policy ultimately realised in the form of the European Coal 
and Steel Community.  We can therefore appreciate the importance of the institutional 
wrangling between the Ministry for Industrial Production and Jean Monnet’s CGP not only 
for France but also for Europe. 
 
 
                                                          
699 The CNPF would later unanimously endorse the creation of the CGP and the Monnet Plan.  See “Assemblée 
générale du 21 juin 1947”, CNPF, 21 June 1947, AS 72 836, ANMT. 
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Conclusions 
 
This thesis has examined France’s Organisation Committees, and particularly the 
Organisation Committee for Steel (CORSID), from their inception in 1940 to their formal 
dissolution in 1946.  It has argued that French industry was reorganised in 1940 as a New 
Industrial Order with a view to facilitate Franco-German collaboration, and that the key 
institutions of the Organisation Committees, which were maintained and reformed after the 
war, were the forerunners to the Modernisation Commissions, described by Jean Monnet as 
the “keystones” of his Plan.  The study has focused on 1940-46 largely because this 
corresponds to the lifespan of the Organisation Committees.  They were formally created 
with the law of 16 August 1940, although in practice these were preceded by Liaison Offices 
which were first created in July 1940.  The Committees were ultimately dissolved with a 
legislative motion on 23 April 1946, albeit allowing for a transition period of six months, 
bringing the formal end date to 23 October 1946.  The existence of the Committees therefore 
corresponds almost exactly with the period between the end of the Third Republic on 10 July 
1940 and the establishment of the Fourth Republic on 27 October 1946,700 or l’entre-deux-
républiques.  Unfortunately, the few studies that have been published on the Committees 
focus on the Vichy period,701 while more general works that mention the Committees tend to 
treat the post-Vichy era as a parenthesis, if this phase is mentioned at all.702  By studying the 
Organisation Committees from their inception, through the various reforms imposed on them 
by the Vichy regime and the GPRF, to their dissolution in 1946, this thesis has reached some 
important conclusions concerning the legacies of the Committees as well as the 
characteristics of l’entre-deux-républiques. 
 
 
 
                                                          
700 These are the generally accepted dates for the end of the Third Republic, with the vote of the National 
Assembly granting Pétain full powers, and the adoption of the constitution of the Fourth Republic, which came 
into force on 27 October 1946 after being supported in a referendum on 13 October. 
701 The only book-length study on the Organisation Committees is an edited volume, Hervé Joly (ed.),  Les 
comités d’organisation et l’économie dirigée du régime de Vichy, (Caen: Centre de recherché d’histoire 
quantitative, 2004).  See also Henry Rousso, “L’organisation industrielle de Vichy” in Vichy. L’événement, la 
mémoire, l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), 79-109. 
702 Claire Andrieu commented on this tendency in La Banque sous l’occupation. Paradoxes de l’histoire d’une 
profession (Paris: FNSP, 1990), 128. 
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The New Industrial Order: a summing up 
This thesis challenges the standard view that the Organisation Committees were 
created without the knowledge – and much to the displeasure – of the German authorities.703  
On the contrary, virtually every element of the law of 16 August 1940 was approved by the 
German authorities ahead of time as the Committees were de facto set up in the weeks 
preceding 16 August.  Moreover, it was clearly understood by the French authorities that the 
new bodies would contribute to the “New Economic Order in Europe”704 outlined by the 
Reich in July 1940; this was also clear to the individuals who agreed to join the Committees, 
who knew that they would be expected to oversee production for the Reich.  Far from being 
an audacious policy that protected France from having to serve Germany, the creation of the 
Organisation Committees was on the contrary a means of institutionalising and formalising 
France’s economic collaboration with the Reich.  Furthermore, economic collaboration was 
at the heart of the Committees from the very beginning, not a later development that emerged 
only after Germany abandoned the Blitzkrieg and focused on building a German war 
economy.705 
1940 marked a significant turning point in the organisation of the French steel 
industry.  The standard narrative advances that the leaders of the industry remained 
unchanged through 1940, with the same leading industrialists maintaining their positions de 
facto if not de jure.706  But the dissolution of the Comité des forges, the pre-war employers’ 
association for the steel industry, and the creation of CORSID saw a decisive change in 
leadership.  Pre-war figures such as François de Wendel and Lambert Ribot were excluded 
from CORSID and were replaced by younger, managerial technicians who neither held the 
highest positions in their firms nor came from the largest companies.  This promotion of a 
new generation of technocratic leaders who had succeeded on merit rather than inheritance 
marked a notable legacy of the creation of CORSID. 
                                                          
703 Arne Radtke-Delacor, “La position des comités d’organisation face aux autorités d’occupation: la pomme de 
discorde des commandes allemandes en 1940-1941” in Hervé Joly (ed.), Les comités d’organisation, op.cit. 
704 Walther Funk, “The economic reorganization of Europe” in Walter Lipgens (ed.), Documents on the history 
of European integration. Volume I: Continental plans for European union, 1939-1945 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1985), 65-70. 
705 These arguments are presented in Chapter One. 
706 Henry Rousso, “L’organisation industrielle de Vichy” in Vichy. L’événement, la mémoire, l’histoire (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1992); Annie Lacroix-Riz, “Les comités d’organisation en Allemagne: tentative d’évaluation” in 
Hervé Joly (ed.), op.cit.; Philippe Mioche, “Le comité d’organisation de la sidérurgie: un lieu d’affrontement 
entre modernisateurs de la sidérurgie et gardiens de la profession?”, in ibid. 
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There is a consensus in the historiography that the French steel industry produced 
massively for the German war effort – perhaps not surprising given that CORSID was created 
to oversee just such efforts.  Yet CORSID cooperated to different degrees with the 
government’s policy of collaboration depending on how it affected the industry’s interests.  
CORSID, and Léon Daum in particular, embraced some innovations of the National 
Revolution, such as the creation of Social Committees, while rejecting Pétain’s demands that 
would hamper the industry, such as greater representation for SMEs.  In the case of labour 
deportations of French workers to Germany, CORSID showed itself to be particularly 
obstructive and went to great lengths to keep their workers in France.  This must not be seen 
as an act of resistance, however, since CORSID pursued this strategy to ensure that it 
maintained a sufficient number of workers to produce effectively.  They welcomed the Speer-
Bichelonne agreement in September 1943, which sought to integrate French industry even 
more closely with the Reich’s and saw the French steel industry produce vastly for the 
German war effort.  In the historiographical debate over deliberate underproduction 
(freinage), this thesis argues that CORSID did not attempt to limit French steel production in 
order to hamper the German economy.  Throughout the war, CORSID ensured that the steel 
industry supplied the Reich insofar as it remained beneficial for France’s firms. 
This thesis also sheds light on the internal debate regarding the maintenance of the 
Committees established under Vichy.  By 1943 a near-consensus had emerged that the 
Committees ought to be maintained regardless of the ideological difficulties this presented.  
For some within the Resistance this was unacceptable, but they were excluded from the 
decision-making process.  Indeed, the appointment of André Diethelm as Commissioner for 
War three months before D-Day was the result of this debate, as his opposition to maintaining 
the Organisation Committees necessitated his removal as Commissioner for Production.  This 
thesis shows how the celebrated CNR Programme, endorsed by the CFLN and by the 
Communist members of the Resistance, was only supported by all sides because it made no 
mention of the Organisation Committees.  The ratification of the GPRF’s economic policies 
by the Provisional Consultative Assembly in July 1944 was based on the popularity of the 
CNR Programme, but it also ensured that the Organisation Committees would endure well 
beyond the Liberation. 
The maintenance of the Committees was conditional on the purging of their 
leadership and on their reform, particularly to include labour representation.  In the case of 
199 
 
CORSID, however, its members were asked to resign and were then appointed to leading 
positions within the industry, preserving the influence they had gained in 1940. Aubrun 
became President of the Chambre syndicale de la sidérurgie française (CSSF) in 1944; 
Eugène Roy was named President of the Modernisation Commission for Steel in 1946; Léon 
Daum was appointed to the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community in 
1952.  For all three, the decisive turning point in their careers came with their appointment to 
CORSID in 1940.  The reforms of the Organisation Committees, meanwhile, amounted to the 
application of most of the articles of the law of 16 August 1940 that created the bodies in the 
first place.  While liberté syndicale was re-established, the inclusion of workers, the reduction 
in the number of Committees, and the roles of the bodies were all in line with the text of the 
Vichy legislation.  Ironically, parts of the law were applied more completely under de Gaulle 
than they had been under Pétain. 
By examining the Organisation Committees in the overlooked period of 1944-46, this 
thesis reveals the evolution from the Vichy-era bodies to the Modernisation Commissions of 
the Monnet Plan.  The October 1945 elections had a decisive influence on the Committees, as 
the appointment of Communist Ministers to the key economic portfolios, including Industrial 
Production, prompted Jean Monnet to establish parallel bodies, Modernisation Commissions, 
which replicated the work of the Committees but would be controlled by a supraministerial 
General Commissariat for the Plan.   When Marcel Paul abolished the Committees in 1946, 
thereby fulfilling a longstanding PCF objective, the Modernisation Commissions, originally 
meant to be provisional, became permanent and took over the Committees’ responsibilities 
and staff as they worked to modernise and revive French industry.  This thesis thus reveals a 
clear line from the 16 August 1940 law to the Monnet Plan. 
 
A pragmatic and provisional age 
Unlike previous studies of French industry and particularly the Organisation 
Committees, this thesis considers the period from the end of the Third Republic to the 
establishment of the Fourth, or l’entre-deux-républiques.  By focusing on 1940-46, this thesis 
reveals some characteristics which apply to the period as a whole.  Chief among these is the 
importance of pragmatism and provisionality.  Successive regimes made decisions on 
industrial organisation that would be seen to work in the short term in the face of direct 
problems, particularly acute material shortages.  These were understood to be pragmatic, in 
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that they would alleviate the immediate problem, and provisional, insofar as they could be 
abandoned once that immediate problem had been resolved. Since the influential writings of 
Richard Kuisel, this period has come to be seen as characterised by interest in planisme, 
suggesting that the industry was organised with a view to the long term.707  Andrew Shennan, 
meanwhile, has stressed that the theme of renewal characterised this period.708  What this 
thesis shows, however, is that the key decisions regarding the organisation of French industry 
were motivated chiefly by pragmatism and were seen as provisional.  The creation and the 
staffing of the Organisation Committees in 1940 were done hurriedly and in order to come up 
with an efficient solution to pressing issues.  Moreover, this “provisional reorganisation” was 
not meant to be a durable new order for a thousand-year regime, but was instead an 
improvised response to an immediate crisis.  Similarly, economic collaboration with the 
Reich made pragmatic sense during the war, while attempts at reshaping the New Industrial 
Order to conform to the regime’s nebulous ideological project fell flat.  Throughout the war, 
short-term pragmatism trumped long-term renewal, despite the rhetorical emphasis on the 
latter.  Indeed, with the future so uncertain at various stages of the war and with material 
shortages remaining a persistent problem, the Committees’ priority was keeping factories 
running rather than five-year plans for the modernisation of industrial equipment.  
This tendency towards the pragmatic and the provisional was clear within the 
Resistance as well, even as they discussed plans for the future and the renewal of France in 
the post-war era.  In Algiers, the CFLN weighed the ideological merits of abolishing the 
Committees created by Vichy but soon concluded that their practical purpose would be 
invaluable in a liberated France and they were maintained.  The reform of these bodies was 
similarly carried out by the Provisional Government with a view to maintaining efficiency 
and causing the least possible disruption to French industry.  However desirable their 
dissolution might have been on ideological grounds, the shortage of materials and the 
disruption caused by the war would require the provisional maintenance of the Committees.  
Even the Modernisation Commissions, the “keystones” of French planisme, were initially 
                                                          
707 Richard Kuisel, “Vichy et les origines de la planification économique, 1940-1946” in Mouvement social, 98, 
January-March 1977, 77-101.  These are also addressed in his monograph, Le capitalisme et l’Etat en France.  
Richard Vinen similarly argues that the Committees “fit into a post-war perspective of planisme and 
modernization”.  See Vinen, The politics of French business (Cambridge: CUP, 1991), 141. 
708 Andrew Shennan, Rethinking France: Plans for Renewal 1940-1946 (Oxford: OUP, 1989). Others have 
instead emphasised the “restoration” of France, albeit by focusing on the post-1944 era. See Jean Bouvier and 
François Bloch-Lainé, La France restaurée (Paris: Fayard, 1986) and William Hitchcock, France Restored: Cold 
War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1998). 
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only meant to exist for six months; it was the decision in April 1946 to dissolve the 
Committees that prompted calls for the maintenance of the Commissions to carry out the 
defunct bodies’ work on a more permanent basis.   
After 1946, this preference for the pragmatic and the provisional was affected by a 
number of factors.  The French economy was recovering and the shortages that had 
characterised l’entre-deux-républiques were coming to an end.  This coincided with the 
beginning of the Marshall Plan in 1947, which further stabilised the economy and helped 
establish the conditions in which longer-term planning in France was possible. That same 
year, the emergence of the Cold War in France introduced a more predictable international 
order which similarly contributed to the ability of politicians and civil servants to plan for the 
long term.  As the economic and political instability that had characterised l’entre-deux-
républiques came to an end, so too did the reliance on the pragmatic and the provisional.  Of 
course, ideology shaped a number of key decisions during this period, and it is not always 
possible to neatly divide the pragmatic from the ideological.  The decision to nationalise key 
industries, for instance, was motivated in large part by ideology and was not seen as a 
provisional measure.  On the other hand, arriving at a consensus on a post-war programme 
for France was certainly a pragmatic objective, and few were naïve enough to think that such 
a consensus stretching across the political spectrum could be much more than provisional.  
Furthermore, ideology was often used to justify pragmatic actions, from applying a veneer of 
National Revolution rhetoric to the creation of the Committees to Monnet’s conscientious 
propaganda campaign in favour of the “democratic” Modernisation Commissions.709   
 A final observation based on the study of this period is the tendency of industrialists 
in particular to oppose change.  While many industrialists were initially wary of the new 
Organisation Committees, they defended the New Industrial Order consistently throughout 
the period of study, despite the fact that it had been created without their consultation.  
Attempts by Pétain to reform the Committees in line with the National Revolution in 1941 
were neutralised and the composition of CORSID remained strikingly consistent throughout 
the war, with only a single change to its membership with the addition of another 
industrialist, Pierre Francou, in September 1941.  In December 1944, Aubrun pleaded at 
length for the maintenance of the system as it existed, offering little more than token 
compromises.  In April 1946, employers were furious when the National Assembly decided 
                                                          
709 The latter is discussed in a note by Jean Monnet. “Note du 7 décembre”, dated 8 December 1946, AMM 2 1 
15, FJME.   
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to abolish the Committees.  Throughout the period, industrialists clung to the New Industrial 
Order and defended it – particularly behind closed doors – until the end.  Their support for 
the Monnet Plan was no doubt bolstered by the continuity offered in the form of the 
Modernisation Commissions, which in the case of the steel industry in particular maintained 
the role of and many individuals from CORSID. 
 This period highlights how new institutions that were purported to be of short 
duration and were couched in terms of pragmatism were successfully created and maintained.  
Indeed, the law of 16 August 1940, reportedly hammered out over a weekend in Vichy, 
outlasted the more ambitious Labour Charter, which was bogged down in 15 months of 
discussions.  When debating whether to maintain the Committees after the Liberation, the 
CFLN (and indeed former minister Pierre Pucheu) stressed that the bodies had been created 
out of practical necessity, and that preserving them was justified on the same grounds.  Yet it 
was agreed that the maintenance of the Committtees would be provisional – an ill-defined 
caveat that doubtless made it easier for résistants to accept the proposal.  Indeed, Monnet 
seems to have been aware that it is easier to sell provisional plans and then extend their life, 
rather than pitch a long-term plan to wary politicians.  He admitted in February 1946 that “the 
administration accepted this method because it knows that the Commissariat and the 
Commissions will disappear in six months”.710  The fact that the Commissariat instead lasted 
until 2006 shows that purportedly short-term, pragmatic initiatives can often outlast grander 
projects geared towards national renewal.711 
 
Epilogue: d’une Europe l’autre 
 By demonstrating the important continuities between Vichy’s New Industrial Order 
and the “keystones” of the Monnet Plan, this thesis sheds some light on the origins of 
European integration.  Preparing the first report of the Conseil du Plan, Monnet wrote a note 
explaining to the members (drawn from all the major political parties) the centrality of coal 
and steel for France’s reconstruction: 
                                                          
710 Untitled document by Monnet beginning with “Les raisons pour lesquelles je considère qu’il n’est pas 
possible de rattacher le plan à l’économie nationale”, 12 February 1946, AMF 1 3, FJME. 
711 The Commissariat Général du Plan formally existed until 2006, when it was transformed into the Centre 
d’Analyse Stratégique (CAS).  The CAS was then turned into the Commissariat Général à la Stratégie et à la 
Prospective (CGSP) in 2013. 
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I would like to draw the Council’s attention to the fact that without a strong steel 
industry, there is no strong economy.  There is no strong steel industry without coking 
coal in sufficient quantities.  Well, we do not have this coal and we can only get it 
from the Ruhr.712 
He stressed this point throughout the document, concluding that “our steel industry needs 
coal from the Ruhr. Our economy needs coal from the Ruhr”.713  Indeed, the chronic shortage 
of coal and unsuccessful attempts to secure greater quantities from Germany for the French 
steel industry is another characteristic of l’entre-deux-républiques.  When Monnet first wrote 
de Gaulle setting out the details of the Plan, he explained that his projected production levels 
for French industry in 1946 depended “on one essential condition, namely that German coal 
arrives in sufficient quantities”.714  In the same document he explained that “France’s weight 
in the world will depend on the extent to which we can increase our production”.715  By 
February 1946, Monnet warned that “the lack of coal threatens to halt the expansion of 
French industry” and called for “a change in the quantity of coal allocated to the steel 
industry” to increase production in that sector.716 
 Unsurprisingly, the first Modernisation Commission to be created was that for coal.  
At the first meeting of the Conseil du Plan, the Commission was given “as its first task […] 
to calculate how much coal France needs, and to publish it in order to inform French and 
international opinion and to thus support the French government’s legitimate requests to the 
Allied governments that greater quantities of coal from the Ruhr be sent to France”.717  It is 
telling that the first task given to the first Modernisation Commission was essentially to try to 
secure more coal from the Ruhr for French industry.  The great weakness of the Monnet Plan 
was that its ambitious targets for French production in steel and other industries was entirely 
dependent on coking coal from outside of France, namely the Ruhr.  France’s vaunted 
recovery could only be realised if it received sufficient coal from the Ruhr. 
Within two years, Monnet recognised that France’s modernisation was struggling.  In 
April 1948 he wrote a letter to then Prime Minister Georges Bidault, explaining that despite 
the “increased production thanks to the application of the Plan de Modernisation, […] the 
national effort of different countries on their current foundations will not, in my opinion, be 
                                                          
712 “Ensemble de six pages de notes diverses ayant servi à l’élaboration du premier rapport”, 11 March 1946, 
AMF 2 1, FJME. 
713 Ibid. 
714 “Note de Jean Monnet pour de Gaulle”, 11 November 1945, AMF 1 6, FJME. 
715 Ibid. 
716 “L’amélioration de la productivité, clef du relèvement français”, 11 February 1946, AMF 1 6, FJME. 
717 “Premier projet memorandum Jean Monnet pour le Conseil”, 13 January 1946, AMF 2 1, FJME. 
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sufficient”.  He concluded that a “federation of the west” of Europe was the only solution.718  
That same day, he also wrote to then Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, explaining that “we 
expose ourselves to bitter disappointment in thinking that Marshall credits will continue for 
long if Europe cannot quickly demonstrate increased and modernised production”.  Again, he 
concluded that to do so required “a veritable European effort that only the existence of a 
federation of the West would make possible”.719  These letters show how the Monnet Plan led 
logically to plans for European union.720   
Of course it helped that Monnet had already been predisposed to European 
federalism.  In August 1943 he had written that “the countries of Europe are too small to 
assure their peoples the prosperity that modern conditions made possible and consequently 
necessary.  They need larger markets.  It is equally important that they not use an important 
portion of their resources to maintain so-called ‘key’ industries, necessitated by the form of 
‘nationally sovereign’ states”.721  That same year, Blum-Picard, then Economic Advisor to de 
Gaulle, had proposed a solution to obtaining sufficient quantities of German coal.  In a report 
he prepared in December 1943, and which he sent to Monnet in July 1944, Blum-Picard 
observed that “there is, in Europe, an issue of “coal” and “coke”, which are intimately linked 
to the issue of cast iron and steel. We lack coking coal” in France, limiting the capacity of the 
nation’s steel industry.  Blum-Picard therefore proposed a “Western Union”, pooling the coal 
of the Low Countries, France, and parts of Germany (Saarland and Aachen) to “supply all the 
coke for the metallurgical industries” of the participating countries.  He noted that the Ruhr 
was “too essential for the entire German economy” for it to be detached from the country and 
added to the Union, a position with which Monnet clearly disagreed.  Nevertheless, Blum-
Picard argued that “it is therefore with a European economic organisation that the issue of 
steel will be resolved”, even adding that “this trust will be subject to a European international 
authority”.722  By 1950, it seemed clear that the way of solving France’s industrial model, 
which depended on French steel which itself depended on coking coal from the Ruhr, was by 
pooling the coal and steel industries of France and Germany.  The Schuman Declaration, 
                                                          
718 “Lettre de Jean Monnet à G. Bidault”, 18 April 1948, AMF 22 1, FJME. 
719 “Lettre de Jean Monnet à Robert Schuman”, 18 April 1948, AMF 22 1, FJME. 
720 It should be noted that these letters also cite the security concerns, implicitly fears of the Soviet Union, 
which prompted France to propose the path of European union. 
721 “Note de réflexion de Jean Monnet”, 5 August 1943, AME 33 1, FJME. 
722 “Sur l’organisation de l’Europe d’après-guerre”, Blum-Picard, 1 December 1943, AME 56 2, FJME.  This 
report was sent to Monnet in July 1944; see “Lettre de Blum-Picard à Monnet”, 12 July 1944, AME 56 2, FJME. 
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written by Jean Monnet and pronounced by Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, proposed 
precisely that. 
The literature on France’s post-war economy and the origins of the ECSC highlight 
the link between the Monnet Plan and the Schuman Plan.  According to Frances Lynch: 
The particular forms which [post-war European] integration took were more a 
response to the problems of French economic development which could not be solved 
within the purely national framework.  Thus the Schuman Plan addressed the problem 
which a relatively small, protected steel industry was seen to have created for French 
manufacturing industry and for French security in the interwar period.  Building on 
the investment in the steel industry undertaken within the framework of the Monnet 
Plan and made possible by Marshall Aid, the Schuman Plan aimed to make the French 
steel industry compete in western Europe.  In return the French steel industry was to 
be guaranteed access to the coal and coke resources of the Ruhr on equal terms with 
the West German steel industry.723  
As Lynch demonstrates, the Schuman Plan was essentially an outgrowth of the Monnet Plan, 
as France’s national strategy for its economy outgrew the confines of the nation state and 
required greater access to coal from the Ruhr.  In his memoirs Robert Marjolin, one of 
Monnet’s closest collaborators, acknowledged that “the functional model of the Monnet Plan 
was transposed to the European level” with the creation of the ECSC.724  Indeed, Monnet’s 
strategy of developing a project in relative secrecy and receiving support from a powerful 
patron – de Gaulle in 1946 and Schuman in 1950 – before springing it on unsuspecting 
colleagues and public opinion, was used in creating both the Monnet Plan and the ECSC.  
Understanding the origins of the Monnet Plan therefore adds to our knowledge of the 
beginnings of European integration.  
There is an important literature on the continuities between Vichy and the Fourth 
Republic in France, beginning especially with the ground-breaking work of Robert Paxton.725  
The historiography on the origins of European integration and on post-war France, 
meanwhile, emphasises that the European Coal and Steel Community was fundamentally a 
French initiative, with France playing the decisive role.726  These two bodies of work tend to 
remain separate, however, as the former tends to remain national in scope, while the standard 
                                                          
723 Frances Lynch, France and the International Economy (London: Routledge, 1997), 214. 
724 Robert Marjolin, Le travail d’une vie. Mémoires 1911-1986 (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1986). 
725 Robert Paxton, Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order, 1940-1944 (New York: Knopf, 1972). 
726 See, for example, Dirk Spierenburg and Raymond Poidevin, The History of the High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community. Supranationality in Motion (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994) ; 
Frances Lynch, op.cit.; William Hitchcock, France Restored, op.cit.; Michael Sutton, France and the Construction 
of Europe, 1944-2007 (New York: Berghahn, 2007). 
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narrative of European integration history considers 1945 as “l’année zéro”,727 an approach 
which a priori obscures the continuities from Vichy to the European Coal and Steel 
Community.728  Given the continuities analysed in this thesis from Vichy to the Monnet Plan, 
and the extent to which the ECSC was an extension of the latter, this gap deserves to be 
closed.  This thesis suggests some ways in which this could be done. 
First, the harmonisation of Franco-German steel specifications that occurred during 
the war and endured until at least 1945 is potentially very important.  Further research is 
needed to determine whether these specifications were maintained in both countries in the 
years following the end of the war.  If so, this would doubtlessly mean that the pooling of the 
French and German steel industries after 1950 was in fact facilitated by the measures taken 
by French industrialists under Vichy to “harmonise” the nation’s industry with the Reich’s in 
the context of an integrated European economy.  While such a claim cannot be conclusively 
made without further research on the 1945-1950 period, such a finding would re-evaluate our 
understanding of the origins of the ECSC. 
Second, the structure of the European Coal and Steel Community can be traced back 
to its forerunner at the national level, the CGP. Like the Council of the CGP, the High 
Authority oversaw the modernisation of the steel industry, allocation of coal, and increased 
production. Just as Monnet ensured that the CGP was separate from the Ministries, with their 
competing interests and changing leadership, the High Authority was staffed with figures 
who would act in the common interests of the Community rather than those of their particular 
states.  The inclusion of trade unionist Paul Finet on the High Authority and the creation of 
the tripartite Consultative Committee similarly echoed the inclusion of labour in Monnet’s 
Modernisation Committees.729  Likewise, the High Authority’s Directorates General for Coal 
and Steel were essentially supranational projections of the Modernisation Commissions for 
those industries.  Given that the “keystones” of the Monnet Plan were in fact based on the 
Organisation Committees established in 1940, this means that we can trace a clear line from 
                                                          
727 For a recent example, see Sylvain Kahn, Histoire de la construction européenne de l’Europe depuis 1945 
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2011).   
728 There is a small number of works that attempt to bridge this gap to some extent, but they tend to suffer 
from significant limitations.  Antonin Cohen’s De Vichy à la Communauté européenne (Paris: PUF, 2012) makes 
the case for ideological continuities between Vichy’s National Revolution and the post-war European project, 
but treats economic issues only superficially.  Meanwhile, John Laughland’s The Tainted Source. The 
Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea (London: Warner Books, 1997) is a muddled and politically-
motivated attempt to trace the origins of the EU to Hitler’s New Order. 
729 Paul Finet was Secretary General of the Fédération générale du travail de Belgique, one of the two main 
trade union federations in Belgium, until his appointment to the High Authority in 1952.  
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the law of 16 August 1940 to the architecture of the ECSC.  The fact that further institutions, 
notably the Council, were added to the ECSC (mostly at the instance of Dutch negotiators) 
does not dilute the continuities from the CGP to the High Authority of the ECSC. 
Third, the continuities of individuals are just as striking if we extend the narrative to 
the establishment of the ECSC in 1952.  France sent two representatives to the High 
Authority in Luxembourg: Jean Monnet and Léon Daum.  Curiously, the more controversial 
of the two was apparently Monnet, as a number of German industrialists voiced their 
concerns that he was not sufficiently sensitive to the particular issues facing the Saarland.730  
Nobody seems to have objected to the presence of Daum, who a decade before the Schuman 
Declaration was being championed by Pierre Laval in Vichy for the position of Minister for 
Industrial Production and who spent the war overseeing France’s steel production for the 
German war economy.  At least one other member of the High Authority of the ECSC was 
also involved in wartime plans for Franco-German industrial integration: Karl-Maria Hettlage 
was an advisor to Albert Speer when the Speer-Bichelonne agreement was reached.731  While 
the very top figures responsible for the creation of the ECSC, from Jean Monnet to Konrad 
Adenauer, generally had credentials of wartime Resistance, digging slightly deeper reveals 
interesting continuities that transcend l’année zéro.      
In a famous article, David Reynolds argued that the Fall of France fundamentally 
reordered international politics, calling it the “fulcrum of the twentieth century”.732  
Correspondingly, this thesis argues that the Fall of France reshaped French industrial 
organisation decisively and enduringly.  Two of the most significant economic projects to 
blossom in post-war France and Europe – the Monnet Plan and the Schuman Plan, 
respectively – were in fact rooted in France’s années noires.  By studying the organisation of 
the French steel industry during l’entre-deux-républiques, this thesis shows how the 
provisional and pragmatic law of 16 August 1940 laid the institutional foundations for 
France’s Trente glorieuses and for the European Union.  
 
                                                          
730 “Lettre de Filliol”, 18 June 1952, P 6353, MAE. 
731 See Mauve Carbonell, “Karl-Maria Hettlage (1902-1995): un expert au service de l’Europe et des 
Allemagnes” in Journal of European Integration History, 23:1, 2006, 67-85. 
732 David Reynolds, “1940: fulcrum of the twentieth century?” in International Affairs, 66:2, 1990, 325-250. 
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